It was really interesting reading. It is surprising that people tend to regard abnormal events as more causal in certain cases. I also found it very interesting when Jonathan presented a parallel topic in the research club (when A and B cause C but B is evil).
Although abnormal situations also include the case where B is evil, and I think an adapted version of the same model will be used in the new study, I would like to hear more of Jonathan’s thoughts on the relationship between the two topics.
Also, this phenomenon makes me think about the functionality of causal understanding in general. I could not quite understand how we can place this phenomenon in the big picture to understand causal understanding.
It is stated in the paper that certain counterfactuals are treated as in some way more relevant than others. However, I did not fully understand what determines the relevancy.
When we examine causal perception in infants, we are usually looking at statistically "normal" events. But here we are talking about how individuals can interpret statistically or prescriptively abnormal events more causally. What does this mean from a developmental perspective?
Also, how is it related to the "explaining away" pattern?
And can you explain more about the "abnormal deflation”?