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SHORT LOAN

Zhivago's Children

The Last Russian Intelligentsia

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prologue

The Fate of Zhivago's Intelligentsia

In December 1955 the Russian poet Boris Pasternak, from the austere study at his country house in Peredelkino, near Moscow, exulted in a letter to a friend about the novel he had just finished: "You cannot imagine what I have achieved! I have found and given names to all this sorcery that has been the cause of suffering, bafflement, amazement, and dispute for several decades. Everything is named in simple, transparent, and sad words. I also once again renewed and redefined the dearest and most important things: land and sky, great passion, creative spirit, life and death."[1] Those themes were tragically connected with Pasternak's own life, and with the fate of thousands of Russian intellectuals and artists in the era of Soviet revolutionary violence and terror.

Boris Pasternak was born in Moscow into an assimilated Jewish family in 1890. His mother, Rozalia Kaufman, was a gifted pianist and his father, Leonid Pasternak, a prominent artist. The Pasternak family belonged to the creative milieu of Moscow, and young Boris grew up surrounded by professional musicians and artists, but also novelists and poets. His mother counted among her friends Sergei Rachmaninoff and Alexander Scriabin. Leonid Pasternak, who was acquainted with Lev Tolstoy, produced one of the finest portraits of the great writer. The parents saw their artistic endeavors as part of the larger civic and cultural mission of the Russian intelligentsia. The intelligentsia, a cultural phenomenon that had emerged in tsarist

Russia by the middle of the nineteenth century, was not a specific social group with distinct boundaries or definable characteristics that could be measured. As a rule, those who identified with the intelligentsia in the early twentieth century stood in opposition to the tsarist state and welcomed the revolutions of 1905 and 1917. Many Russian intellectuals and artists believed that the emancipation of society from the authoritarian state would usher in an era of unparalleled creativity.[2] Like the majority of intellectuals, artists, and university students in the early 1900s, the Pasternak family longed for the social and cultural emancipation of Russia from the absolute autocracy of the tsars and the power of a corrupt bureaucracy. Leonid Pasternak, despite his cultural assimilation, refused to renounce his Jewish roots and be baptized. Little Boris, however, accompanied his Russian nanny Akulina, a deeply religious woman, to Orthodox church services.[3] He imbibed the mystical Byzantine atmosphere of old Moscow, with its hundreds of cathedrals and little churches, its black-cloaked, bearded priests and monks, the long Orthodox liturgies, the beautiful choral singing, and the languorous effect of incense. He never lost that early connection to the world of Byzantine-Russian faith, which many years later was to save him.

Pasternak studied German philosophy in Marburg and had begun to write poetry by the time Russia entered the war against Austria-Hungary and Germany in 1914. After an initial outburst of patriotic fervor, the mood of the country turned to anger against the tsarist regime as the carnage mounted. The Great War sealed the fate of those who, like the Pasternaks, identified with the Russian intelligentsia. When revolution broke out in Petrograd in March 1917, cheering crowds of people welcomed it as "the dawn of freedom." The Pasternak family, like many of their friends, believed that Russia not only would win the war but would join the family of Western democracies. Soon, however, these dreams were crushed by the stark reality of anarchy, mob violence, and economic disintegration. In October 1917 a group of socialist extremists led by Lenin and Trotsky toppled the well-meaning and liberal, but ineffectual, Provisional Government. In Boris Pasternak's eyes, the Russian Revolution represented an extension of natural forces, the awakening of the people's spiritual strength, and a leap into the unknown. But as Russia descended into bloody chaos, Pasternak remained above the fray. In 1921 he published a book of love lyrics, written in a strikingly new language and employing brilliant and original verse forms. Seen as according with the revolutionary times, the poems met with acclaim from the best Russian poets, including Anna Akhmatova, Marina Tsvetaeva, Osip Mandelstam, and Vladimir Mayakovsky.

As the Bolshevik rulers moved to consolidate the new order in Russia, they began to destroy the most essential components of Pasternak's milieu: freedom for individual creativity, sources of nonstate support for intellectual and artistic undertakings, and opportunities for civic solidarity and intellectual dissent. The Bolsheviks arrested, murdered, and forced into exile thousands of nobles, clergy, bourgeois, and educated professionals—the groups from which the intelligentsia had emerged. Even more than the tsarist government, Lenin and his associates regarded the intelligentsia as a social class and as a dangerous political opposition movement. The early Bolshevik years, marked as they were by terror, civil war, and rampant violence at every level of society, took a terrible toll on Russia's intellectuals and artists. Petrograd, the capital of Russia before the Revolution, suffered especially heavy losses. By 1923 half the membership of the Russian Academy of Sciences had died, emigrated, or been expelled by the regime. From 1921 to 1923 Lenin's government, apprehensive about the intelligentsia's capacity to generate anti-Bolshevik sentiment, expelled a sizable number of intellectuals, university professors, philosophers, economists, writers, and journalists from Soviet Russia.[4] Others emigrated to return to normal life and continue their education—among them Pasternak's sister Josephine, who moved to Berlin. In September 1921 Pasternak's father, mother, and younger sister Lidia left for Germany as well. In 1923 Pasternak stayed with them in Berlin, but then returned to Moscow. He would never see them again.

Waves of arrests among intellectuals who did not support Bolshevik rule continued, despite the advertised liberalization of the New Economic Policy (NEP). At first, it seemed possible to live outside politics and maintain a relative cultural autonomy from the regime. Also, many young artists were attracted to the cultural projects that Bolsheviks had initiated and supported. These projects sought to promote a new proletarian culture and build a bridge between the "bourgeois" cultural legacy of the old Russia and the masses. The state-sponsored "enlightenment" policy received enormous social support from workers who had tasted the fruits of knowledge and were eager to express themselves in novel artistic forms within the revolutionary cultural framework. The people from these movements, usually party members, enjoyed the patronage of intellectuals in the Bolshevik Old

Guard, among them Nikolai Bukharin, Anatoly Lunacharsky, and Georgy Chicherin. Pasternak and many young intellectuals and artists who had been educated in prerevolutionary universities and nurtured in a "bourgeois" milieu remained under the powerful spell of the revolutionary mystique. They believed they were witnessing the "birth of a new world." Emigrating, escaping to the safety of the "old world," from their point of view meant cultural death. Boris Pasternak, however distressed he was by the separation from his family, believed that only in the "new" Russia could one create authentic forms of cultural expression. The dream of the new Russia, articulated in a number of ideological schemes, from Eurasianism to Fabian socialism, caused many Russian émigré intellectuals to return to Soviet Russia in order to join the Great Experiment. Prince Dmitry Sviatopolk-Mirsky, a brilliant scholar of Russian literature who was born in the same year as Pasternak, was a striking example of this phenomenon. Mirsky fought in the White Army against the Bolsheviks and fled from Russia in 1920 after its defeat. In 1932, after years of scholarly research and lecturing in Britain, France, and the United States, he returned to the Soviet Union a devoted communist. He wrote, "An émigré intellectual who wishes to remain alive must either lose his nationality or accept the revolution in one way or another."[5]

Instead of the new Russia, however, the Soviet Union emerged, a totalitarian multiethnic empire. When Stalin consolidated his hold on power in the early 1930s, official tolerance for cultural autonomy and pluralism came to an end. The Stalinist regime sponsored ultraleft professional educational groups and restructured the scholarly and scientific elites. It used writers and journalists to create a mythology that masked the existence of mass terror, famine, and a slave economy.[6] Eventually, Stalin sought to gain total control over the substance and direction of cultural and intellectual production. The regime categorized all people of culture involved in education and science as Soviet intelligentsia. It became one of Stalin's pet projects, no less than the secret police and the army, to marshal the intellectual and cultural resources to glorify his regime, prepare for war, and call upon the population for sacrifices.

The ideals of self-cultivation and self-improvement through high culture, intellectual work, and scientific knowledge were the official requirement for all Soviet citizens. The "Soviet intelligentsia" became necessary for the production and propagation of these ideals (of course under the guidance of the party leaders).[7] In exchange, the state granted educated professionals privileged access to scarce goods, beginning with food. In 1934 Stalin authorized the establishment of "creative unions," state-sponsored guilds for writers and literary critics, musicians, artists and architects, filmmakers, and theater people. Simultaneously, scientists and scholars were incorporated into the state-sponsored academy and academic institutes. Literature, once the "teacher of life" for the intelligentsia, now became the most important staple of the Stalinist arts. Stalin flattered writers, characterizing them as "engineers of human souls." With great cunning, the Soviet leader let writers themselves construct their intellectual and aesthetic prison. Maxim Gorky presided over the establishment of the new cultural doctrine of socialist realism, announced with great pomp at the First Congress of Soviet Writers in 1934; but in practice the doctrine soon became the reflection of Stalin's personal preferences. The innovative formalist vanguard was repudiated, and state-sponsored art promoted Soviet patriotism and mobilized the populace for the inevitable outbreak of war. All the "Soviet intelligentsia" had to submit to the infallible Stalin's judgment of cultural works.[8]

The authorities bowdlerized Russian culture, excising from it everything judged to be "reactionary." At the same time, the regime appropriated the greatest figures of classical Russian culture, from Pushkin to Tolstoy and Chekhov, as well as select figures from the revolutionary vanguard, like the poet Vladimir Mayakovsky. All of them took their place in the Stalinist literary pantheon. In a macabre paradox, during the height of Stalin's terror, the entire country celebrated the hundredth anniversary of Pushkin's death. Every town, every collective farm, and even the smallest shop had to honor the aristocratic Russian poet with lectures, readings, and performances. This cult of Pushkin became emblematic of the linguistic and aesthetic norms that defined for millions the shape of socialist realism.[9] Only shortly before, Stalin's new Soviet constitution had decreed that everyone who had an advanced education or worked in the professions belonged to the Soviet intelligentsia, a vague "intermediary layer" *(prosloika)* in the Stalinist social cake, between those of the allegedly "hegemonic" workers and of the collectivized peasants. State co-optation of intellectuals and artists—along with their social milieu, their cultural symbols, and their very language—had reached its apogee.

Few options remained for Russian intellectual and cultural groups that had not been in the Bolshevik camp. Even earlier, during the 1920s, they

had had to choose between cooperating with the revolutionary victors or finding niches outside the public sphere and forming semiprivate circles, in order to preserve an ethos of free discussion and cultural interaction. The first option meant becoming "fellow travelers" of the regime out of necessity, and thus compromising cultural independence for the sake of new opportunities. Often this was a slippery slope leading to forced collaboration with the secret police and denunciations of colleagues. The second option entailed intellectual and artistic marginalization, poverty, oblivion, and eventual elimination. The growing realization of that ineluctable outcome triggered a wave of suicides among artists who had earlier believed that the Russian Revolution was synonymous with cultural and spiritual emancipation.

Stalin's regime was successful in incorporating many members of the prerevolutionary educated elites into the state-run cultural institutions. Not only intimidation, the secret police, and the gulag contributed, but also many artists and intellectuals' willingness to accept an autocratic order in preference to famine, violent death, or emigration. And the rewards were considerable. The state fed and clothed the Soviet intelligentsia, which it placed high in the distribution hierarchy. Stalin's creative unions afforded the educated elites unique benefits and privileges, while millions in the Soviet Union lived in misery and destitution. Unionized writers, artists, scholars, and scientists received better food supplies at a time of universal shortages, enjoyed free vacations at the unions' guest houses and hotels, and dined in subsidized union restaurants that were closed to the general public. The most loyal, successful, and sometimes even talented were awarded big monetary prizes, dachas, chauffeured cars, and scarce luxury goods.[10]

Stalinism attracted intellectuals by identifying the Soviet modernization project with the agenda of the Russian Revolution, and the goals of social and cultural transformation espoused by generations of the Russian leftist intelligentsia. Stalinism not only subverted the revolutionary message but also manipulated the intelligentsia's traditional values of self-improvement, social activism, and commitment to being an agent of historical progress. The alternative to becoming part of the Soviet intelligentsia was too bleak to contemplate. Marginalization entailed the virtual impossibility of creative work and social recognition. Many members of the old intelligentsia, overwhelmed by traumatic changes, allowed themselves to be caught up in the current of history—that is, they served the regime. Some became informers for the secret police. Some even managed to perceive Stalin as the embodiment of History itself. Cultural and intellectual life in the Soviet Union during the 1930s resembled the two escalators of Moscow's metro, moving in opposite directions. On the escalator going down stood people who were disillusioned, cynical, broken, and resigned. On the escalator moving up were those who were still young, ambitious, optimistic, full of smug idealism.[11]

The Great Terror of the 1930s marked a point in time when the logic of fear and survival among intellectuals and artists provided a powerful corrective to their interests and pursuits. Even those who had enthusiastically joined the Revolution and served the Bolshevik regime during war communism, NEP, and the first years of Stalinist transformations felt trapped. The regime demanded individual approval of terror from each and every member of the Soviet intelligentsia, whether in the form of "indignant" speeches at rallies or a signature under collective letters published in Soviet media. Thousands of intellectuals destroyed their archives, burned their diaries, in fear of arrest and interrogation. The personal files of the secret police archives are closed, but it is safe to conclude that practically every professional in the scholarly, scientific, educational, cultural, and engineering spheres had a dossier filled with denunciations. It was the time when intellectuals devoured one another, sacrificing colleagues for the sake of survival. Anybody with ancestors from "former classes," like the nobility, clergy, merchants, or kulaks, was vulnerable. Dmitry Likhachev, a student at Leningrad University, was arrested in 1928 for belonging to a circle of philosophers, lovers of Russian culture. After two years in a concentration camp on the Solovetsky Islands and at the "correctional works" of the Belomor Canal, he was allowed to return to Leningrad (as the city, formerly St. Petersburg or later Petrograd, was now called). Aware of his chronic vulnerability, he found an inconspicuous job as a proofreader at the Academy of Sciences Press. There, all the staff members were people from "former classes" who could not find better employment. After the murder of Kirov in 1934, Likhachev learned from a woman who worked in the personnel department that she was making a list of members of the nobility and he was on it. In fact, Likhachev did not belong to the noble estate. He offered to retype the list at his own expense and thus saved his life. All people on the list disappeared without a trace. In 1938 Likhachev began to work at the Institute of Russian Literature (Pushkin House) in Leningrad. He found

there an "apocalyptic" atmosphere of mutual treason, and only a few people of integrity among the hordes of "scoundrels."[12]

Boris Pasternak, like many others, was fascinated by Stalin's power to transform Russia. And he felt, like many, the collectivist urge to leave the "rotten" humanism of the old intelligentsia behind. The meaning of the Russian Revolution for modern European history, for the fate of Russia, and for his generation captivated his mind. Yet his talent, integrity, and religious faith saved him from illusions about the nature of Stalinism. He saw the Russian countryside destroyed by Stalin's collectivization, peasants begging for food, carloads of peasant families dragged from their homes off to Siberia. In 1933, after Hitler came to power in Germany, Pasternak wrote to his parents in Berlin comparing the Nazi regime to Stalinism: "These two movements act in tandem and have the same characteristics. To make matters worse, one feeds off the other. These are the right wing and the left wing of one materialistic night." As Stalin's terror spread, Boris Pasternak was in despair and on the brink of suicide.[13] He was horrified when Stalin offered him public recognition as "the number one poet" of the Soviet Union. The Kremlin leader allocated to him one of the first state-built country houses in Peredelkino, a village converted into a relatively comfortable ghetto for "Soviet writers and poets." Pasternak stopped writing poetry and devoted himself to doing translations of Shakespearian tragedies, as well as Goethe's *Faust.* He refused to read Soviet newspapers, which were filled with news about executions. In 1937 he stayed away from the official celebration of Pushkin's centennial. In that year many of his friends perished; some took their lives, and some died in labor camps. When Stalin and his secret police began to arrest and murder famous Old Bolsheviks, all members of the Soviet intelligentsia had to affix their signatures to petitions praising executions and demanding more of them. Pasternak refused to sign, saying: "Nobody gave me the power of life and death over other people." He confessed to his friend Kornei Chukovsky that he would die rather than sign in support of such "baseness." The officials of the writers' union, appalled at Pasternak's defiance, forged his signature.[14]

Pasternak surmounted the temptation to commit suicide by rediscovering his Orthodox Christian faith. The Great Terror, paradoxically, freed him from the fear of being marginalized. He realized that his infatuation with the Russian Revolution and attempts to "align himself" with the Soviet project had brought him to the brink where the destruction of humanist values meant the death of an artistic and moral self. Pasternak rejected the totalitarian temptation, without fear of the consequences. He began to write poetry again, but no longer in an experimental formalist, "revolutionary" style. His language became simpler, more lucid. The writer Alexander Afinogenov, who lived in Peredelkino in September 1937, wrote in his diary: "My conversations with Pasternak will forever remain in my heart. He comes to you and immediately begins to speak about big, interesting, genuine issues. Art alone is his main concern. He loves people and suffers for them, yet he does it without weepy sentimentality. He has the gift of peering into the future, of separating the wheat from the chaff."[15]

The Great Terror left many writers, artists, and intellectuals disastrously isolated and demoralized. After the orgy of mutual denunciations, they could barely trust one another. Former members of the Russian intelligentsia who had supported the Bolshevik regime during the 1920s and enjoyed the political patronage of Bolshevik politicians now felt isolated and abandoned. According to a secret police file, the writer Mikhail Svetlov said in 1938, "We are just the pitiful remnants of the epoch that has died. Nothing is left of the old party; there's a new party, with new people. They have replaced us."[16] Indeed, there were no more Bolshevik intellectuals like Nikolai Bukharin, or authoritative cultural figures like Maxim Gorky, connoisseurs and patrons of art and literature. The new recruits in the party and state apparatus, many of them from a blue-collar or peasant background, treated intellectuals and artists as a class in the service of the regime. The only patron of art and culture was now Joseph Stalin.

The German attack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, and the subsequent tragic developments overshadowed not only the previous years of terror and upheavals, but even the Bolshevik Revolution itself. The country was fighting for its life, and the people, after months of defeats, desertions, cowardice, and disarray, began to rally around the Soviet flag under the slogans of the "holy" and "Great Patriotic" war. The war decimated the remaining cultural elite, as it did every other group in Russia. The German siege of Leningrad in 1941–42 took a particularly horrifying toll: most of the old city dwellers who had grown up in the prerevolutionary culture died of famine. People burned libraries, to keep from freezing to death. At the same time, the war raised the morale of intellectuals and gave a new meaning to their personal destinies. Scientists, including those under arrest, worked to design new weapons. The regime mobilized artists and

writers, who served in various capacities to inspire people to sacrifice and heroism with national patriotic slogans. This was the moment when the defunct ethos of the old Russian intelligentsia, which had been trampled underfoot, appeared to be returning. It was especially true for the writers, poets, and musicians: people turned to their verse and songs for direction. Vera Sandomirsky, a Russian émigré in the United States, wrote in 1943 that the word *rodina* (Motherland) "became the highest symbol of unification, the banner of a whole nation." The remaining members of the old intelligentsia and the young intellectual iconoclasts alike realized, under wartime duress, that they owed loyalty not to the Revolution, but to the country and the Russian people. The war restored a mutual trust, a sense of national identity, and the feeling that Soviet citizens were a "band of brothers" risking death at the hands of the brutal enemy.[17]

Pasternak was unfit for military service. He, like most other poets and writers, was evacuated by train to eastern Russia when German armies approached Moscow. When he returned, months later, he found his city apartment vandalized. His books and manuscripts, as well as the works of his father, had vanished. He also grieved at the suicide of his dear old friend Marina Tsvetaeva, the great Russian poet who had recently returned to the Soviet Union from emigration. These were drops in an ocean of war-related disasters and tragedies. Pasternak began to read Soviet news, and he empathized with people's heroism and tenacity. In 1943, after the victory at Stalingrad, he traveled to the front line as a military journalist. He wrote in his notes about the ruined Russian cities and German atrocities against civilians, yet also prophetically remarked that if one had "to change the political system" to rebuild Russian cities and restore the country's well-being, "this sacrifice would not be made. Instead, they would sacrifice the whole world to save the system."[18]

As Pasternak's religious and mystical inclinations deepened during the war, they reinforced his view of human existence as a duel between life and death, whose ultimate stakes were spiritual resurrection. He summarized his spiritual experience in "Dawn," a poem later included in his great novel as one of the "poems of Yuri Zhivago."

> My life owed everything to you.
> Then came the war and devastation.
> You vanished from my sight and soul,

> Even your name became unmentioned.
> Now, after many, many years
> I heard your voice with trepidation.
> All night I read your testament
> And was awakened back to action.[19]

Pasternak seemed to ignore the nationalist and racist hatred around him, including rampant anti-Semitism. Other writers and poets of his generation did not share his spiritual detachment. Ilya Ehrenburg, who came from an assimilated secularized Jewish family of the same Moscow milieu as Pasternak, joined the Bolshevik party at a very young age. He welcomed the Revolution but soon left the party in disillusionment and emigrated to Paris, Brussels, and other European cities, to live the life of an avant-garde artist. With the rise of fascism and Nazism, however, Ehrenburg returned to Moscow and became Stalin's informal ambassador-at-large in charge of international propaganda, using his extensive contacts among those on the European left to mobilize the antifascist coalition. During the Great Patriotic War he became a member of the Jewish Antifascist Committee, a vehicle to mobilize support for the Soviet cause in the United States. At the same time, the entire Soviet army learned to worship Ehrenburg, who put hatred against the Nazi invaders into cruel language. He wrote: "Kill the German—that is your grandmother's request. Kill the German—that is your child's prayer. Do not let him through. Kill!"[20]

The poet Konstantin Simonov's main theme during the war was his love for a woman who was waiting for his return. Simonov was born in St. Petersburg to a Russian noble family; his mother was Princess Obolenskaia, and his father, a general, perished in World War I. Young Kirill (that was Simonov's birth name) was raised by his stepfather, a tsarist officer who joined the Red Army. Simonov grew up accustomed to the discipline and unswerving loyalty of the military caste. During the 1930s he plunged into the furnace of the cultural revolution in which "new Soviet people" were being forged. Like many others who were products of that era, he "aligned" his life with revolutionary history. Between 1937 and 1939 he began to write poetry intended to mobilize youth to serve the state in the impending epic battles of World War II. In 1939 he graduated from the Institute of Literature and became a war journalist. The Nazi assault on the Soviet Union changed his life. He began to write about the real tragedies of the Russian people—soldiers in grim retreat and peasant women left to the mercy of

the enemy. Millions of soldiers at the front and their relatives back home quoted Simonov's poem:

> Wait for me, and I'll be back.
> Wait the best you can.
> Wait when sadness overwhelms
> You in the yellow rain.
> Keep on waiting even when
> All of them give up.[21]

The poet Alexander Tvardovsky celebrated the simple patriotism and sturdiness of a Russian peasant soldier. He belonged to the cohort of talented people of peasant background who joined the Soviet intelligentsia during the 1930s. His father had been dekulakized and the family exiled. Alexander, under threat of arrest, had to separate himself from his family. He joined the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers.[22] In his autobiography, published in 1951, Tvardovsky admitted that he suffered from the lack of a "serious cultural background," a crucial problem for his literary generation.[23] It took him less than a decade to compensate for his peasant "backwardness" through determined all-night self-education sessions: in 1936 he became a student at the Institute of Philosophy, Literature, and History (IFLI). Two years later he published a poetic saga about the end of a naive peasant's dream to find a country with no communists or collective farms. In 1941, on the eve of the war with the Nazis, Tvardovsky received the Stalin Prize for literature. By that time, feeling more secure, he had found his family in exile and brought them to back to their homeland. Yet the stigma of having a "kulak" father continued to beset him for the rest of his life.[24] When the war with Germany broke out, Tvardovsky became a military journalist and wrote a cycle of poems about war, whose lack of officious pathos and sincere tone won readers' hearts. His main protagonist, the soldier Vasily Tyorkin, became a hero to the army. Tyorkin, who was known and loved by millions, joined the gallery of Russian national characters previously created by Ivan Turgenev, Lev Tolstoy, Anton Chekhov, and Ivan Bunin. Stalin also liked Tyorkin, and bestowed further awards on Tvardovsky.[25]

During the war, hopes soared for a better life after victory, and the end of the repressive regime. Wartime transformations—the abolition of the Communist International, the opening of churches, and other measures taken

by the regime—left intellectuals musing about the future. Some voiced remarkably frank opinions in private conversations that were registered by the secret police and its ubiquitous informers. One writer said in 1943: "In the near future we will have to permit private initiative, a new NEP, without which we won't be able to restore and revive the economy and circulation of goods." A journalist was heard by a secret police informer to say, "My sympathies have always been on the side of the democratic powers. . . . In the event of victory for Soviet power, there is only one thing left for me, an old democrat—suicide!" Another writer said, "The Revolution has not justified the forces and sacrifices expended on it. We need reforms, transformations. Otherwise, we won't be able to rise out of this abyss, out of the devastation the war has cast us into." Others continued to adhere to the Soviet communist project or remained pessimistic about the possibility of changes in the future. At most, they expected the end of terror and alleviation of the bureaucratic management of cultural affairs. They hoped the regime would allow them to write their books, make their films, and stage their performances. There were people who welcomed the Russian nationalist patriotic themes and wanted to evict the Jews from the ranks of the "Soviet intelligentsia." The Jews, by contrast, dismayed by the growing anti-Semitism, felt vulnerable and sought a return to the internationalist Bolshevik traditions of earlier years.[26]

In May 1945, after millions of casualties and indescribable suffering, the Soviet Union won the war. Instead of instituting reforms, however, Stalin mobilized the country for a cold war against the Western powers. New waves of terror ensued. Remarkably, Stalin and his secret police did not arrest the members of the Soviet intelligentsia who had raised reformist and liberal voices during the war. Instead, a campaign to rein in the "cultural front" commenced. It became known as *Zhdanovshchina*, after Stalin's lieutenant Andrei Zhdanov, who voiced the leader's opinion. The party decrees of 1946–1948 humiliated and denigrated, among others, the most original and autonomous artists from Pasternak's milieu: the writer Mikhail Zoshchenko and the poet Anna Akhmatova, the composers Sergei Prokofiev and Dmitry Shostakovich, and the filmmaker Sergei Eisenstein. It was the signal to all creative voices: align with the regime's policies or perish. The Stalin-Zhdanov decrees of 1946 that gave the party direct control over culture killed genuine creativity, caused self-censorship to metastasize, and opened the door to mediocrities, careerists, and intriguers. Some literary

hacks, in collusion with the party censors, invented the "theory of the absence of conflicts," as a way of emasculating and banning literary works and essays that focused on social and economic problems. Many writers began to compose for an audience of one person, Stalin himself, in works catering to his whims and tastes, and seeking to win his favor. Indeed, the despot remained the ultimate judge of what was good or bad in literature. He could even, at times, overrule the oppressive dictates of his minions and their literary assistants.[27]

Zhdanovshchina and the Cold War ended the hopes of intellectuals and artists in Soviet Russia to resume contact with the outside world and regain their freedom to travel abroad. During NEP these contacts and travel had become a privilege, available only to supporters of the regime and trusted "fellow-travelers." It had still been possible to obtain individual permission to emigrate.[28] During the 1930s, however, the borders closed completely, and it became very dangerous to have foreign friends and contacts. And after World War II Stalin, concerned with the effects that exposure to foreign lands might have on the Soviet army and society, unleashed a campaign against "genuflection before the West." Special "courts of honor" were created to stigmatize international cooperation and contacts in science. All forms of cultural exchange came to a halt. The almost complete isolation of Russian intellectuals and cultural figures from the rest of the world lasted for at least two decades under Stalin. It had traumatizing and sometimes curious effects. The Oxford scholar Isaiah Berlin, who visited Moscow and Leningrad in 1946 and 1956, observed that even the most sophisticated and knowledgeable people in Moscow and Leningrad knew nothing about contemporary culture, lifestyle, and living standards in the West and remained unaware of the problems high culture faced in societies characterized by mass consumption and marketing directed toward the lowest common denominator.[29]

Stalin's postwar policies reflected a growing suspicion of Jews as "the agents of American and British imperialism." Antagonism at the top coincided with the dangerous growth of anti-Semitism in the bureaucracy and in society as a whole during the war. After the establishment of Israel in 1948, anti-Semitism became a state policy used to unify and cement Soviet Russian nationalism: Yiddish cultural institutions were shut down, and leading Jewish poets and actors, members of the Jewish Antifascist Committee (JAC), were arrested and murdered. The campaigns against "cosmopolitan influences," aimed at Jews assimilated into Russian-Soviet culture, became the most divisive and traumatic experience of the late Stalin years, culminating in the Kremlin's Doctors' Plot accusations and purges of January 1953. At one of the anticosmopolitan meetings at Moscow State University, a professor of history asked a colleague what the reason for this campaign could be. The answer was: "War. People must be prepared for a new war." During the anticosmopolitan campaigns, colleague denounced colleague, students humiliated their own professors, and writers, poets, literary critics, academic scholars, and many others had to attend the public sessions of *prorabotki* ("criticism and self-criticism") that degraded and decimated the intellectual and cultural milieu in which they worked.[30]

Again, as during the 1930s, the members of the "Soviet intelligentsia" who had jobs in state-sponsored institutions were caught up in an orgy of mutual recrimination and self-castigation. All of them became executors of the regime's policies, among whom, according to a cruel Stalinist logic, were the popular literary heroes of the war years. Ehrenburg, because of his Jewish background, was under attack, but Stalin decided to keep him in his "literary court." From 1946 to 1952 Ehrenburg helped the Soviet Union organize the Soviet-led "peace movement," and he was as effective then as he had been ten years earlier during the antifascist Popular Front. Ehrenburg was the only member of the Jewish Antifascist Committee who survived its tragic end. Had Stalin lived longer, Ehrenburg would have faced a terrible dilemma: whether to participate in the cover-up of a Jewish pogrom or to perish.[31] Simonov, like Ehrenburg, became part of the literary court Stalin created, and his propaganda "ambassador." In early 1946 Stalin sent Simonov to the United States and later "recommended" that he write a play portraying "dark forces" in America plotting a war against the USSR. Stalin then made use of the play and film script *The Russian Question* in marshaling forces for the Cold War. Simonov had to preside over the public humiliation of the writer Mikhail Zoshchenko, whom Stalin viciously attacked in August 1946 as a "literary low-life." Later, Simonov obediently led the attack on Jewish writers, many of whom were his friends.[32]

It was at this time, during a new descent from hope into despair, that Boris Pasternak began to write his novel *Doctor Zhivago*. During World War II, Pasternak lost his parents: they died in London after fleeing there from Nazi Germany. He also grieved over the death of twenty-year-old Adrian Neigauz, the son of his second wife, Zinaida. And the first years af-

ter the war brought him a new personal drama. He fell in love with the young and charming Olga Ivinskaia, who worked for the literary journal *Novy Mir.* After two years of an intense romantic relationship with him, Ivinskaia was arrested and sent to labor camps. As he had during the Great Terror, Pasternak staggered under the blow. He regained his creative stamina, however, and a new theme emerged in his writings, the tragic demise of the Russian intelligentsia in an era of revolutionary violence.

On March 5, 1953, Stalin died. Millions mourned his death. Very few noticed that the great Russian composer Sergei Prokofiev had died on the same day. It was a bad omen for the future of Russian culture. Among the Soviet intelligentsia, no level of creative autonomy, not to mention separation from the regime, was possible in public or even in private. All possible outlets for intellectual and artistic endeavor were controlled by the state and the secret police. Even more significantly, intellectuals and artists had been fatally vitiated, consumed by their own venom, including ideological fanaticism and anti-Semitism. Writers and poets seemed to have forgotten how to think and write freely. Artists could not express their true feelings on canvas or onstage. Filmmakers were conscripted to shoot crude propaganda and slapstick comedies. The ideal of civic solidarity among intellectuals seemed a hopeless pipe dream. And the mission of improving and reforming Soviet society and its government seemed definitively buried. Yet the decade that followed proved that the obituary for the intelligentsia was premature.

Pasternak's novel was the first defiant challenge to the postwar cultural silence. In *Doctor Zhivago* a mystical poet, a sensitive idealist, a doctor who saved people's lives, finds supreme meaning and resurrection in love. In the novel, Yuri Zhivago has lost both his parents as a child and grown up in a family of educated and assimilated Jews, similar to the Pasternaks. Zhivago's milieu too worshipped classical Russian culture and welcomed the Revolution against the tsarist regime. Yuri marries Tonia, a daughter of the people who adopted him as a child. A series of mysterious events, however, leads him to meet a young woman, Lara, who becomes his true love. Yuri is not particularly interested in politics and has no inclination to participate in the Revolution. Yet the Revolution sucks him into the vortex of outsize and tragic events, along with his family and his love. Fate gives Zhivago only a few weeks of happiness with Lara, during which he composes the "poems of Yuri Zhivago" in a country house, to which the couple has escaped from the surrounding turmoil. Soon the Civil War separates him from Lara, and later she seeks to emigrate from Russia and disappears from Zhivago's life forever. Yuri himself is at the brink of death several times, but each time Providence saves him. In the novel's poignant concluding scene, which takes place in NEP Russia at the end of the 1920s, Yuri, sick and unrecognized, believes he sees Lara from the window of a crowded streetcar. He rushes out to greet her and instantly dies of a heart attack.

Doctor Yuri Zhivago belongs to the Russian intelligentsia, an imagined community that existed for seven decades in Russian society.[33] Zhivago's fate in the chaos and violence of the years that follow emblematizes the destruction of the social milieu and ethos of the intelligentsia. Pasternak describes, through the eyes of this doctor, the fratricidal, often senseless, and always dehumanizing nature of the Russian Revolution and Civil War. Pasternak writes about the crimes committed by the Reds and the Whites, which mirrored and reinforced one another. Yuri Zhivago, having been forcibly drafted into a peasant army, is in a position to observe both the ideological rigidity of communist fanatics and the desperate ruthlessness of the White Army leaders. Many atrocities, in his view, were committed by simple peasants and soldiers who "needed no encouragement to hate intellectuals, officers, and gentry with a savage hatred." Pasternak remarked that the enthusiastic left-wing intellectuals greatly valued such people. "Their inhumanity seemed a marvel of class consciousness, their barbarism a model of proletarian firmness and revolutionary instinct."[34] Pasternak seems to argue that the ideologies that the Revolution unleashed and the principles and values that Stalinism appropriated and exploited in lethal fashion were all dehumanizing dogmas, not worth the loss of Russia's cultural and spiritual treasure trove. Though many intellectuals were culpable, he deplores the disappearance of the intelligentsia's cultural milieu, which he compares to "frozen music." In the final pages of *Doctor Zhivago,* after Yuri Zhivago's death, his friends, survivors of war and terror, meet the only child of Yuri and his beloved Lara. That child, Tania, has grown up as an orphan among peasants, separated from the world of high culture. She has no opportunity to inherit the tradition of freethinking, spirituality, and creativity that her father embodied. Pasternak does not tell us Tania's fate. Her cameo appearance in the book makes the readers wonder whether the cultural continuity of the Russian intelligentsia has been irreparably broken.

In 1956 Pasternak sent the manuscript of *Doctor Zhivago* out to several foreign publishers, and despite heavy pressure from the Soviet authorities, conspired with those publishers to have his novel published abroad. Even before its publication, however, party authorities began to blackmail the writer. Olga Ivinskaia, Pasternak's lover and the prototype for Lara, had just recently returned after seven years in labor camps and in exile. Imploring Pasternak to give up his dangerous project, she told him that not only his life but also her own was at stake.[35] Pasternak resisted. "If the truth that I know must be redeemed by suffering," he wrote to the boss of the party department of culture, Dmitry Polikarpov, "I can accept any suffering." The atheistic bureaucrat could hardly appreciate Christian parables and sentiments, and party leaders were deaf to Pasternak's appeal: "How can anyone think that someone's passionate and focused creation can be concealed from the world simply by sealing it as one seals a bottle with a cork?" The writer continued by assuring them that "the only way to calm the storm" would be "to leave [him] and this theme in peace."[36]

On November 23, 1957, *Doctor Zhivago* came off Feltrinelli's presses in Milan. Overnight it became a worldwide literary sensation and was translated into virtually every major language.[37] In October 1958 the Swedish Academy voted to award Pasternak the Nobel Prize for Literature. In the United States the translated version topped the *New York Times* best-seller list for over half a year. Nikita Khrushchev, who had taken over the leadership of the Soviet Union after Stalin, was enraged. He and his associates had learned from members of the Union of Soviet Writers that the poem "denigrated" the Bolshevik Revolution and blamed it for the destruction of Russian cultural heritage. Khrushchev and his political lieutenants never bothered to read the novel, but they decided that the brouhaha surrounding it was a Western Cold War provocation. The party presidium assessed the novel as "a tool of international reaction" and ordered "a collective letter from the most prominent Soviet writers" to be issued condemning Pasternak. *Pravda* denounced Pasternak as a "literary weed in the service of international reaction."[38] In a nationally broadcast speech, Vladimir Semichastny, the head of Komsomol, the communist youth league, said that Pasternak was an "internal émigré," worse than a pig, which "never makes a mess where it eats and sleeps."[39] Pasternak found himself under tremendous domestic pressure to repent, while thousands of intellectuals and public figures from all over the world expressed their solidarity with the beleaguered writer. In January 1959 he responded to the witch hunt with another poem, published abroad:

> What was my fault?
> Did I commit a murder?
> I have just written about my beautiful land
> And made the whole world commiserate.[40]

Pasternak's defenders included such world-famous writers as John Steinbeck, Graham Greene, Aldous Huxley, Somerset Maugham, Ernest Hemingway, André Maurois, and Alberto Moravia. Eleanor Roosevelt and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India both appealed to Khrushchev not to expel Pasternak from the Soviet Union.[41] Khrushchev decided to rescind the sentence exiling the poet. On November 1, Pasternak, under enormous pressure, agreed to write to Khrushchev renouncing the Nobel Prize. According to some observers, Olga Ivinskaia, fearing arrest, served as the tool of the regime by helping fabricate letters of repentance that were published in *Pravda* and attributed to Pasternak. The poet was not defeated in spirit, however. Privately, he announced his verdict on the Soviet regime: "It is doomed. One cannot live like this."[42]

In Pasternak's novel numerous people, recognizing Dr. Zhivago posthumously as a figure of great talent and inspiration, attend his funeral. When Pasternak died, only a brief mention in the newspapers signaled the death of "a member of the Literary Foundation, B. L. Pasternak," on May 30, 1960. But many admirers of the poet experienced a moment of revelation the day they learned of his death.[43] Some went to the village of Peredelkino to bid him farewell. The authorities had clearly discouraged attendance at the funeral, and KGB agents took photographs of those who were present at the graveside. Nevertheless, Pasternak's funeral was the occasion for the first sizable demonstration of unofficial civic solidarity in Soviet Russia, and as such it was symbolic. The funeral procession, later described by many witnesses and memoirists, as well as KGB agents, consisted of five hundred mourners who made their way from the poet's dacha to a church cemetery on a nearby hill. Speeches were given at the newly dug grave.[44] According to one witness, the very fact that hundreds of people ignored official disapproval of the public funeral march showed a "crystallization of new civic notions" that were "stronger than the usual fear."[45] Although many of Pasternak's friends and admirers did not show up, for fear of losing official

Boris Pasternak, who wrote *Doctor Zhivago* about the vanishing milieu of the old intelligentsia, which he described as "frozen music." His funeral in 1960, however, marked the birth of a new community of Russian intelligentsia (Courtesy of Memorial, Moscow).

public standing and privileges, many others, including some people who had betrayed Pasternak during his ordeal, came to his funeral, perhaps to atone for their betrayal.

The death of the poet, who had belonged to the spiritual milieu of the old intelligentsia, was the moment at which another spiritual and civic community emerged in the popular mind. The young people who identified with that community had a vastly different social background and life experience than Pasternak had, and many of them did not share or even understand his spiritual world. At the same time, they too were striving for intellectual and artistic emancipation, as the dead poet had. And they viewed themselves as the descendants of the great cultural and moral tradition that Pasternak, his protagonist Yuri Zhivago, and his milieu embodied. Thus, they were Zhivago's children, in a spiritual sense.

These people did not belong to a single generation, if one defines a generation by age. The oldest of them were born in the 1920s—the Russians who fought against Hitler's armies in World War II. Pasternak had high hopes for the war veterans. In his novel he attributed to them "fabulous, astounding qualities," including a readiness "for great, desperate, heroic exploits," and called them "the moral elite of this generation."[46] Yet the survivors were few, for many of their peers had perished in the carnage of war.

The larger cohorts of Zhivago's children were younger. They were born in the 1930s or early 1940s and were the generation that entered the universities of Moscow and Leningrad after the war. There, they met the veterans, and their feelings of solidarity united them in one "extended" historical generation that transcended the boundaries of age.

Zhivago's spiritual children were born into a society where everyone was supposed to absorb the Soviet way of life as naturally as the Russian Orthodox had their faith, in church. They walked under the Kremlin's red stars and learned Soviet songs. Many of them grew up without fathers, because of the lives lost to war or to political terror. In a sense, "Comrade Stalin" became their substitute father. Some of them were taught to love Stalin more than their parents. The beneficiaries of the Soviet enlightenment project, they were the graduates of the best universities, above all in Moscow and Leningrad, and were destined to become the highly educated group that Stalin cynically called the Soviet intelligentsia. In reality, they were intended to be cadres totally loyal to Stalin's agenda and the party line: scientists and engineers, physicians and educators, elite youth in the military, security, propaganda, and cultural institutions who were destined to become apparatchiks in the state and party bureaucracies. This cohort of young intellectuals and artists grew up in isolation from the world, in a country of closed borders and "captive minds." Meeting a foreigner was less likely than seeing a total solar eclipse. Foreign travel was unimaginable. Comparison between the Soviet experience and life in other countries was almost impossible.

Yet something remarkable occurred. The years of war, violence, and misery tested the spirits of the "extended" generation of Zhivago's children who grew up during that time and gave them extraordinary experience. They broke loose. The educated cadres trained for Stalinist service turned out to be a vibrant and diverse tribe, with intellectual curiosity, artistic yearnings, and a passion for high culture. They identified not only with the Soviet collectivity, but also with humanist individualism. This was the unintended result of the Stalinist educational system, the ideals of self-cultivation and self-improvement, and the pervasive cult of high culture that it propagated. These ideals, once intrinsic to the ethos of the Russian intelligentsia, now provided the codes for its revival among the young educated cohorts of the post-Stalin era. The remnants of the old intelligentsia in literature and liberal arts, with their memories of the truncated past, were still around and,

despite their abdication to the Stalinist mainstream, provided a compass to pre-Soviet ethical and aesthetic ideals, behavior, and language. Likewise, remnants of the romantic revolutionary idealism and optimism that had powerfully motivated the founders of the Soviet regime lingered on, despite the colossal moral and physical losses among its agents in the first half of the twentieth century. This idealism and optimism, although manipulated and corroded by the regime, still had the vigor to confront cynical conformism and docile passivity. The prestige of science and scientists, boosted by the exigencies of the Cold War, grew to an unprecedented degree in the USSR. The relentless search for "objective truth" placed scientists in the position of supreme intellectual oracles, autonomous from the party and ideology.[47]

As a result, these people who had grown up under the unifying press of Soviet conformism and censorship would succeed in presenting a dazzling array of ideas and attitudes.[48] In 1987 Joseph Brodsky spoke in his Nobel Prize acceptance speech about his generation of writers, artists, and intellectuals:

> The generation born precisely at the time when the Auschwitz crematoria were working full blast, when Stalin was at the zenith of his Godlike, absolute power, which seemed sponsored by Mother Nature herself—that generation came into the world, it appears, in order to continue what was interrupted in those crematoria and in the anonymous common graves of Stalin's archipelago. The fact that not everything got interrupted, at least not in Russia, can be credited in no small degree to my generation, and I am no less proud of belonging to it than I am of standing here today. Looking back, I can say again that we were beginning in an empty—indeed, a terrifyingly wasted—place, and that, intuitively rather than consciously, we aspired precisely to the recreation of the effect of culture's continuity.[49]

This tribute might well be addressed to all Zhivago's children, the different groups from that complex extended generation whose view of the uses of the mind and spirit rekindled the intelligentsia's dream of a just and humane Russian society.

> We fulfilled our duty during the war,
> And we wanted our rights in peacetime.
>
> —David Samoilov, 1979

one

The "Children" Grow Up 1945–1955

After World War II a remarkable surge took place in the educational and cultural life of Russia. Schools and universities in Moscow, Leningrad, and other Russian cities filled up with new cohorts of students. The city youth, those who did not drown the stresses of war in drunkenness, gambling, and crime, plunged into reading and study. Soviet libraries registered a burgeoning demand for detective and adventure stories, and even for fairy tales. Yet a minority of readers had more serious educational aspirations—acquaintance with world literature, history, poetry, and philosophy.[1] The number of university students that graduated during the postwar years was no more than a million and a half. It was a small group by comparison, for instance, with college graduates in the United States, where eight million people graduated from universities as a result of the G.I. Bill alone. Still, it was the largest group of educated young men and women that had ever emerged in Russia—six times as large as the entire "Zhivago generation," the university graduates in the last decades before the Revolution.

Aside from quantity, these students exhibited a special quality. During the first two decades of their lives they had acquired extraordinary memories and social experience. Their youth and childhood had been interrupted by the Nazi invasion. Their soul and spirit absorbed the worst impressions of inhumanity as well as sublime moments of patriotic sacrifice and national unity. Many years later, the young Russian filmmaker Andrei Tar-

Notes

Prologue

1. Yevgeny Pasternak and Yelena Pasternak, *Zhizn Borisa Pasternaka* (St. Petersburg: Zvezda, 2004), 435; see also Y. B. Pasternak, *Boris Pasternak: Biografiia,* at http://pasternak.niv.ru/pasternak/bio/pasternak-e-b/biografiya-1-1.htm *(note that this and all other Internet sites mentioned in the notes were last accessed in November 2008);* and Christopher Barnes, *Boris Pasternak: A Literary Biography,* vols. 1–2 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
2. One might also use the term "imagined communities," as does Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991). Anderson also presented the idea in lectures and conversations at a workshop for Russian historians in St. Petersburg, July 5–17, 2007. Most scholars of Russian and Soviet society use the term "intelligentsia" as a social construct (similar to "class") or prefer to speak about "intellectuals." V. P. Leikina-Svirskaia, *Intelligentsia v Rossii vo vtoroi polovine XIX veka* (Moscow: Mysl, 1971); Leikina-Svirskaia, *Russkaia intelligentsia v 1900–1917 godakh* (Moscow: Mysl, 1981); L. G. Churchward, *The Soviet Intelligentsia: An Essay on the Social Structure and Roles of Soviet Intellectuals during the 1960s* (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973); Nicholas Lampert, *The Technical Intelligentsia and the Soviet State* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1979); Lynn Mally, *Culture of the Future: The Proletkult Movement in Revolutionary Russia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Mark D. Steinberg, *Proletarian Imagination: Self, Modernity, and the Sacred in Russia, 1910–1925* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2002); Katerina Clark, *Petersburg, Crucible of Cultural Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995); Igal Halfin, "The Rape of the Intelligentsia: A Proletarian Foundational Myth," *Russian Review* 56, no. 1 (Jan. 1997): 90–109. Other scholars emphasize the moral, cultural, and even spiritual characteristics of the Russian intelligentsia,

above all the belief in a mission to help the oppressed Russian people, educate and improve Russian society, and reform or overthrow the autocratic regime. See Vera S. Dunham's review of Churchward's book in the *American Journal of Sociology* 80, no. 2 (Sept. 1974): 573–575; Boris Uspensky, "Russkaia intelligentsia kak spetsificheskii fenomen russkoi kultury," in *Etiudy o russkoi istorii* (St. Petersburg: Azbuka, 2002), 393–413; D. S. Likhachev, ed., *Russkaia intelligentsia: Istoriia i sudba* (Moscow: Nauka, 1999).

3. Guy de Mallac, "Pasternak and Religion," *Russian Review* 32, no. 4 (Oct. 1973): 360–375.
4. A. N. Artizov et al., *"Ochistim Rossiiu nadolgo . . .": Repressii protiv inakomysliashchikh, Konets 1921–nachalo 1923 g.* (Moscow: Materik, 2008); Stuart Finkel, *On the Ideological Front: The Russian Intelligentsia and the Making of the Soviet Public Sphere* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2007).
5. Michael David-Fox, *Revolution of the Mind: Higher Learning among the Bolsheviks, 1918–1929* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997); Katerina Clark and Evgeny Dobrenko, with Andrei Artizov and Oleg Naumov, *Soviet Culture and Power: A History in Documents, 1917–1953* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2007), 32–33; G. S. Smith, *D. S. Mirsky: A Russian-English Life, 1890–1939* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
6. Cynthia A. Ruder, *Making History for Stalin: The Story of the Belomor Canal* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1998).
7. Jochen Hellbeck, *Revolution on My Mind: Writing a Diary under Stalin* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), 360.
8. Karl Eimermacher, *Die sowjetische Literaturpolitik, 1917 bis 1972: Von der Vielfalt zur Bolschewisierung der Literatur* (Bochum, Ger.: Brockmeyer, 1994). I cite the Russian edition of this book: Karl Eimermacher, *Politika i kultura pri Lenine i Staline* (Moscow: AIRO-XX, 1998), 140. Yevgeny Gromov, *Stalin: Vlast i iskusstvo* (Moscow: Respublika, 1998), 149.
9. Clark and Dobrenko, *Soviet Culture and Power,* 249–301; Katerina Clark, *Petersburg, Crucible of Cultural Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), 288–289.
10. Yelena Osokina, *Our Daily Bread: Socialist Distribution and the Art of Survival in Stalin's Russia, 1927–1941* (Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 2001), 65–66.
11. On the fear of marginalization, see Hellbeck, *Revolution on My Mind,* 295–297, 350–351; Lev Anninsky, "Monologi byvshego stalintsa," in *Perestroika: Glasnost, demokratia, sotsializm: "Osmyslit kult Stalina"* (Moscow: Progress, 1989), 55. See the description by the young "proletarian" writer Alexander Avdeenko of his conversation with Prince Dmitry Mirsky, an aristocratic writer who returned to the USSR. Avdeenko, "Otluchenie," *Znamia* 3 and 4 (1989), as analyzed in Ruder, *Making History for Stalin,* 59–62; and the diary of Andrei Arzhilovsky in Véronique Garros, Natalia Korenevskaya, and Thomas Lahusen, eds., *Intimacy and Terror: Soviet Diaries of the 1930s,* trans. Carol A. Flath (New York: New Press, 1995), 139.

12. Papers of Dmitry S. Likhachev, fond 769, Manuscript Division of the Institute of Russian Literature, St. Petersburg; Dmitry S. Likhachev, *Reflections on the Russian Soul: A Memoir* (Budapest: CEU, 1995), 195–196. On the psychological and moral fallout of the Great Terror years, see Orlando Figes, *The Whisperers: Private Life in Stalin's Russia* (New York: Metropolitan, 2007), 227–315.
13. Lazar Fleishman, *Boris Pasternak i literaturnoe dvizheniie 1930-kh godov* (Moscow: Akademicheskii Proekt, 2005), 9, 51–54, 65, 108, 167, 180; Andrei Artizov and Oleg Naumov, eds., *Vlast i khudozhestvennaia intelligentsia: Dokumenty TsK RKP(b), VChK-OGPU-NKVD o kulturnoi politike, 1917–1953* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodny Fond Demokratiia, 2002), 216, 275; Y. B. Pasternak and Y. V. Pasternak, eds., *Boris Pasternak: Pisma k roditeliam i sestram, 1907–1960* (Moscow: Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie, 2004), 572. Interview with Yevgeny Pasternak, the poet's son and biographer, in *Vestnik,* June 23, 1998, at http://www.vestnik.com/issues/98/0623/win/nuzov.htm. See also B. M. Borisov, "Reka, raspakhnutaia nastezh: K tvorcheskoi istorii romana Borisa Pasternaka 'Doktor Zhivago,'" at http://pasternak.niv.ru/pasternak/bio/borisov-reka.htm.
14. Pasternak, *Boris Pasternak* (Internet version).
15. Entry in Afinogenov's diary, published in *Voprosy Literatury* 2 (1990): 113–114; on Afinogenov's background and diary, see Hellbeck, *Revolution on My Mind,* 285–345; on Pasternak's humanist religiosity, see Dmitry Bykov, *Boris Pasternak* (Moscow: Molodaia Gvardiia, 2007), 607–609.
16. Cited, from the NKVD files, in Clark and Dobrenko, *Soviet Culture and Power,* 318.
17. Vera Sandomirsky, "Soviet War Poetry," *Russian Review* 4, no. 1 (Autumn 1944): 47–66; Catherine Merridale, *Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939–1945* (New York: Metropolitan, 2006).
18. Cited in Pasternak, *Boris Pasternak.*
19. From Boris Pasternak, "Dawn," translation by Vladislav Zubok.
20. Joshua Rubenstein, *Tangled Loyalties: The Life and Times of Ilya Ehrenburg* (New York: Basic, 1996); Benedikt Sarnov, *Sluchai Erenburga* (Moscow: Tekst, 2004).
21. Konstantin Simonov, "Wait for Me," translation by Vladislav Zubok.
22. *Znamia* 8 (1989): 147.
23. See the autobiographical preface in A. Tvardovsky, *Stikhotvoreniia i poemy v dvukh tomakh* (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia Literatura, 1951); and Regina Romanova, *Alexander Tvardovsky: Trudy i dni* (Moscow: Vodolei, 2006).
24. Evgeny Dobrenko, *Formovka sovetskogo pisatelia: Sotsialnye i esteticheskie istoki sovetskoi literaturnoi kultury* (St. Petersburg: Akademicheskii Proiekt, 1999), 302–347.
25. Sandomirsky, "Soviet War Poetry," 63; fragments from Tvardovsky's war diary, "Iz zapisnoi potertoi knizhki (Zapisi A. T. Tvardovskogo, 1944–45 gg.)," *Druzhba Narodov* 6 (2000): 182.
26. Clark and Dobrenko, *Soviet Culture and Power,* 356, 357, 359.

27. Katerina Clark, *The Soviet Novel: History as Ritual*, 3rd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), 191, 199–209; Veniamin Kaverin, *Epilog: Memuary* (Moscow: Russkaia Kniga, 2000), 339.
28. Clark and Dobrenko, *Soviet Culture and Power*, 109–113.
29. Isaiah Berlin, *Personal Impressions*, ed. Henry Hardy (New York: Viking, 1981), 177.
30. Vladislav Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 59–60; Likhachev, *Reflections on the Russian Soul*, 267–277.
31. Rubenstein, *Tangled Loyalties*, 253–276; Rubenstein and Vladimir P. Naumov, eds., *Stalin's Secret Pogrom: The Postwar Inquisition of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2001).
32. On Simonov, see Boris Pankin, *Chetyre ia Konstantina Simonova* (Moscow: Voskresenie, 1999); Natalia Ivanova, "Konstantin Simonov glazami cheloveka moego pokoleniia," *Znamia* 7 (1999); and Lev Anninsky, "Konstantin Simonov: 'Ia prishel vovremia,'" *Svobodnaia Mysl* 7 (2005): 154.
33. As indicated earlier, the phrase "imagined community" is inspired by Benedict Anderson's book *Imagined Communities*.
34. Boris Pasternak, *Doctor Zhivago*, trans. Max Hayward and Manya Harari (New York: Pantheon, 1958), 359.
35. Pasternak and Pasternak, *Zhizn Borisa Pasternaka*.
36. Pasternak, *Boris Pasternak: Biografiia*, 2nd ed. (Moscow: Tsitadel, 1997), 691–692.
37. It was quickly translated into English by Max Hayward and Manya Harari. Patricia Blake, introduction, Max Hayward, *Writers in Russia, 1917–1978* (London: Harvill, 1983), xlix–l.
38. Zapiska sekretaria TsK KPSS Suslova s predlozheniiem mer v sviazi s prisuzhdeniem B. L. Pasternaku Nobelevskoi premii po literature, Oct. 23, 1958, in V. Y. Afiani and N. G. Tomilina, "A za mnoiu shum pogoni . . . ," in *Boris Pasternak i vlast: Dokumenty, 1956–1960* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2001), 144–145.
39. Vladimir Semichastny, *Bespokoinoe serdtse* (Moscow: Vagrius, 2002), 72–74; Andrei Voznesensky, *Na virtualnom vetru* (Moscow: Vagrius, 2000), 34–35; William Taubman, *Khrushchev: The Man and His Era* (New York: Norton, 2003), 385.
40. From Boris Pasternak, "Nobel Prize," translation by Vladislav Zubok.
41. Pasternak and Pasternak, *Zhizn Borisa Pasternaka*, 466–467.
42. Kaverin, *Epilog*, 381–382; *Novy Mir* 2 (1990): 172.
43. Grigory Pomerants, *Zapiski gadkogo utenka* (Moscow: Moskovskii Rabochii, 1998), 309.
44. Among the descriptions of the funeral see Lidia Chukovskaia, diary entry of June 2, 1960, in Chukovskaia, *Sochinenia v dvukh tomakh* (Moscow: Gudyal-Press, 2000), 2:263–266; and Kaverin, *Epilog*, 385–387.
45. David Samoilov, *Pamiatnye zapiski* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia, 1995), 360.
46. Pasternak, *Doctor Zhivago*, 508.

47. Ethan Pollock, *Stalin and the Soviet Science Wars* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006), 3–4.
48. Igor Vinogradov, "Stalin—ideiny tiran" (on the fiftieth anniversary of the Twentieth Party Congress), *Znamia* 7 (2006), at http://magazines.russ.ru/znamia/2006/7/ko9.html.
49. See http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/laureates/1987/brodsky-lecture-e.html.

1. The "Children" Grow Up, 1945-1955

1. Elena Zubkova, *Russia after the War: Hopes, Illusions, and Disappointments, 1945–1957*, trans. Hugh Ragsdale (Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1998), 36; Anatoly S. Cherniaev, *Moia zhizn i moe vremia* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia, 1995), 195.
2. For poignant memories of this environment, see Eduard Kochergin, *Angelova kukla: Rasskazy risovalnogo cheloveka* (St. Petersburg: Ivan Limbakh, 2006).
3. Georgy Knabe, "Final: Arbatskaia epopeia," in T. Kniazevskaia, ed., *Russkaia intelligentsia* (Moscow: Nauka, 1999), 342–350; Cherniaev, *Moia zhizn*, 38–44; author's interview with historian Sigurd Shmidt, Jan. 17, 2008, Moscow. See also Stephen V. Bittner, *The Many Lives of Khrushchev's Thaw: Experience and Memory in Moscow's Arbat* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2008), 19–39.
4. P. Gorelik, ed., *Boris Slutsky: Vospominaniia sovremennikov* (St. Petersburg: Neva, 2005), 550; Boris Slutsky, *Things That Happened*, ed., trans., and intro. G. S. Smith (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1998), 61.
5. David Samoilov, *Podennye zapisi* (Moscow: Vremia, 2002), 1:78, 86, 97, 107.
6. Oleg Troianovsky, *Cherez gody i rasstoiania* (Moscow: Vagrius, 1997), 94.
7. Samoilov wrote in his diary in October 1941 that his circle, "still anonymous for the state, offered its services to the state." Samoilov, *Podennyie zapisi*, 1:139.
8. Ibid.
9. Elke Scherstjanoi, "Germaniia i nemtsy v pismakh krasnoarmeitsev vesnoi 1945 g.," *Novaia i Noveishaia Istoriia* 2 (2002): 137–151; Samoilov, *Podennye zapisi*, 1, 209; Slutsky, *Things That Happened*, 71.
10. Vera Sandomirsky, "Soviet War Poetry," *Russian Review* 4, no. 1 (Autumn 1944): 66.
11. Boris Slutsky, *O drugikh i o sebe* (Moscow: Vagrius, 2005); Nikolai Inozemtsev, *Frontovoi dnevnik* (Moscow: Nauka, 2005), 181, 227.
12. This topic was virtually taboo in historical studies until the 1990s. See Norman Naimark, *Russians in Germany* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995); Antony Beevor, *The Fall of Berlin, 1945* (New York: Viking, 2002), 28–31, 108–110; Catherine Merridale, *Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939–1945* (New York: Metropolitan, 2006), 309–320; Cherniaev, *Moia zhizn*, 132–133, 191–192. See also excerpts from the war diaries of Boris Slutsky, "Iz 'zapisok o voine,'" *Ogonyok*, Apr. 17, 1995; war letters of Viktor Olenev published in

the young intelligentsia, whereas in 1980 that dream had faded away, along with the Soviet communist project. Very few could predict that just five years later the conservative reign would come to an end, or that in three years more the streets of Moscow would be filled with huge demonstrations and rallies, led and inspired by writers, journalists, and artists.

The Pharisee claims all, and I'm alone.
This life is not a stroll across the meadow.

—Boris Pasternak, "Hamlet," 1946

epilogue

The End of the Intelligentsia

In March 1985 the septuagenarian Kremlin rulers loosened their grip on power. The fifty-four-year-old Mikhail Gorbachev became the general secretary of the Communist Party. Igor Dedkov wrote in his diary, "A man of our generation has come to power. A new cycle of Russian illusions is about to begin."[1] Soon the new leader began to speak of achieving "more socialism," branded the Brezhnev years a period of stagnation, and finally began to talk about the need for perestroika (restructuring). Gorbachev and his wife Raisa, as we have seen, belonged to the postwar Moscow student generation. They had left Moscow for the provincial southern town of Stavropol in 1955, at the time when the Thaw was becoming noticeable. Like most of their classmates, the Gorbachevs had an insatiable appetite for high culture, and a veneration for writers and intellectuals. In the 1950s, when they had lived in Moscow in the Stromynka dorm, they had spent all their free time at museums, theaters, and poetry readings. These habits continued when the couple left Moscow. Gorbachev was the only one among the rising party leaders who read books on philosophy, sociology, and history, as well as Lenin's early works. In the summer of 1967 he had long off-the-record discussions with his former university roommate, Zdeněk Mlynář, by then a senior official in the Czechoslovak Communist Party, who had come to Stavropol to see his old friend. Like Mlynář, Gorbachev became convinced of the need to search for a more human and

liberal model of socialism. A few months later Mlynář came out in support of the Prague Spring, and he later emigrated to the West.

Gorbachev never revealed that his sympathies lay with the party reformers at that time; he continued his successful career. Yet Mikhail and Raisa managed to escape the cynicism of many in their age cohort who became unprincipled careerists. Moreover, the Gorbachevs remained untouched by the disillusionments and bitter divisions that profoundly affected their Moscow-based classmates, the former idealistic students. In 1985 the Gorbachevs continued to believe in the ideas most of Zhivago's children had cherished thirty years before. The two neither abandoned their Marxist-Leninist views nor resorted to cultural escapism. Above all, they continued their self-education. They read and discussed the ideas of Jean-Paul Sartre, Martin Heidegger, and Herbert Marcuse. They read *History of the USSR*, written by the Italian communist Giuseppe Boffa, the works of Palmiro Togliatti, the books of Antonio Gramsci, and the articles of socialists Willi Brandt and François Mitterrand. Also, while remaining Soviet Russian patriots, Mikhail and Raisa rejected the anti-Semitism of the Russian nationalists as a shameful betrayal of the socialist ideals of their youth. They were curious to see the world outside the borders of the USSR. They traveled together across Western Europe as tourists, and these trips, together with their reading, made them question Soviet realities without losing hope in a "better socialism." When the Gorbachevs went to live in Moscow in 1978 (the year Gorbachev joined the secretariat and the Politburo), they tried to make up for two decades of life in the provinces. The couple spent every Sunday in museums, methodically explored the city's historical monuments, attended exhibitions and theaters. Raisa reconnected with her classmates from the 1950s, by that time renowned philosophers or sociologists.[2]

Gorbachev was the first Soviet leader since Lenin who was friendly to intellectuals. Determined to return the Soviet Union to the path of reform, he was driven, like other enlightened apparatchiks, by a sense of shame at the inferiority of Soviet social and economic conditions by comparison with the West. In 1983, during his official visit to Canada, Gorbachev conversed with the Soviet ambassador Alexander Yakovlev, who was living out an honorable exile there after his clash with Russian nationalists. Yakovlev showed Gorbachev around prosperous Canadian farms, knowing well that they would greatly impress a former country boy from "black-soil" Russia. Gorbachev gazed at them and muttered to himself, "Even after

fifty years we will not be able to reach this level of efficiency." Yakovlev said later to his friend, a veteran of Thaw-era "honest" journalism, "You won't believe it, but he was attacking the system more vigorously than I would or even you."[3] Gorbachev had no sympathy for the dissidents or the circles that supported them; however, he made an exception for Andrei Sakharov (whom he brought back in November 1986 to Moscow from exile in Gorky) and ended up sharing Sakharov's views on the danger of nuclear war and the need for thinking globally about international security. Gorbachev also believed that the best elements of the intelligentsia could be an important force for reform and could supply him with advice. Publicly claiming that the Brezhnev years had been a time of stagnation, Gorbachev turned to "the best forces of his generation," including Moscow intellectual and artistic circles, in hopes of re-creating the cultural and intellectual vanguard of the sixties.[4] He met regularly with the most distinguished writers. His brain trust consisted of international scientific and economic experts and enlightened party apparatchiks like Alexander Yakovlev and Anatoly Cherniaev.[5]

In 1986–87 Gorbachev began to lift the Iron Curtain and, like Khrushchev, invited writers and artists to promote the new "human face" of the Soviet Union abroad. To assist in Gorbachev's exercise of public diplomacy, they accompanied him on his foreign trips. In March 1987 an official delegation of Soviet writers, journalists, and historians for the first time met with ex-Soviet émigré writers, at a conference in Denmark. Almost all of them had belonged to the same generation and lived through the hopes and illusions of the post-Stalin decade. Among the émigrés were Aksyonov, Siniavsky, and Etkind. The first day ended in scandal. When Etkind, by that time a professor at the Sorbonne, made a presentation entitled "Soviet Literature—An Apologia for Violence," a member of the Soviet delegation, Grigory Baklanov, began to shout that he, as a war veteran, would not tolerate such a disgrace. Suddenly the historian Yuri Afanasiev, an MGU student from the class of 1956, took the floor on the Soviet side and said: "We are all from Russia [*rossiyane*]. Why should we stay divided?" This appeal to Russian cultural identity, instead of the *Soviet Union*, brought tears to everyone's eyes, including the Russian Jews.[6] It was a milestone. The postwar generation of intellectuals and artists, the émigrés and those who remained, dissidents and nondissidents, Jews and non-Jews, began to reestablish broken relationships. Afanasiev's appeal to the intellectuals to rally

around a reform-oriented Russian identity was a harbinger of great political changes. At the same time, the urge to rally together as the Russian intelligentsia in support of reform was deceptive, considering the internal divisions that had existed over history, identity, cultural preferences, and political agenda.

It became commonplace to explain Gorbachev's reformism as an offshoot of his early affinity with the cultural and intellectual left.[7] The evidence however shows that initially Gorbachev sought to invite all the groups in the divided Moscow intelligentsia and cultural elite to become partners in and backers of his perestroika.[8] In November 1986 at the suggestion of the scholar Dmitry Likhachev, Gorbachev established the Soviet Cultural Foundation, which from 1986 to 1991 raised one hundred million rubles for its projects.[9] The mission of the foundation was to unify and mobilize the best and the brightest to carry out reforms. Gorbachev and his wife had read and liked the books of Likhachev, a scholar of art and literature. In their eyes, Likhachev, who had been educated in St. Petersburg before the Revolution, embodied the qualities of a true Russian *intelligent*. He did not share the negativism of dissident and semidissident "society." He loved the Russian Orthodox tradition and the legacy of the religious thinkers. At the same time, he rejected anti-Semitism and the xenophobia of Russian nationalists and considered Russia to be part of European civilization. As a result, according to James Billington, Likhachev became "a part-time tutor on Russian cultural history to Gorbachev and particularly to his wife Raisa."[10] Likhachev also became the head of the Soviet Cultural Foundation and in this capacity was supposed to serve as mentor to all Zhivago's children, whether on the left or on the right.

At first, experienced Moscow intellectuals, the remnants of the sixties cultural ferment, were skeptical that substantial changes could come from above. Yuri Levada, a sociologist, remembered people's fear that, as had happened many times before, the leader's mood would change or the leader himself would be ousted. "They all placed their hopes in Gorbachev, and tried not to do anything that would drive away the beautiful dream that he brought with him."[11] Alexander Yakovlev, now a member of Gorbachev's political team, pushed his old acquaintances in the cultural elite and the journalists of the sixties into action. "Publish everything, but do not lie," he said to the editors. "The responsibility should be yours."[12] This was the freedom that Tvardovsky had sought so desperately to win. The first ones who appropriated this freedom were journalists, theater directors, and playwrights. Yegor Yakovlev, Otto Latsis, and Len Karpinsky turned an obscure newspaper, *Moscow News*, into the glasnost publication that resuscitated the traditions of "honest" journalism of the early sixties. Oleg Yefremov and the playwright Mikhail Shatrov restaged the sixties plays about revolutionaries, Lenin and the Bolsheviks, which seemed to underscore Gorbachev's slogan "More socialism!"

In 1986 Gorbachev and his reformist lieutenants urged the incorporated writers, artists, and filmmakers to democratize their unions and rid them of the "ballast" of the Brezhnev era. The Filmmakers' Union was the first to take this invitation seriously. Its congress in May 1986 resembled the agitated meetings of spring 1956 and fall 1962. The new leadership of the union consisted of leading cinematic lights of the sixties. The recently appointed head of the Filmmakers' Union, the filmmaker Elem Klimov, promised in his interview for *Pravda* to bar "the path to the screen to hacks, timeservers, and wheeler-dealers" and to clear "a broad path for people of talent and artists" who could "meet the criteria of genuine art." He deplored the spread of entertainment cinema and asserted: "We have to enlighten [people] and make them want to think." The new union leaders released all the films banned by censors during the Brezhnevite "stagnation."[13]

The greatest sensation of glasnost cinema was the film *Repentance* by the Georgian director Tengiz Abuladze. It was an exquisite work of art and a poignant, trenchant denunciation of the Great Terror, secretly produced with the personal authorization of Georgian Party Secretary Eduard Shevardnadze. In October 1986 Gorbachev's colleague Alexander Yakovlev watched the film at home with his family. He recalled: "When it was over, we fell silent for ten minutes. The film took my breath away. It was more than a fresh breeze, it was a hurricane." At that time Gorbachev and the KGB decided to begin releasing political prisoners, as part of the campaign to improve the Soviet image abroad. The unveiling of *Repentance* accorded well with those steps. The Politburo decided at first to send five hundred copies of the film to the provinces, where the KGB monitored the reaction of the audience. In Moscow *Repentance* opened in the midsize screening hall of the Filmmakers' Union in November 1986. For many intellectuals from the postwar generation the event seemed like a replay of fall 1956, when Dudintsev's novel was discussed. The hall was packed; mounted police surrounded the building. After the film many people were weeping.

They knelt before Abuladze and kissed his hands, as if in a trance. Other viewers, however, left the theater, perhaps in protest.[14] Foreign correspondents and television stations waited outside for the crowd to emerge and asked for opinions. And people spoke into the microphones, thus crossing the long-standing divide between private dissent and public conformism.

In 1987 writers and editors from literary journals joined the filmmakers. A season of frank speeches, bold publications, and sensational performances began. The editor of the literary journal *Znamia*, Grigory Baklanov, a war veteran who had belonged to the leftists of the 1960s, published a novel by Anatoly Pristavkin about the murderous deportation of the Chechen people during the Great Patriotic War.[15] In the avalanche of new publications were Anatoly Rybakov's *Children of Arbat*, Vladimir Dudintsev's novel *White Clothes*, and Nikolai Shmelev's fiction and articles. Readers were also hungry for historical, economic, and sociological facts. The circulation of literary journals, no longer limited, grew astronomically, far surpassing the circulation of *Novy Mir* and other journals during the sixties. Finally, the state television channels also began to catch up, showing documentaries on the consequences of the Chernobyl nuclear accident and inviting artists and intellectuals to speak live on issues ranging from Stalinism to the environment. The message in televised discussions was that the entire system, immutable during the years of stagnation, had to change, so that socialism could live up to its potential. The long list of taboo subjects that could not be discussed in the Soviet media shrank rapidly.

Many figures from the leftist avant-garde in the early 1960s did not make it to the front rank during perestroika. Many stayed in emigration and remained highly suspicious and critical of Gorbachev's intentions. Some émigrés pointed to Gorbachev's phrase "more socialism" as proof of his opposition to genuine freedom and democratic reforms.[16] Yevtushenko, Voznesensky, and other poets from the early 1960s published extensively during the perestroika and glasnost years, but their "sincere" lyrical voices were lost in the new environment of public revelations. Slutsky died in 1986, alone and hiding from friends. Samoilov lived in Estonia, far from the politics of perestroika, and died during a poetry reading in 1989. Some scientists, riding the wave of Gorbachev's campaign for nuclear disarmament, gained public visibility. At the same time, by comparison with the early 1960s, in this era scientists were no longer public heroes. In the aftermath of the Chernobyl tragedy, there was a public backlash against nuclear scientists. Many, especially village writers, acted on their resentment over the scientists' earlier preeminence by successfully presenting scientific communities as groups of selfish and arrogant technocrats who sacrificed humanity to their utopian schemes, ignored historical and moral issues, and destroyed the environment. In a word, scientists were now blamed for what they had been admired for just three decades earlier.[17]

At the same time, numerous other figures, among them artists, historians, journalists, and actors, began to claim they belonged to the ranks in perestroika's "progressive intelligentsia." The majority were from the postwar student generation. The Thaw dream of a partnership between a reform-minded political leadership and the progressive intellectual and artistic elites seemed again to be coming to fruition. Yet as in the 1960s, this development revealed a sharp polarization between the "cosmopolitans" and the Russian nationalists, as symbolized by Gorbachev's two lieutenants. Yegor Ligachev favored the Russian nationalists, lacked any rapport with Moscow-based liberal society, and had distinctly conservative and provincial predilections. Alexander Yakovlev, on the contrary, was the archenemy of the Russian patriots and had numerous friends in sixties cultural circles in Moscow. After his demotion as the result of an article against the Russian nationalists, Yakovlev underwent a radical conversion: he began to speak about the ideas and tragic fate of the dissidents, he began to appeal to the émigrés, and he became convinced that the country needed, above all, democratization, glasnost, and cultural liberalization.[18]

Before long the Russian nationalists, who had procured many prominent positions in the rejuvenated and reformed Union of Soviet Writers, took a very negative attitude toward Gorbachev's glasnost. They argued, at first privately and then publicly, that it was a disastrous mistake to let the left-leaning Moscow intellectuals and dissidents define the agenda of reform. Those people, the argument went, did not care about the Russian people and the Russian state, but rather tended only to destabilize and confuse society. The established nationalist writers, journalists, and artists were particularly opposed to the growing assault on Stalinism, which in their eyes represented a period of great achievements when the empire had been built. In late 1986 anti-Semitic Russian patriots began to build up their network of local nongovernment associations, among them antialcohol societies and the "historical-patriotic society" Pamiat (Memory). These associations were especially active in Moscow and Akademgorodok. In Novosibirsk

a group of scientists of the Siberian branch of the Academy of Sciences, along with local party officials, organized lectures for students and general public at which the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion" and other supposed evidence of a Judeo-Masonic conspiracy in the Soviet Union were distributed. The patriots targeted the reformist economist Aganbegyan and even the late party leader Yuri Andropov as members of the conspiracy.[19] On March 13, 1988, the newspaper *Sovetskaia Rossia*, one of the havens of Russian nationalists, published a letter by Nina Andreeva, an obscure professor at the Polytechnic Institute in Leningrad. She defended socialist principles but also attacked the notion that one group of intellectuals and artists could be the "leading and mobilizing force" of perestroika. The article claimed that intellectuals who were allegedly promoting "left-wing liberal socialism," were in reality trying to "slaughter socialist values" and undermine the Soviet state. The article specified what was destructive in the activities of the former vanguard of the sixties intelligentsia: "the value placed on individuality, the modernist search in culture, God-seeking tendencies, theocratic idols, sermons on the 'democratic' pleasures of modern capitalism, and genuflection before capitalist achievements, real or false."[20] The article also defended Stalin as a great statesman and linked the adherents of "left-wing liberalism" with the Jewish emigration and "cosmopolitan" trends associated with Jews. The original, unedited letter from Andreeva, which was even more explicitly anti-Semitic, drew ominous parallels between Gorbachev's glasnost and the Prague Spring.[21]

The Andreeva letter gave Russian patriots in the bureaucracy and society as a whole the signal for the counterattack. Ligachev and some members of Gorbachev's Politburo embraced Andreeva's theses. The publication began to look to rank-and-file communists like a new ideological doctrine. Not a single journal dared to publish a rejoinder to Andreeva. The intellectuals of Moscow and Leningrad froze in fearful silence. After painful weeks of waiting, it became clear that Gorbachev interpreted the article as an attack on his policy. In contrast to Khrushchev and Brezhnev, the Soviet leader had taken the Prague Spring as a model for his reformist strategies. He did not fear that a group of freethinking writers and intellectuals would incite a political revolution. He worshipped Lenin as a model politician and was supremely confident that like the Bolshevik founding father, his successor would remain in control of events. *Pravda* published the official rejection of Andreeva's views, condemning her arguments point by point. The rejoinder proclaimed the freedom of cultural and intellectual pursuits. The party issued instructions eliminating the Stalinist policies of party control over the cultural sphere, collectively known as *Zhdanovshchina*. The laws abolishing both censorship and the state monopoly on mass media followed much later, in June 1990, yet de facto the policy of ideological censorship collapsed in spring 1988. The meaning of the past, present, and future, as well as the content of the "new thinking" itself, was open to interpretation not only within the party ranks, but in society at large.[22]

The next year and a half became the golden age of glasnost. The dream of the cultural vanguard of the postwar generation came true. Gorbachev embraced the concept of the intelligentsia as the generator of a reformist climate. He allowed artists and intellectuals to make use of enormous state resources, including state-owned media, to articulate their ideas and ideals to tens of millions of people inside the Soviet Union and abroad. The response from the aging veterans of the sixties was understandably euphoric. It seemed as if the history of their generation had resumed at the point where it had been forcibly arrested in 1968. Soon, however, it became clear to Gorbachev and his reform-minded entourage what the Czechoslovak party reformers had experienced twenty years earlier. Once they had abolished censorship and decided to use the liberalization of the ideological and cultural sphere as a tool to mobilize against the entrenched antireformist forces, it became increasingly difficult to stop that liberalization halfway. And from the revelations of Stalinist crimes, Soviet glasnost inevitably and predictably led to the questioning of the entire foundation of Soviet socialism, including its revolutionary and patriotic myths. In 1988–89 explosive questions about the Revolution and Soviet history emerged in the pages of literary journals and in glasnost-era newspapers, and finally in television programs.[23] The carefully calibrated half-truths of the Khrushchev era were no longer possible. From the special sections of the libraries *(spetskhrany)* opened in 1988–89 thousands of books became available to the general public, books containing a wealth of noncommunist philosophy, political science, history, and economics, and the treasure trove of Russian émigré memoirs and literature. Samizdat ceased to be subversive and became a legitimate part of public media and discussions. In July and August 1988 the first nongovernment newspapers appeared in Moscow. At the same time, former political prisoners organized the group Memorial to document the history of Soviet terror and the persecution of dissidents. In November

1988 the authorities stopped jamming Western radio broadcasts, and the enormous and costly system that had been used for jamming stations was allocated to serve the needs of domestic broadcasting.

From that moment on, glasnost took on a momentum of its own. Writers, economists, sociologists, and even historians issued broadsides against the myths of the Soviet past and present. The new wave of hope and even euphoria among Moscow intellectuals and artists was darkened only by the memory of past setbacks. In a volume summarizing glasnost for Western readers, an elite *institutchik* from the Baby Boom generation expressed the prevailing mood in educated circles in Moscow: "For the first time in my life I feel optimistic and hopeful. For me now my country is the most interesting place in the world. I can barely remember 1956 and the Twentieth Party Congress (I was just six years old at that time), but the atmosphere of enthusiasm in the early 1960s and the ensuing bitterness at the end of that decade are preserved in my memory." For those of Zhivago's children who were entering the fifth or sixth decade of their lives, perestroika was the last chance. This time the reforms could not fail! Eventually, even Gorbachev himself seemed to have been caught up in this "win or perish" attitude. After 1987 he kept repeating that there was no way back and that the failure of perestroika would mean the end of socialism in the Soviet Union.[24]

The founding myths of the regime—the Bolshevik Revolution and the role of Vladimir Lenin—soon came under fierce attack from cosmopolitans and Russian patriots alike. The journalist Vasily Seliunin unmasked Lenin as a violent, doctrinaire fanatic who brought a national catastrophe down on Russia. The historian Yuri Afanasiev denounced the very foundations of the Soviet state and society and wrote about "sixty years of spiritual void and decay."[25] A bit later, the theater director Mark Zakharov publicly proposed that Lenin's body be removed from the mausoleum on Red Square. Vladimir Soloukhin published his anti-Lenin tract in the émigré journal *Posev;* Radio Liberty then broadcast it to all of Russia. The publication of Solzhenitsyn's works in the Soviet Union, along with Grossman's novels, dealt crushing blows to the popular faith in Lenin, the last myth of late Soviet society.[26] The Russian-born American pundit Leon Aron commented, about the cultural and ideological revolution of that time, "Its most original and most dangerous feature is the precision with which the heavy artillery is targeted, and the depth of shell penetration. In Gorbachev's Soviet Union, almost every major legitimizing myth is being shattered." He concluded that Gorbachev, who had set out to create a reformed version of one-party state socialism with a human face, had "unleashed forces that [were] methodically destroying the legitimacy of any such future arrangement. No economic reform, no amount of Western good will, and no brilliant foreign policy stratagems," he added, "can hope to fill this spiritual vacuum."[27] A Moscow intellectual, Lev Osterman, wrote in his diary, "We, the omniscient intelligentsia, should contain our egocentric revelatory passion—in order not to alienate people who might otherwise begin to loathe us for our enlightening mission." Osterman believed that it would be better "to reveal the truth about our past gradually—little by little."[28] Instead, the "perestroika intelligentsia" sponsored by Gorbachev acted with frenzied fervor in attacking the very idols they had recently worshipped and feared.[29] The majority of educated Soviet Russian society experienced disillusionment and demoralization on a large scale. Feeling cheated and claiming to having been hopelessly naive for decades gave rise to a collective inferiority complex. "Homo Sovieticus," the gullible and conformist Soviet citizen, became the target of masochistic social satire, later repeated in public speeches by numerous intellectuals and artists.

Nobody realized that this was the last time that the intelligentsia, as either an idea or a reform-minded community, would play a central role in Russian history. Zhivago's children, because of the cultural differences dividing them and the hatred all of them felt toward the Soviet regime, even though it was now headed by Gorbachev, contributed inadvertently to the self-destruction of the Soviet Union. The squabbling chattering classes, along with Gorbachev himself, dug the grave not only of Soviet communism, but also of the Soviet state. In the spring of 1989 the radical and rapid cultural de-Stalinization of Russian society spilled over into politics. Former dissidents, now skeptical observers of Gorbachev's policies—Sakharov, Bonner, and others—saw the main danger to perestroika as coming from the vast party and bureaucratic apparatus, as well as the KGB. They mistrusted Gorbachev and criticized his vacillations. Their own experience made them believe that radical democratization and peaceful rallies and strikes against the "Stalinist apparatus" could be the only guarantee against the threat of a "Khrushchev scenario," such as the one that had ended in Khrushchev's ouster and the triumph of Brezhnevism. A minority of Gorbachev's advisers, enlightened apparatchiks like Yakovlev and Cherniaev, thought along similar lines. All of them, and the freedom-hungry Musco-

vite intellectuals, pushed the general secretary toward fundamental democratization, delegitimation of the party, and reliance on peaceful mass rallies. Gorbachev reluctantly followed this advice, and he was also guided by his own reasons. The Kremlin reformer, being confident of his political skills, believed he could ride two horses at once: stay in control of the party apparatus and manage gradual democratization.

In any political revolution, the muses cede the place of honor to political speeches, mass rallies, and public demonstrations. Some intellectuals and nationally known cultural figures sought to ride the crest of radical politics. Dozens of them, mostly established sixties leftists, but also former dissidents, were elected in the spring 1989 to the new national legislative body, the Congress of People's Deputies. Tens of thousands of intellectuals and artists came out of their oases and into the public realm for the first time in their lives. With the passion and devotion emblematic of a reawakened intelligentsia, they helped elect their moral leaders and came to listen to their speeches. When the conservative leadership of the Academy of Sciences tried to prevent the election of Andrei Sakharov to the People's Congress, hundreds and then thousands of scientists and humanitarian scholars from Moscow institutes protested, and the heroic human rights defender was elected. The constituency of intellectuals thus emerged as a factor in the politics in Moscow and Leningrad, and then even in some major provincial cities of Russia.

This constituency included hundreds of thousands of scientists, engineers, librarians, teachers, academic researchers, physicians, and other professionals. The largest and most outspoken contingent among them consisted of the postwar students who had emulated *stiliagi*, read *Novy Mir*, and listened to Western radio and the songs of Okudzhava, Galich, Vysotsky, and other songwriters of the sixties. During all those years, especially in the so-called time of stagnation, they had behaved like conformists and cultural escapists. Now they sought to compensate for the decades of past moral humiliation and doublethinking. Political liberalization and freedom of speech, conscience, and assembly became their watchwords. In their eyes, dissidents like Sakharov and scholars like Likhachev from the semidissident circles embodied the moral and cultural vision of the intelligentsia as they conceived it.

Meanwhile, the political reforms presented new and unfamiliar challenges to both leaders and followers of this movement. The leader of pere-

The academician Dmitry S. Likhachev among the delegates to the Congress of People's Deputies, May 1989. Instead of bringing about a cultural renaissance, the intelligentsia's politics contributed to the demise of the Soviet Union (Courtesy of the Likhachev Foundation, St. Petersburg).

stroika, Gorbachev, was the object of international admiration elicited by his initiatives in disarmament, security cooperation, and above all rapprochement with the West. One by one the Soviet satellites of the Warsaw Pact began to overthrow their communist regimes. On November 9, 1989, the Berlin Wall was breached and the two German states began to move toward reunification. At the same time, Gorbachev and the Politburo were increasingly divided and overwhelmed by domestic changes and processes. Economic and financial crises loomed large in the Soviet Union. From 1986 to 1989, the salaries and honoraria of the creative and scientific elites increased sharply, but soon the collapsing economic and financial system buried those gains under its rubble. Rigidity and disorganization in the state distributive structures and misguided measures to introduce private initiative without changing the centralized system precipitated disastrous consequences, including the disappearance of consumer goods from the stores. Outside Soviet Russia, in the Baltics and in the South Caucasus, non-Russian nationalist forces clashed violently with one another, and with the Soviet state, spilling blood and provoking pogroms and ethnic cleansing. Gorbachev, the rest of the Kremlin leadership, and the more moderate among the experts surrounding them, having been caught unawares, could offer no recipe for reform, no blueprints or consistent strategies. The Soviet Union was sliding into the abyss.[30]

Neither did the best and the brightest have any specific plan for meeting the challenges posed by radical change. Even the best minds in the sixties intelligentsia were not up to the task of reforming Soviet society while pre-

serving sufficient stability in the Soviet Union. In the economic sphere, Gorbachev's advisers were the same sixties reformist journalists and economists who had sought a third path between the centralized Stalinist economy and free-enterprise capitalism. Between 1986 and 1989 they had partially dismantled the existing economic mechanisms. At the same time, nobody, from the reform-minded economists (Aganbegyan, Zaslavskaia, Lisichkin, and others) to the journalists and writers (Seliunin, Shmelev, Latsis, and Chernichenko), knew what to do in the present or in the future about economics and finances. Their schemes for reform revolved around vague notions of an ethical and participatory economy that would somehow combine the promises of the Revolution with the efficiency of modern technological processes. In a word, they diagnosed a terminal illness yet could not prescribe a cure. Some of them proposed "going back to NEP," Lenin's policy of tolerance for the peasantry and small entrepreneurs. Yet at the end of the 1980s the peasantry was as good as moribund, and attempts to create a new class of "cooperators" ran aground because of the abysmal corruption and conflicts between the state apparatus and the new entrepreneurs. The majority of reformist economists claimed that economic reforms required fundamental changes in society, especially a new working-class consciousness of co-ownership and participation in management. These utopian aims emerged under the influence of partial economic reforms in Yugoslavia and Hungary, which had, however, long failed to produce any tangible results. Such programs as workers' councils, socialist cooperatives, and regulation of profit could only generate financial and economic chaos in the Soviet Union.[31] The principal intellectual supporters of perestroika could not imagine the future without some kind of "socialist regulation" in which the state and the technocratic intelligentsia would play leading roles. In many ways, especially in the economic field, the advocates of perestroika remained Soviet to the core. Unable to come up with solutions, glasnost-era economists, supported by the intelligentsia, the politically mobilized educated classes, and later disaffected workers, vented their rage against the managerial and party bureaucracy. In their eyes, it had become the main obstacle to economic transformation. Economists and sociologists concealed their own lack of intellectual vision behind such populist accusations.[32]

In the sphere of national politics the advice of politicized intellectuals was equally problematic and inadequate. On the liberal flank former dissidents, including Sakharov and Bonner, demanded immediate reform of the Soviet Union to offer the complete right of national self-determination. In pursuit of freedom, many Moscow intellectuals automatically supported and promoted any form of ethnic separatism and any movement against the Soviet Russian center. When the Kremlin used military force to put down the ethnic violence that broke out (in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan), many of them denounced any use of force and appealed to international public opinion. The American Sidney Drell was bewildered when he observed Yelena Bonner lecturing Gorbachev on what to do about the Armenian-Azeri conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. The dissident refused to listen to the general secretary and insisted that her own solution was the only one that would work. "For her there was no such thing as getting it 99 percent correct. Only 100 percent," he recalled. "She rejected compromises." Even the U.S. ambassador in Moscow, Jack Matlock, who admired Sakharov, believed that the proposals he and Bonner put forward for a territorial solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue "could be dangerous" and were likely to lead to violence and loss of life.[33] That was exactly what happened. The dissidents, guided by a traditional aversion to government-sponsored violence and by moral sympathy for nationalist movements in Armenia, Georgia, the Baltics, and elsewhere, helped destabilize and undermine the Soviet Union.

In the Russian Federation, the main constituent part of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev was still trying to balance the radicalized groups in major cities with more conservative segments of Russian society. Many people were humiliated by the revelations of glasnost and increasingly angry about the economic disarray. The Kremlin leader sought to keep these people within the perestroika coalition. This effort did not endear him to the increasingly impatient and fearful liberal intellectuals in Moscow and Leningrad. Panic was growing among Russian Jews, and figures of cosmopolitan and supposedly Westernized cultural background, that Gorbachev's loss of control might bring Russian fascists to power and into the streets. In December 1989 liberal-minded deputies in the congress, the so-called interregional group, decided to call on the people of the Soviet Union to stage a two-hour symbolic strike. When Gorbachev's lieutenants objected that it would further destabilize the country, Andrei Sakharov replied that, on the contrary, it would be the only way to support perestroika, under attack by rightist forces, anti-Semitic and chauvinist Russo-

phile groups united "under the White slogan of a single and indivisible Russia."[34]

On December 14, 1989, after a stormy session in congress, Andrei Sakharov suddenly died of a heart attack. On the eve of that session, he had clashed with Gorbachev and demanded the immediate abolition of the constitutional clause about the leading role of the party. His parting words were: "There will be a fight tomorrow!" His funeral in Moscow was an event reminiscent of the funeral of Vysotsky in 1980. The academician-turned-dissident was mourned as the last true Russian *intelligent,* and it seemed as if the entire intellectual and artistic elite of Moscow had turned out to bid him farewell, along with tens of thousands of other Muscovites. The death of Sakharov, who had always professed his loyalty to Gorbachev, was the tipping point.[35]

The union between left-leaning intellectuals and the Gorbachev leadership began to disintegrate, and their mutual irritation grew. Liberal Moscow politicians, both former party members and former dissidents, criticized Gorbachev for lack of democratic convictions and for adherence to the methods of authoritarian rule. The end of the political romance with Gorbachev represented for many intellectuals and artists the severing of the last link connecting them with the dream of socialism with a human face. Many of them began to proclaim publicly that any kind of socialism in Russia was doomed and that the Soviet communist project could not be redeemed. It could only, like ancient Carthage, be razed to the ground. These members of the perestroika intelligentsia abandoned their onetime creed with a remarkable ease—a result of the long process of erosion of socialist ideals and the accumulation of anger and frustration during the time of radical politicization. At the same time, Gorbachev's "enlightened" assistants, including Anatoly Cherniaev, were appalled by how mean and ungrateful "the upper crust of the Moscow intelligentsia" acted toward the father of perestroika. They saw this group (except for Sakharov, a man of enormous integrity) as elitist and overweening, in that it claimed to have supreme authority over public morality and political matters as well.[36] In the course of 1990 the Moscow interregional group and thousands of its followers began to leave the party and shift their allegiance and aspirations over to Gorbachev's rival, Boris Yeltsin. Yeltsin, guided by ambition and iconoclastic populist instincts, had at first been seen by Sakharov and other intellectuals as a dangerous demagogue. In 1990, however, Yeltsin began to

appear like the only leader who could grapple with the situation and at the same time remain open to the ideas and advice of intellectuals. In the spring of 1991 he was elected, in the first free elections, as president of the Russian Federation, still subordinate to the Soviet Union and Soviet leader Gorbachev, but thereafter increasingly autonomous.[37] The more Gorbachev felt abandoned by the intelligentsia and threatened by the forces of chaos, both national-separatist and economic, the more he remained hostage to the same party apparatus and to the KGB he wanted to manage and control. Indecisive in every sphere, he antagonized the majority of Russians, and only a few intellectuals and enlightened apparatchiks remained his true admirers.

The attempts of hard-line members of the Gorbachev team, including the head of the KGB and the minister of defense, to halt the disintegration of the empire led to a feckless coup on August 19, 1991. The putschists placed Gorbachev under house arrest, and he was pushed off the center stage of history. Boris Yeltsin, who displayed defiant resistance in the face of the takeover attempt, remained as the only legitimate leader of Russia. During the three days of uncertainty, when the coup plotters could have stormed the White House, the seat of government for the Russian Federation, thousands of Moscow intellectuals, old and young, converged on it to form a living shield against the attack. It was a moment of mythic redemption for the educated Russian elite for the decades of collaboration with the Bolsheviks and Stalin, for its long passivity and egocentric existence "in captivity," and for its resignation in response to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and other ignominious pages in its history. The former human rights defenders, including Yelena Bonner, stood next to the triumphant Yeltsin and spoke to the cheering, exultant masses. It seemed as if the dream of the Russian intelligentsia, a leader in the national reformation, had miraculously materialized.

This was, however, the beginning of the end for the grand intellectual dreams. The Soviet Union was crumbling, and new developments, following in rapid succession, left the basic structures and conditions for the existence of the social milieu of the intelligentsia and the mythology of its leading role in shambles. In December 1991 Yeltsin, along with the leaders of Ukraine and Belarus, dissolved the Soviet Union and removed Gorbachev from the political scene. And in January 1992 radical economic reform was launched, shock therapy to bring Russia into capitalism. These devel-

opments would have been impossible without the mass conversion of the proliberal intellectuals, the former leftist cultural vanguard, and the politically active dissidents. By then, many of them had abandoned the idea of a third path, of socialism with a human face, in favor of the institutions of Western democracy and market capitalism. At one point the economic reformers, sociologists, and journalists practically stampeded in their haste to make the shift from a model of some kind of socialism (preferably Swedish) to the American version of a deregulated economy. Many intellectuals and artists labored under the illusion that once they took Russia in that direction, the West out of gratitude would provide a new Marshall Plan for them, and all the hardships and humiliations would be over. Most scientists, writers, filmmakers, and other groups of the former Soviet intelligentsia took state support for granted and never imagined the consequences of a collapse of the socialist system. They grossly exaggerated their ability to flourish under conditions of "freedom," including a free market. George Faraday, who observed the turmoil among Soviet filmmakers, recognized that they had "rejected the bureaucratic devil they knew for the capitalist devil they didn't."[38]

Had there been a Russian Rip Van Winkle who went to sleep in 1988 and woke up just four years later, he would have been amazed. The Soviet Union was no more, and the omnipotent state, the Communist Party, and political oppression no longer existed either. There also remained no visionary vanguard promoting enlightenment and reform, and no public veneration for the idea of the intelligentsia. What was left instead was a pathetically weak state and a powerful group of criminalized nouveau riche oligarchs and bureaucrats who stole or embezzled the national wealth. There was also the miserable, impoverished, and degraded population, ignored and despised by the elite groups. The cohorts of liberal intellectuals and cultural gurus who had dominated the earlier national debates either emigrated or joined the small army of timeservers and hacks who attempted to please the new regime in order to get a chunk of former state property. Hundreds of think tanks and research labs, including the ones in Dubna, Academgorodok, and other hubs of advanced scientific research, went virtually bankrupt. The so-called creative unions vanished, along with their entire material base of perks, privileges, and cultural production. The budgets of the Literary Foundation and the Soviet Cultural Foundation disappeared into the pockets of unscrupulous officials. The filmmaking industry practically collapsed, along with the nationwide system of film distribution and screening. Many filmmakers had to switch to the production of mass-culture B-quality movies, instead of the highbrow auteur films they had previously been engaged in. The moral and spiritual downsizing of nationally known writers, those "engineers of human souls," was breathtaking. Literary journals, theaters, opera, musical collectives, all teetered on the brink of bankruptcy. Their circulation dropped from millions to thousands, largely because of the drastic impoverishment of subscribers from the educated strata, who could no longer afford the luxury of reading and discussing ideas.[39]

The intellectual, spiritual, and moral collapse of the early 1990s was unrivaled in Russian history. The rise of the concept of intelligentsia as a moral authority during the perestroika and glasnost years began to falter once intellectuals went into politics. With their abandonment of socialist ideals in favor of Western liberal freedoms and institutions, and then market capitalism and private property, they lost moral and intellectual ground. After all, they were not experts in those areas, and the numerous Western advisers who flocked to Russia eclipsed them. These advisers actually knew what capitalism and democracy were and how they worked. The Moscow cultural elites had inadvertently sawed off the bough on which they were all sitting, not only in an economic and financial sense (they lost their state subsidies), but also in the moral sense. The search for humane socialism had been a form of ethical and moral exercise. Andrei Sakharov had written in the early versions of his memoirs, around 1981–82, "I see in the ideas of socialism a certain (albeit limited) contribution to the socioeconomic development of humanity. I appreciate the moral pathos and attraction of these ideas. And I believe that the presence of socialist elements in the life of democratic countries is important and necessary."[40]

The spasmodic and total rejection of these ideals in the early 1990s by some of the leading representatives of the intellectual and cultural vanguard led to a paradoxical situation. The majority of the Russian population, stripped of its savings and thrown into a state of uncertainty during the plunge into capitalism, began to view the Brezhnev period of supposed stagnation as a better time. Everybody could see the visible excesses of wild Russian capitalism, ridden with criminality and conspicuous consumption, millionaires and billionaires, and obscene cynicism toward Homo Sovieticus, the idealistic Soviet person, who was relegated to the dustbin of history.

In this environment, the Russian Communist Party quickly came back from the shadows and began to score successes in free elections. Another winner was a new ultranationalist party led by Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who proposed publicly to exile the entire perestroika intelligentsia that had allegedly brought the country to such humiliation and misery. At the same time, leading Moscow and Leningrad artists and intellectuals looked to Yeltsin as the only guarantor that the Soviet times would not return and that Russian fascism would not take to the streets. The dangers of a communist victory and the fascist threat of Russian nationalism blended in their imagination to produce the image of a "red-brown menace." In October 1993, when the coalition of communist and nationalist forces tried to force Yeltsin out of power, many Moscow intellectuals supported violent suppression of the coup. When troops loyal to Yeltsin fired at followers of the opposition, cultural icons of the sixties and later times, among them Bulat Okudzhava, Sergei Averintsev, Dmitry Likhachev, and Bella Akhmadulina, applauded the October massacre as the lesser evil. Fear of the ghosts of the past drove many figures from the former intelligentsia to support Yeltsin, even after his government began to lose its early liberal-radical luster and to become mired in corruption and oligarchic schemes. Also, filmmakers, theater directors, and scientists had to turn to Yeltsin and the financial gurus and oligarchs in his entourage for money. It was at first shocking for them to trade their old dependence on the Soviet bureaucracy in for new forms of financial dependence, but many quickly began to see it as the only option, and a profitable one at that. Yeltsin and the recently elected mayor of Moscow, Yuri Luzhkov, could be very generous patrons of the arts. And the oligarchs supporting the Yeltsin regime against the communists were even more generous. As a result, increasing numbers of people from the perestroika intelligentsia began to serve new masters, and were well paid for their service. Smeliansky described how it looked in December 1995, when free elections to the Russian Parliament were held. "As a bait to catch voters, most of the forty-three parties put up actors, pop singers, and television gameshow presenters as candidates. Actors were as sought after as generals. Each party, according to its taste, had video shorts made which were then run on all the television channels every day for two months. Only one party produced no video shorts and did not flash across our screens. This was the Russian Communist Party. It won."[41] Intellectuals and artists found themselves in the service of a regime and its oligarchs that the majority of Russian people hated.

The rapid parting of the Iron Curtain and the new freedom of travel for all, constrained only by economic problems and Western visa restrictions against Russians, destroyed the notion of the captivity of the intelligentsia. Yet the same development also devalued the views and ideas that intellectuals and artists had been promoting for decades through samizdat and Western radio. As had happened earlier to Russian intellectual émigrés, the free market of ideas, intellectual production, and art made the old notions look primitive and outdated. In the world of the late twentieth century, art was a commodity, literature and cinema were a form of entertainment, and mass culture triumphed everywhere. The notion of high culture for connoisseurs and highbrow intellectuals survived only as an elitist phenomenon, unrelated to primary social, economic, and political issues. This change was as destructive to the ethos of the intelligentsia as the structural and spiritual collapse was. The networks that had formed the cultural underground of the Soviet era, an essential part of the intelligentsia's "imagined community," disappeared. A brief boom in Soviet nonconformist art in the West began to wane after 1991. It became clear that the underground culture owed its existence to the unique centrality of high culture in Soviet society, in combination with the state support and pressure to channel this culture within prescribed boundaries. With the advent of democratization and marketization, the artists and intellectuals of the semidissident milieu, who used to thrive on their elitism, had to search for new niches and identities in the emerging post-Soviet order. Many of them—for instance, rock musicians—began to condemn the new order with the same vehemence with which they had denounced the old. The majority, however, emigrated to the West or joined the rapidly expanding mass culture.

Between 1988 and 1993 another mass emigration occurred in Russia, much larger than during the Jewish emigration of the 1970s. It began with the panic among the assimilated Jewish intellectuals in Moscow, Leningrad, and other cities; they were afraid of Russian fascism and took advantage of the opening of borders to emigrate to Israel or the West. Then, as the financial crisis led to the collapse of the cultural and scientific infrastructure, thousands began to look for jobs abroad. In all, 1.5 million people left the Soviet Union, many of whom were highly educated and identified with the intelligentsia. The intellectual and cultural hemorrhage would have been

even more terrible had it not been for the large-scale assistance program to scientists and intellectuals organized by the billionaire George Soros, an American financier of Jewish-Hungarian origin who was fascinated by Russian high culture. Western governments and most private foundations, however, provided very limited help.

The unique centrality of high culture, inherited from nineteenth-century tsarist Russia and Central Europe, and reproduced in the late Soviet era, was no more. At the end of 1991 the writer Daniil Granin expressed his fear that in the "new commercial life" there would be "no room for the sublime movements of the soul, for free art for art's sake." He felt that "the intelligentsia in the sense that our history and literature have given us" would soon be gone. "The West has its intellectuals and respects them," Granin went on. "Yet it has never known such an intelligentsia as ours, with its idealism, rejection of profit in the name of public ideals, acute moral sensitivity."[42] In June 1993 the physicist Lev Osterman, an assimilated Jew and an ardent supporter of the left-wing high culture of the sixties, wrote to his son, who had emigrated with his family to the United States: "My chosen and beloved milieu (perhaps through literature) is the Russian intelligentsia and its spiritual heirs in our times. This milieu is unique in the world, owing to Russia's unique history." He noted that post-Soviet existence, especially the gigantic, commercialized mass culture, "has been drying out the soil" for the regeneration of the ethos of the intelligentsia.[43]

The story of Zhivago's children ended in the 1990s. It is a story about the struggle of intellectuals and artists to regain autonomy from an autocratic regime seeking to control society and culture. Yet it is also a story about the heavy price they paid for this autonomy, and above all about the slow and painful disappearance of their revolutionary-romantic idealism and optimism, their faith in progress and in the enlightenment of people, beliefs and values inherited from the milieu of the Russian intelligentsia of the nineteenth century. With the exception of a few courageous public dissenters, like Andrei Sakharov, Yelena Bonner, and Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the intellectuals and artists in Soviet Russia remained an intelligentsia-in-captivity, with all the social and moral consequences that implied. Only a tiny minority consistently sought to live by the intelligentsia's ethos and implement its high principles. Most had to compromise, living a double life, exercising freethinking in private and remaining party conformists in

public. Still, for all the justified reproaches aimed at this community during the 1970s and 1980s, time has shown that their cultural and spiritual work in the immediate post-Stalin decades was not in vain. The dazzling entrance of the intelligentsia onto the stage of world history took place during the years of glasnost, when Mikhail Gorbachev granted educated elites the autonomy to create and the freedom to speak and engage in civic activities.

The death of the Russian intelligentsia during the 1990s ended an important chapter in European intellectual and cultural history. This chapter is both inspiring and troubling. The intellectual milieu attracted many Soviet citizens who graduated from universities after World War II, among them the young veterans who had defeated Hitler but later had to struggle with Stalinism. The Moscow intelligentsia's dreams and expectations reached their peak in the years from 1960 to 1968, at a time when cultural and social protest was changing Western democratic societies. In common with Western protest movements, the reborn intelligentsia in the Soviet Union displayed moral fervor and a commitment to emancipation from authoritarianism and to a coming to terms with the crimes and injustices of the recent past. Like the West, Soviet Russia experienced the rise of technocratic trends among scientists, the avant-garde influence in literature, theater, cinema, and journalism, and the movement in defense of human rights. All these left-leaning groups stood against the legacy of Stalinism, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism. These groups, Zhivago's spiritual children, clashed with xenophobic and anti-Semitic groups of Russian nationalists, who also claimed to be part of the intelligentsia. The death of the intelligentsia was an unintended result of the failure of the communist project. The movement of intellectuals, scientists, human rights activists, and artists contributed to the strange end of the communist empire—or even its suicide. At the same time, bringing down the temple of communism brought to an end the intelligentsia's historical mission. Even earlier, in Central Europe after 1989 both the obsession with high culture and the intense underground artistic life vanished in a similar way. Still, in Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and the former Yugoslavia, intellectuals and artists had a much deeper national identity. They had the luxury of pretending that the communist phase was not their own, that it had been imposed from outside. In Russia, by contrast, few intellectuals and cultural figures could feel or think that way. For many of them the idea of the intelligentsia was not related to the task of national self-determination and lib-

eration. On the contrary, many of them lived in constant fear of resurgent Russian nationalism. The grand dreams of Zhivago's children homed in on the centrality of culture and art in the social life of their people, and on the possibility of building a gentler society based on noncapitalist foundations and free from the perpetual drive for money, property, and the acquisition of material goods. The advent of "wild capitalism" sent these illusions crashing down. Shattered was the dream of a revolutionary transformation that would lead to grassroots social justice. The pretension of the intelligentsia to the status of social oracles and cultural prophets, occupying a seat above the state and the people, quickly dissipated, mocked by history itself.

In the early 1990s many intellectuals of the postwar generation began to look back on the optimism of their youth as naive and unjustified. In Alexei Adzhubei's opinion, "We did not know many things, and this ignorance helped us preserve our optimism."[44] Alexei Kozlov, the jazz musician, regretted his optimism in 1960 and renounced the "purely Soviet illusion" that "people could be raised to a higher cultural level."[45] The last and the staunchest believers in Marxist-Leninist historical determinism began, one by one, to abandon their beliefs. The philosopher Yuri Kariakin wrote that for him personally, parting with the communist faith took more than two decades. "I resisted long and fiercely, until I had to surrender before . . . life itself." A longtime admirer of Fyodor Dostoevsky, Kariakin became an Orthodox Christian zealot.[46] Many other intellectuals from his generation embraced the Christian faith as a last spiritual refuge. The trickle of people who in the mid-1960s had made their way to the church of Alexander Men became a torrent by the early 1990s. Confused by the sudden and unfamiliar lack of purpose, some aging sixties intellectuals forgot their militant atheism and put icons up on their apartment walls instead of photos of Hemingway. In lieu of fantasizing about a cybernetic socialist paradise, they humbly lit candles before the altars of Russian Orthodox churches. Consciously or unwittingly, they turned to the values and images that had saved Boris Pasternak from suicide half a century earlier. Yuri Zhivago's poems began at last to reveal their true mystical meaning in their hearts and souls. In the early 1990s, a new "time of troubles" in Russia, Pasternak's poem "Hamlet" sounded especially poignant:

> I love and cherish it, Thy stubborn purpose,
> And am content to play my allotted role,

> But now another drama is in progress.
> I beg Thee, leave me this time uninvolved.
> But alas, there is no turning from the road.
> The order of the action has been settled.
> The Pharisee claims all, and I'm alone.
> This life is not a stroll across the meadow.[47]

Alexander Men, the first and greatest preacher for many of Zhivago's children, could no longer help them find their bearings in a changed Russia. In September 1990 he died near his church after an unknown assassin split his skull with an ax.

The story of Zhivago's children has no happy ending. Arguments about the role and place of this group in Russian history and culture continue to rage to this day. In the immediate wake of the Soviet collapse, the postwar cohorts of intellectuals and cultural figures became an easy target for criticism. Many hostile darts emanated from within their ranks, aimed by Zhivago's children themselves. From his emigration in Paris, Andrei Siniavsky, the onetime critic of socialist realism, lashed out at the moral bankruptcy of the Moscow intelligentsia. He described the post-perestroika developments as "the bitterest years of my life." For him "nothing is more bitter than unfulfilled hopes and lost illusions." The intelligentsia, according to Siniavsky, succumbed to the temptations of power and lust for money. In his opinion, the calling of the intelligentsia was to love the people and share their misfortunes. Instead, intellectuals in Moscow today, he claimed, were "afraid of those same people."[48] The nationalist thinkers blamed the "liberal" majority of their generation for the destruction of the Soviet Union and the sellout to the West.[49] Increasingly allied with the resurgent Orthodox Church, extremist Russian patriots began to identify the liberal Moscow intelligentsia as an elitist group, primarily the "children and grandchildren of Soviet and party nomenklatura." Leonid Borodin, a religious Russian nationalist and a former student of the class of 1956, wrote about his liberal enemies: "They groped around, discovering shortcomings in the life and order around them, yet because of their clan-bound and half-bohemian mentality, on one hand, and because of a typically Soviet internationalist upbringing, on the other, they could never rise to a 'systematic' understanding of the problem."[50]

Scathing criticism of Zhivago's children came from the younger generations, those who had grown up in the 1970s and 1980s and were unceremo-

Andrei Siniavsky as an émigré in Paris. In the early 1990s he blamed the postcommunist intelligentsia for having succumbed to the temptations of power and lust for money (Courtesy of Memorial, Moscow).

niously beginning to push their predecessors to the sidelines of history. Most of them lashed out at the *shestidesiatniki* from a postmodernist position and blamed them for their participation in the Soviet cultural project. The younger critics refused to draw a distinction between the dissidents, the enlightened apparatchiks, the established left-wing poets, novelists, and artists, and the vast conformist majority of party members and Soviet citizens. Some of them claimed that the *shestidesiatniki* had helped the communist regime get its second wind after Stalin's death and endure for almost three decades.

Czeslaw Milosz had once observed that for him the depth of Russian literature was always suspect, because it was "bought at too high a price." In line with this observation, one may suspect that Russia needed its critical intelligentsia and its high culture only as long as it suffered from tyranny, misery, and backwardness. With the emergence of a free market economy and a free exchange of ideas, in addition to a stable middle class holding entrenched democratic values and property, it is no longer necessary to have the intelligentsia either as a moral vanguard and guardian of intellectual integrity or as a social opposition force. In its stead appear professional educators, intellectuals, artists, and entertainers. They respond to the needs of middle-class "well-fed and industrious people," not the idealistic romantics and truth seekers.[51] For all the setbacks and reverses, Russia has been moving steadily in this direction. The gradual transformation of Russia has rendered the intelligentsia a historical anachronism, a subject for literary and historical recollections only.

Zhivago's children rarely lived up to the ethos and ideals of the old

Russian intelligentsia. Their behavior, with a few exceptions among the principled dissidents, was checkered by conformism, cowardice, mutual denunciations, cynicism, and hypocrisy. Quite a few of them were unable to resist pressures from the secret police, let alone the temptations of self-aggrandizement, vanity, and profiteering. The artistic and literary legacy of the Thaw and the succeeding period does not bear comparison with the classical cultural legacy created by their predecessors, not to mention the great writers and thinkers of nineteenth-century Russia. And yet Zhivago's children deserve empathy, not condemnation. The rebirth of the idea of the Russian intelligentsia in the post-Stalin years was a phenomenon that had one foot in the revolutionary era and the other in the era of unparalleled scientific and technological progress, globalization, and mass culture. The children of Zhivago spent their lives on "a voyage from the coast of Utopia" into the turbulent open sea of individual self-discovery.[52] Their grand illusions, tragic experiences, and enormous vitality compressed the most talented people from several age cohorts into one generation.

The story of Zhivago's children demonstrates the remarkable, and underestimated, centrality of the cultural and idealistic dimensions in the history of Soviet society, and consequently in the history of Europe and the world as a whole. The preoccupations and aspirations in the intellectual milieu remained essentially noncapitalist. Most intellectuals and artists in Moscow did not accept or understand Western notions of liberal democracy but rather thought and acted within the Soviet and communist framework, by seeking to combine individual emancipation with socialism. Few were prepared to denounce the legacy of the Russian Revolution or Leninism. This dream of a freer but still noncapitalist society lasted into the era of Mikhail Gorbachev and perestroika, before being buried under the rubble of Soviet communism. Just as the movements of the sixties profoundly changed Western democratic societies, by addressing their totalitarian, racist, and chauvinist past, the revival of the Russian intelligentsia was a crucial part of the evolution of Soviet society away from its revolutionary myths and totalitarian legacy. Curiously enough, some intellectuals in Moscow (and their counterparts in Warsaw, Budapest, and Prague) had begun this process even earlier than their Western counterparts who lived in "free" and democratic societies.[53] This was an impressive achievement, given the high moral and material costs involved. The ethos of educated civic participation, resistance to the immorality of the communist regime,

and belief in humane socialism was a feature common to the efforts of Russian, Polish, and Czech reformers and liberal-minded people of culture. The two phenomena, in the West and in the East, were very different, but together they contributed to building a more peaceful and humane world.

Abbreviations
Notes
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house in Parnu, Estonia, where he stayed most of the time. He returned to Moscow only to read his poetry.

98. Eidelman was born in 1930 in Moscow into an assimilated Jewish family, fervent supporters of the Bolshevik Revolution. His father, a literary critic, passionately criticized Pasternak for his "formalism." Nathan Eidelman graduated from Moscow State University as a historian in 1952, but because of the anti-Semitic campaign (and the arrest of his father) he worked at a high school outside Moscow. Khrushchev's secret speech changed the historian's life; he returned to Moscow and joined the neo-Marxist underground group of Lev Krasnopevtsev. When the group was arrested, Eidelman's house was searched and he lost his job as a schoolteacher. G. M. Hamburg, "Writing History and the End of the Soviet Era: The Secret Lives of Nathan Eidel'man," *Kritika* 7, no. 1 (Winter 2006): 71–109.
99. See the Web site devoted to Eidelman, at http://vivovoco.rsl.ru/VV/PAPERS/NYE/EIDELMAN.HTM.
100. German, *Slozhnoe proshedshee*, 397–415, 447–457, 471–499.
101. Songs by Okudzhava (1975 and 1976), translations by Vladislav Zubok.
102. Vysotsky was born in Moscow in 1937, the son of a Soviet army officer. He had learned from his schoolteacher about Russian poetry, learned to love Boris Pasternak, Velimir Khlebnikov, Marina Tsvetaeva, Alexei Kruchenykh, Igor Severianin, and Nikolai Gumilyov. He also discovered Isaac Babel, a writer banned at the time. In 1955–56 he attended the Institute of Civil Engineering but, sensing his artistic vocation, signed up for the Studio School of the Moscow Art Theater. He graduated as an actor in 1960 and after many trials and errors found a home in the Taganka Theater. Alla Demidova, *Vladimir Vysotsky kakim znaiu i liubliu* (Moscow: Soiuz Teatralnykh Deiatelei RSFSR, 1989), 30.
103. Pyotr Soldatenkov, *Vladimir Vysotsky* (Moscow: Olimp, 1999), 56.
104. Arkady Vysotsky, in *Vladimir Vysotsky: Chetyre chetverti puti* (Moscow: Fizkultura i Sport 1988), 15.
105. Yitzhak M. Brudny, *Reinventing Russia: Russian Nationalism and the Soviet State, 1953–1991* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), 105, 109, 127.
106. This group of writers included Viktor Astafiev, Vasily Belov, Yuri Bondarev, Valentin Rasputin, Vladimir Soloukhin, Vladimir Chivilikhin, Dmitry Balashov, Pyotr Proskurin, and Sergei Zalygin.
107. The American-Israeli scholar Yitzhak Brudny sees the rise in influence of conservative Russian nationalists as a result of the policy of "inclusion" by the Brezhnev leadership, "an integral part of what might be called the Brezhnev program" that began in early 1966 and peaked in 1968–69. Brudny, *Reinventing Russia*, 57–58, 64–65, 98–102; Mitrokhin, *Russkaia partiia*, 357; Cherniaev, *Moia zhizn i moe vremia*, 370–371, 388. "Protiv anti-istorizma," *Literaturnaia Gazeta*, Nov. 15, 1972.
108. Andropov to CC CPSU, Mar. 28, 1981, RGANI, f. 5, op. 84, d. 1011, ll. 31–35, published in *Istochnik* 6 (1994): 108–110. On the attempts of radical Russian nationalists to organize themselves and spread, see Mitrokhin, *Russkaia partiia*, 537–556.
109. Brudny, *Reinventing Russia*, 123–128.

110. Cherniaev, *Dnevniki*, Dec. 30, 1979.
111. Ibid., Jan. 1, 1977, and Dec. 19, 1980.
112. Ibid., June 21, 1980.
113. Entry for Oct. 28, 1969, in Vladimir Lakshin, "Memuary: Poslednii akt," *Druzhba Narodov* 5 (2003): 177.
114. Gorelik, *Boris Slutsky*, 64–66, 384–385; S. Shcheglov, "Poslednie gody Borisa Slutskogo," *Voprosy Literatury* 4 (1999): 369–372.
115. Cherniaev, *Dnevniki*, July 29, 1980.

Epilogue

1. Igor Dedkov, entry for Mar. 11, 1985, "Novyi tsykl rossiiskikh illiuzii: Iz dnevnikovykh zapisei, 1985–1986 godov," *Novy Mir* 11 (2001): 123.
2. Andrei Grachev, *Gorbachev* (Moscow: Vagrius, 2001), 28–29, 86; Robert D. English, *Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press), 182, 202.
3. Andrei Grachev, *Gorbachev's Gamble: Soviet Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War* (Malden, Mass.: Polity Press, 2008), 46.
4. See Archie Brown, *Seven Years That Changed the World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); and Brown, "Gorbachev, Lenin, and the Break with Leninism," *Demokratizatsyia* 15, no. 2 (Spring 2007): 230–244.
5. This brain trust also included Zaslavskaia and Aganbegyan from Akademgorodok, Leonid Abalkin, Oleg Bogomolov, Georgy Arbatov, Yevgeny Primakov, and the physicists Yevgeny Velikhov and Roald Sagdeev. Later, Georgy Shakhnazarov and two MGU classmates of Raisa, Nail Bikkenin and Anatoly Lukianov, joined the brain trust.
6. Galina Belaia, "Ia rodom iz shestidesiatykh . . . ," *Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie* 70 (2004): 223–227.
7. Igor Vinogradov, a columnist for Tvardovsky's *Novy Mir*, described Gorbachev as "a typical Don Quixote from the sixties generation" who realized its dream of "democratic socialism." Igor Vinogradov, "Paradoks Mikhaila Gorbacheva," *Kontinent* 107 (2001): 261–263, 270–276.
8. Gorbachev's roots in the rural Russian South made him sympathetic toward village writers and Russian nationalists. See the report on the Politburo meeting on July 3, 1986, in A. Cherniaev, V. Veber, and V. Medvedev, eds., *V Politbiuro TsK KPSS . . . Po zapisiam Anatolia Cherniaeva, Vadima Medvedeva, Georgiia Shakhnazarova, 1985–1991* (Moscow: Alpina, 2006), 60; Alexander Yakovlev, *Omut pamiati* (Moscow: Vagrius, 2000), 264; and Anatoly Cherniaev, *My Six Years with Gorbachev*, trans. and ed. Robert D. English and Elizabeth Tucker (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), 212–214.
9. See http://culture.ru/index.php?section=1&sub=75.
10. Born into a middle-class liberal family from St. Petersburg in 1906, Likhachev studied at the university, was arrested in 1928, and spent six years in the Solovetsky

concentration camp and on the construction of the Belomor Canal. He survived the Great Terror and the blockade of Leningrad and found an intellectual haven at the Institute of Russian Literature (Pushkin House). His admirer Sergei Averintsev believed that Likhachev belonged to "a cultural type that was irrevocably lost" by the end of the Soviet era. See Likhachev, "Sergei Averintsev," in *Literaturnaia Gazeta*, Oct. 12, 1999, 6; E. G. Vodolazkin, ed., *Dmitry Likhachev i ego epokha: Vospominaniia, esse, dokumenty, fogografii* (St. Petersburg: Logos, 2002); biographical materials, at http://likhachev.lfond.spb.ru/memoirs.htm; and James H. Billington, *Russia in Search of Itself* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2004), 60–64.

11. Yuri Levada, "Yuri Burtin: Chelovek i ego vremia—In memoriam," *Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie* 48 (2001): 91.
12. Yakovlev, *Omut pamiati*, 256.
13. Elem Klimov, whose name was an acronym taken from the names Engels, Lenin, Marx, was born in Stalingrad in 1933 into a family of communist idealists. He left the burning city, attacked by the Wehrmacht, in the fall of 1942. He graduated from VGIK in 1964. His first film, a satirical comedy, was banned. The first film made by his wife, Larisa Shepitko, was destroyed by the censors. George Faraday, *Revolt of Filmmakers: The Struggle for Artistic Autonomy and the Fall of the Soviet Film Industry* (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), 125–129.
14. Alexander Yakovlev, archive of Radio Liberty, at http://www.svoboda.org/programs/cicles/cinema/russian/Repentance.asp; Lev Osterman, diary entry for Nov. 14, 1986, *Intelligentsia i vlast v Rossii, 1985–1996* (Moscow: Gumanitarnyi Tsentr Monolit, 2000), 20.
15. Pristavkin had graduated in 1959 from the Institute of Literature in Moscow, yet for years he had to write "into the drawer" and could not publish his works.
16. Author's interview with Natalia Gorbanevskaia, June 10, 2008, Paris.
17. On the effects of Chernobyl, see David R. Marples, *The Social Impact of the Chernobyl Disaster* (New York: St. Martin's, 1988); Grigory Medvedev, *The Truth about Chernobyl* (New York: Basic, 1989); and Svetlana Alexievich, *Voices from Chernobyl*, trans. Keith Gessen (London: Dalkey Archive Press, 2005).
18. Yakovlev, *Omut pamiati*, 239–246; Alexander Yakovlev and the Roots of the Soviet Reforms, a collection of documents at the Web site for the National Security Archive, Washington, D.C., at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB168/index.htm.
19. *Universitetskaia zhizn* (newspaper of the University of Novosibirsk), Dec. 23, 1986; Varlen Soskin to D. S. Likhachev, Jan. 16, 1987, in the papers of D. S. Likhachev, fond 769, Manuscript Division of the Institute of Russian Literature (Pushkin House), St. Petersburg.
20. Nina Andreeva, "Ne mogu postupitsia printsipami," *Sovetskaia Rossia*, Mar. 13, 1988. An incomplete English translation appears in Isaac J. Tarasulo, ed., *Gorbachev and Glasnost: Viewpoints from the Soviet Press* (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1989), 277–290.

21. The head of the editorial board, Viktor Chikin, a veteran of *Komsomolskaia Pravda* and a prominent member of the Russian nationalist network, edited Andreeva's letter before its publication. In one passage edited out of the newspaper version, Andreeva reminded everyone that in Czechoslovakia in 1968, "it all began, too, with the congress of writers and with [Jews]. And how did that end?" Another dropped sentence was: "The Jews in our country have become a nationality apart." Giuletto Chiesa, "Secret History of the Anti-Gorbachev Manifesto," *L'Unità*, May 23, 1988, translated into English in Kevin Devlin, "L'Unità on the Secret History of the Andreeva Letter," RFE/RL Research, RAD background report 93 (USSR), at http://files.osa.ceu.hu/holdings/300/8/3/text/139-3-214.shtml.
22. *V Politbiuro TsK KPSS*, 356–360.
23. Vasily Grossman's novel *Life and Fate*, impounded by the KGB in 1960, did not vanish; three friends of the writer secretly kept a copy for decades, and in 1988 the Moscow literary journal *Oktiabr* published it in full. John Garrard and Carol Garrard, *The Bones of Berdichev: The Life and Fate of Vasily Grossman* (New York: Free Press, 1996), 317–324. Among other shattering publications were the "Requiem" of Anna Akhmatova, about the victims of the Great Terror, the anti-Bolshevik work *We*, by Yevgeny Zamiatin, the poems of Joseph Brodsky, and the novels of Vladimir Nabokov.
24. Andrei Melville, "A Personal Introduction," in Andrei Melville and Gail W. Lapidus, eds., *The Glasnost Papers* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1990), 1. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Melville, the son of a Soviet philosopher and a senior researcher at the Institute for the United States and Canada Studies, became a very successful educational entrepreneur.
25. Vasily Seliunin, "Istoki," *Novy Mir*, May 1988, 162–189. Seliunin graduated from MGU as a journalist in the early 1950s (in the same cohort as Adzhubei); Dmitry Shalin, interview with Vasily Seliunin, Apr. 30, 1990, Boston, at http://www.unlv.edu/centers/cdclv/archives/Interviews/seliunin.html; Melville and Lapidus, *The Glasnost Papers*, 73–83.
26. The effects of the desacralization of Leninism are described in Alexei Yurchak, *"Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More": The Last Soviet Generation* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006), 295.
27. Leon Aron, *Russia's Revolution: Essays, 1989–2006* (Washington, D.C.: AEI, 2007), 4, 12–13.
28. Lev Osterman, entry for Nov. 8, 1987, in Osterman, *Intelligentsia i vlast v Rossii*, 29, 30.
29. The Italian film director Bernardo Bertolucci brilliantly showed a similar transition in his film *Il Conformista* (1970).
30. Vladislav Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), chap. 10.
31. Seliunin, at http://www.unlv.edu/centers/cdclv/archives/Interviews/seliunin.html; Levada, "Yuri Burtin"; Melville and Lapidus, *The Glasnost Papers*, 189–227.
32. The discussion on economic reforms in glasnost media is analyzed in Melville and

Lapidus, *The Glasnost Papers,* 189–227. Remarks on the reformers' being still "Soviet" in their thinking are based on author's interview with Vittorio Strada, Apr. 1, 2006, Rome.
33. Author conversation with Sidney Drell, June 11, 2007, Bellagio, Italy; Jack F. Matlock, *Autopsy on an Empire* (New York: Random House, 1995), 108.
34. Houghton Library, Harvard University, Andrei Sakharov Papers, MS Russ 79, folder S.II.2.6.1.45.
35. Timothy Colton, *Yeltsin: A Life* (New York: Basic, 2008), 168–170.
36. Cherniaev, *My Six Years with Gorbachev;* K. N. Brutents, *Nesbyvsheesia: Neravnodushnye zametki o perestroike* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia, 2005), 310.
37. Leon Aron, *Yeltsin;* Colton, *Yeltsin,* 177–185, 191–194.
38. Faraday, *Revolt of Filmmakers,* 129.
39. Rosalind Marsh, "The Death of Soviet Literature: Can Russian Literature Survive?" *Europe-Asia Studies* 45, no. 1 (1993): 115–139; N. N. Shneidman, *Russian Literature, 1988–1994: The End of an Era* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995), 22–23, 26–28.
40. Houghton Library, Harvard University, Andrei Sakharov Papers, MS Russ 79, folder S.II.2.5.172.
41. Anatoly Smeliansky, *The Russian Theater after Stalin* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 142.
42. Daniil Granin, "Sobratsia s dukhom, chtoby vyzhit: O meste intelligentsii v nastoiashchem vremeni," *Izvestia,* Dec. 19, 1991.
43. Osterman, *Intelligentsia i vlast v Rossii,* 260.
44. Alexei Adzhubei, *Krushenie illuzii: Vremia v sobytiakh i litsakh* (Moscow: Interbuk, 1991), 143.
45. Alexei Kozlov, *Kozel na sakse* (Moscow: Vagrius, 1998), 169.
46. Yuri Kariakin, quoted in Sergei Miturich, ed., *Vittorio: Mezhdunarodnyi nauchnyi sbornik posveshchennyi 75-letiiu Vittorio Strady* (Moscow: Tri Kvadrata, 2005), 24, 25.
47. From Yuri Zhivago's (Boris Pasternak's) poem "Hamlet," trans. Christopher Barnes, *Toronto Slavic Quarterly* 10 (Fall 2004), at http://www.utoronto.ca/tsq/10/barnes10.shtml. Quoted by permission.
48. Andrei Siniavsky, *The Russian Intelligentsia,* trans. Lynn Visson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 1, 12–13.
49. Vladimir Bondarenko, *Deti 1937 goda* (Moscow: Informpechat ITRK, 2001).
50. "Dissidenty o dissidentstve," *Znamia* (1997–98), special issue, 159.
51. Czeslaw Milosz, *Native Realm: A Search for Self-Definition,* trans. Catherine S. Leach (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1981), 145.
52. I allude here to a play of Tom Stoppard, *The Coast of Utopia* (New York: Grove, 2003).
53. Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (New York: Penguin, 2005), 394.

Acknowledgments

Zhivago's Children was not just a scholarly project. I came of age in Moscow after Soviet tanks had crushed the Prague Spring, thus reinstating the Iron Curtain and demolishing the idealistic project of socialism with a human face. In those years the word "intelligentsia" was often on the lips of my parents and their friends, some of them television engineers, others employees in the military-industrial complex, and yet others musicians, artists, or art historians. To them I owe my first interest in the intelligentsia's universe. This interest grew when I began to listen to the ballads of the Russian songwriters of the sixties, whose records my parents played on a bulky tape recorder. Such singing had nothing in common with the saccharine timbre of the crooners we were used to hearing on official Soviet radio and television. I learned from Vysotsky and Okudzhava about the existence of labor camps and anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union, Stalin's use of "penal battalions" of kamikaze units to fight against Hitler's armies, and many other shocking revelations. I also learned about the poet Boris Pasternak, whose writings were not on the Soviet school curriculum. It was the beginning of my discovery of the rich and diverse cultural world that had flourished in Russia after Stalin's death yet was not part of the official culture. It was, in fact, the world of the intelligentsia, which had played such a pivotal role in the thinking and interests of my parents and their friends. *Zhivago's Children* is the acknowledgment of my gratitude to them.

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