Syllabus
Name of the course: The Self
Instructor: Ferenc Huoranszki
Number of credits: 4
Semester: Fall, 2021, Monday 15.40-17.20; Tuesday, 8.50-10.30
Course level: PhD open for MA
Prerequisites: None
Teaching format: Seminar
Course description: Theories of the Self have played a prominent role in modern philosophical inquiry at least since Descartes. In this course, we are going to discuss four interrelated philosophical problems about the Self: (1) the metaphysical question concerning the nature and continued existence of the Self (2) the semantic problem of how someone can identify oneself as oneself (3) the epistemic question about how conscious beings can have knowledge about their own actions and their own mind (4) and finally, the question about whether, and if yes how, we can self-determine our own actions and beliefs. One of the central aims of the course shall be to uncover the connection between these problems and the theories of rational and free agency.
Learning outcomes: Students attending this course are expected to familiarize themselves with the most important issues concerning philosophical problems involving the concept of the Self, such as the question about the persistence of the self; the logic of self-reference; the peculiarities of self-knowledge and self-interpretation; and the extent to which conscious agents can self-determine their own actions and beliefs. By following this course students can significantly broaden their knowledge in metaphysics, philosophical semantics as well as in certain areas of epistemology. They are expected to learn how to reconstruct and analyze philosophical positions about the issue of the Self, how to understand the validity and soundness of arguments about it and how to identify background principles in different theories of the Self. Finally, they are also expected to improve their oral communication skills such as the ability to formulate arguments concisely and accessibly in words and to give short critical comments.
Assessment: Students’ performance shall be evaluated on the following grounds. First, students are required to attend classes regularly and to participate actively in seminar discussions. Second, students are required to give one or two short presentations of some chosen topic(s). The choice of topic is optional, but overlap should be avoided. Thirdly, students are required to submit a 4 000-word long term-paper. The chosen topic should be approved by the instructor and presented in the last class of the course. The main component of evaluation is the quality of the term paper, but the overall result can be improved by good presentations and by active participation in discussions.
Deadline for submitting term papers: January 10, 2022.
Grading criteria: Students should be able to make comments on the texts they have read and respond to the presentations of other students. Their presentation must include the logical reconstruction of the main arguments of the relevant article/chapter and, possibly, critical remarks or questions for discussion. Students are also expected to prepare and distribute a maximum two-page long hand-out that they distribute before their presentation. The topic of the paper can be either a careful critical reconstruction of a particular and important argument for some position discussed in the course; or a comparison between competing arguments about alternative solutions to a problem; or a defense of some particular position/argument against some relevant criticism. References can, but need not, go beyond the material included into the mandatory readings.
Topics and Readings
Part I: Identity and self-reference
WEEK 1: EARLY MODERN ACCOUNTS OF THE SELF: DESCARTES AND LOCKE
• Descartes, R., 1641/1984, “Second Meditation” and “Fourth Meditation”, in Cottingham, Stoothoff and Murdoch (trans.), The Philosophical Writings of Descartes Volume II, 16–24; 37–44, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Locke, J., 1689/1975, “Of Identity and Diversity”, Book Two, Chapter XVII in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, P.H. Nidditch (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
WEEK 2: EARLY 20TH CENTURIES ACCOUNTS OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS
• Ryle, Gilbert, 1949, “Self-Knowledge”, in The Concept of Mind, 136–178, New York: Barnes and Noble.
• Strawson, P. F., 1959, “Persons”, in Individuals, 87–116, London: Routledge.
WEEK 3: PERSONS AND SELVES
• Parfit, Derek, 1984, “How we are not what we believe”, in Reasons and Persons, 219–243, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• McDowell, John, 1997, “Reductionism and the First Person”, in Dancy, Jonathan (ed.), 1997, Reading Parfit, 230–250, Oxford: Blackwell.
WEEK 4: SELF-REFERENCE
• Anscombe, G.E.M., 1975, “The First Person”, in Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), Mind & Language: Wolfson College Lectures 1974, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 45–65.
• Evans, G. 1982, “Self-Identification”, in The Varieties of Reference, edited by John McDowell, 205–255. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
WEEK 5: SELF-IDENTIFICATION
• O’Brien, Lucy, 1995, “The Problem of Self-Identification”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 95: 235–251.
• Pryor, James, 1999, “Immunity to Error Through Misidentification”, Philosophical Topics, 26(1&2): 271–304.
WEEK 6: THE UBIQUITY OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS
• Lewis, David, 1979, “Attitudes De Dicto and De Se”, The Philosophical Review, 88(4): 513–543.
• Kapitan, Tomis, 1999, “The Ubiquity of Self-Awareness”, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 57: 17–44.
Part II: Self-knowledge and self-determination
WEEK 7: PERCEIVING OUR OWN MIND
• Armstrong, David, 1968/1993, “Introspection”, in A Materialist Theory of Mind, 323–338, London: Routledge.
• Shoemaker, David, 1986, “Introspection and the self”, Midwest Studies of Philosophy, X, 101–120.
WEEK 8: RATIONALITY AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE
• Shoemaker, David, 1988, “On Knowing One’s Own Mind”, Philosophical Perspectives 2: 183–209.
• Burge, Tyler, 1996, “Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 96: 91–116.
WEEK 9: INTENTIONS AND SELF-UNDERSTANDING
• Velleman, J. David, 1989, Practical Reflection, 15–77. Princeton: Princeton UP.
• Wilson, George, “Proximal Practical Foresight”, 2000, Philosophical Studies 99 (2000): 3–19.
WEEK 10: KNOWING WHAT ONE DOES
• Stuart Hampshire & H. L. A. Hart, 1958, “Decision, intention and certainty”, Mind 67 (265):1-12.
• O’Brien, Lucy, 2007, “On Knowing One’s Own Actions” in Self-Knowing Agents, 156–190, OUP.
WEEK 11: AGENCY AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE
• Boyle, Matthew, “Two Kinds of Self-Knowledge”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 78: 133–164.
• Moran, Richard, 2012, “Self-Knowledge, 'Transparency', and the Forms of Activity”, in Introspection and Consciousness, ed. Declan Smithies and Daniel Stoljar. Oxford University Press (OUP).
WEEK 12: SELF-DETERMINATION
• Boyle, Matthew, 2011, “‘Making up your mind’ and the activity of reason”. Philosophers' Imprint 11(17): 1-24.
Name of the course: The Self
Instructor: Ferenc Huoranszki
Number of credits: 4
Semester: Fall, 2021, Monday 15.40-17.20; Tuesday, 8.50-10.30
Course level: PhD open for MA
Prerequisites: None
Teaching format: Seminar
Course description: Theories of the Self have played a prominent role in modern philosophical inquiry at least since Descartes. In this course, we are going to discuss four interrelated philosophical problems about the Self: (1) the metaphysical question concerning the nature and continued existence of the Self (2) the semantic problem of how someone can identify oneself as oneself (3) the epistemic question about how conscious beings can have knowledge about their own actions and their own mind (4) and finally, the question about whether, and if yes how, we can self-determine our own actions and beliefs. One of the central aims of the course shall be to uncover the connection between these problems and the theories of rational and free agency.
Learning outcomes: Students attending this course are expected to familiarize themselves with the most important issues concerning philosophical problems involving the concept of the Self, such as the question about the persistence of the self; the logic of self-reference; the peculiarities of self-knowledge and self-interpretation; and the extent to which conscious agents can self-determine their own actions and beliefs. By following this course students can significantly broaden their knowledge in metaphysics, philosophical semantics as well as in certain areas of epistemology. They are expected to learn how to reconstruct and analyze philosophical positions about the issue of the Self, how to understand the validity and soundness of arguments about it and how to identify background principles in different theories of the Self. Finally, they are also expected to improve their oral communication skills such as the ability to formulate arguments concisely and accessibly in words and to give short critical comments.
Assessment: Students’ performance shall be evaluated on the following grounds. First, students are required to attend classes regularly and to participate actively in seminar discussions. Second, students are required to give one or two short presentations of some chosen topic(s). The choice of topic is optional, but overlap should be avoided. Thirdly, students are required to submit a 4 000-word long term-paper. The chosen topic should be approved by the instructor and presented in the last class of the course. The main component of evaluation is the quality of the term paper, but the overall result can be improved by good presentations and by active participation in discussions.
Deadline for submitting term papers: January 10, 2022.
Grading criteria: Students should be able to make comments on the texts they have read and respond to the presentations of other students. Their presentation must include the logical reconstruction of the main arguments of the relevant article/chapter and, possibly, critical remarks or questions for discussion. Students are also expected to prepare and distribute a maximum two-page long hand-out that they distribute before their presentation. The topic of the paper can be either a careful critical reconstruction of a particular and important argument for some position discussed in the course; or a comparison between competing arguments about alternative solutions to a problem; or a defense of some particular position/argument against some relevant criticism. References can, but need not, go beyond the material included into the mandatory readings.
Topics and Readings
Part I: Identity and self-reference
WEEK 1: EARLY MODERN ACCOUNTS OF THE SELF: DESCARTES AND LOCKE
• Descartes, R., 1641/1984, “Second Meditation” and “Fourth Meditation”, in Cottingham, Stoothoff and Murdoch (trans.), The Philosophical Writings of Descartes Volume II, 16–24; 37–44, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Locke, J., 1689/1975, “Of Identity and Diversity”, Book Two, Chapter XVII in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, P.H. Nidditch (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
WEEK 2: EARLY 20TH CENTURIES ACCOUNTS OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS
• Ryle, Gilbert, 1949, “Self-Knowledge”, in The Concept of Mind, 136–178, New York: Barnes and Noble.
• Strawson, P. F., 1959, “Persons”, in Individuals, 87–116, London: Routledge.
WEEK 3: PERSONS AND SELVES
• Parfit, Derek, 1984, “How we are not what we believe”, in Reasons and Persons, 219–243, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• McDowell, John, 1997, “Reductionism and the First Person”, in Dancy, Jonathan (ed.), 1997, Reading Parfit, 230–250, Oxford: Blackwell.
WEEK 4: SELF-REFERENCE
• Anscombe, G.E.M., 1975, “The First Person”, in Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), Mind & Language: Wolfson College Lectures 1974, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 45–65.
• Evans, G. 1982, “Self-Identification”, in The Varieties of Reference, edited by John McDowell, 205–255. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
WEEK 5: SELF-IDENTIFICATION
• O’Brien, Lucy, 1995, “The Problem of Self-Identification”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 95: 235–251.
• Pryor, James, 1999, “Immunity to Error Through Misidentification”, Philosophical Topics, 26(1&2): 271–304.
WEEK 6: THE UBIQUITY OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS
• Lewis, David, 1979, “Attitudes De Dicto and De Se”, The Philosophical Review, 88(4): 513–543.
• Kapitan, Tomis, 1999, “The Ubiquity of Self-Awareness”, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 57: 17–44.
Part II: Self-knowledge and self-determination
WEEK 7: PERCEIVING OUR OWN MIND
• Armstrong, David, 1968/1993, “Introspection”, in A Materialist Theory of Mind, 323–338, London: Routledge.
• Shoemaker, David, 1986, “Introspection and the self”, Midwest Studies of Philosophy, X, 101–120.
WEEK 8: RATIONALITY AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE
• Shoemaker, David, 1988, “On Knowing One’s Own Mind”, Philosophical Perspectives 2: 183–209.
• Burge, Tyler, 1996, “Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 96: 91–116.
WEEK 9: INTENTIONS AND SELF-UNDERSTANDING
• Velleman, J. David, 1989, Practical Reflection, 15–77. Princeton: Princeton UP.
• Wilson, George, “Proximal Practical Foresight”, 2000, Philosophical Studies 99 (2000): 3–19.
WEEK 10: KNOWING WHAT ONE DOES
• Stuart Hampshire & H. L. A. Hart, 1958, “Decision, intention and certainty”, Mind 67 (265):1-12.
• O’Brien, Lucy, 2007, “On Knowing One’s Own Actions” in Self-Knowing Agents, 156–190, OUP.
WEEK 11: AGENCY AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE
• Boyle, Matthew, “Two Kinds of Self-Knowledge”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 78: 133–164.
• Moran, Richard, 2012, “Self-Knowledge, 'Transparency', and the Forms of Activity”, in Introspection and Consciousness, ed. Declan Smithies and Daniel Stoljar. Oxford University Press (OUP).
WEEK 12: SELF-DETERMINATION
• Boyle, Matthew, 2011, “‘Making up your mind’ and the activity of reason”. Philosophers' Imprint 11(17): 1-24.
- Instructor: Ferenc Huoranszki