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Interpreting Emotions

IN RUSSIA AND EASTERN EUROPE

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VICTORIA FREDE

RADICALS AND FEELINGS

The 1860s

Scratch a Russian radical, and you will find a Romantic. Though radicals of the 1860s ridiculed Romanticism, associating it primarily with sentimental self-indulgence, their own attitudes toward sentiment and the senses were in key regards a product of the Romantic movement. Writers for the journals *The Contemporary, The Russian Word,* and *The Cause* emphasized the importance of allowing oneself to be guided by "feeling," which they used in a number of different but overlapping ways. Cognizance of the natural world was to come from feeling as sensory experience. Knowledge of oneself was to be based on feeling as disposition and inclination. Attitudes toward morality, society, and politics, too, were to be shaped by feeling as affect, such as sympathy, love, or disgust. In all these regards, it was essential to radicals that feeling be authentic. Nature—the physical organism—must be allowed to function unencumbered by culture—socially endorsed norms and prejudices. With regard to each of these assertions, radicals owed debts to their predecessors of the 1840s. What they were remembered for, however, was their thoroughgoing rejection of all previous philosophical and literary traditions, especially Romanticism.

Radicalism is often described as an oppositional stance, formulated by Nikolai Chernyshevsky, Nikolai Dobroliubov, Maxim Antonovich, and Dmitrii Pisarev after 1855, when Alexander II came to power. Their views continued to find resonance in the mid-1860s to early 1870s in the writings of Nikolai Shelgunov, Varfolomei Zaitsev, and Petr Tkachev.[1] Negation was indeed a core element of the radical platform. They rejected

autocracy and the reform program announced by Alexander II as doomed to failure. Further, they rejected serfdom, and with it all forms of hierarchy; they denounced deference to parents, teachers, and social superiors; they condemned the institution of marriage and faith in God; they scorned aestheticism, Pushkin, and polite manners.

As they entered the world of Russian journalism in the later 1850s, young radicals soon clashed with established journalists, literary critics, and novelists of the 1840s. "Fathers" and "sons" came to regard one another as rivals. The fathers' generation would denounce the sons as "nihilists": naysayers who reject everything. They were "dry, cold, callous, and heartless."[2] For their part, the sons would dismiss their elders, most notably Alexander Herzen and Ivan Turgenev, as aging Pechorins: however rebellious they had been in their own day, they were too caught up in Romantic *Schönseligkeit*—too sentimental and self-absorbed—to show Russia the way out of its miserable condition. These mutual recriminations would shape the manner in which radicals were remembered for the next hundred years. In Western historical literature, they were represented as cold-blooded "rationalists" who attempted to banish affect from thought and the decision-making process.[3]

Yet fathers and sons were not as far apart as they liked to pretend. The leading writers of the 1840s, including Herzen, Turgenev, and Vissarion Belinsky, had come of age at a time when the Romantic movement was still at its height. They had been the first to repudiate that movement, and in doing so formulated an image of, and set of arguments against, Romanticism, which members of the 1860s generation would repeat. Yet neither generation cast aside the legacy of Romanticism entirely. Like father and son in Turgenev's *First Love* (1860) they wooed the same woman while pretending to despise her.

Both followed the Romantics in emphasizing the role that sensory perception and affect play in thought processes and decision-making. All regarded sensory experience and affective dispositions as essential sources of knowledge about nature, society, and the human individual. Our senses are our only window into the world around us, and our felt responses to what we see tell us how we should evaluate it. The impressions that our senses furnish us with about the world and about ourselves are only reliable if we preserve their authenticity, or naturalness. The sons' primary complaint against the fathers—and the Romantics—was that they had adulterated their feelings. Instead of allowing nature to take its course within the human organism, the fathers, like the Romantics, had manipulated and perverted their feelings, inventing phantoms when they did not like what they saw, and suppressing their inclinations when they did not seem sufficiently elevated.

THE CLASH WITH ROMANTICISM—PHYSIOLOGY, SENSATION, AND THE SUPERNATURAL

Russian radicals came to be known for their preoccupation with physiology. They were interested in the operation of the nervous system as it directs human action and conveys sensory impressions to the brain, processing these impressions into ideas. Their emphasis on the unity of body and mind was by no means new; it was an important feature of Sentimentalism in the late eighteenth century. As Ilya Vinitsky notes in his chapter of this volume, "Russian Sentimentalism's *emotional utopia*" demanded the reconciliation of soul and the body, man and nature, literature and life.[4] Romantics in western Europe carried forward this utopian vision, and turned their attention to physiology as a science that could demonstrate the unity of body and mind. Discoveries about the operation of the nervous system and brain by Erasmus Darwin, Luigi Galvani, and Pierre-Jean-Georges Cabanis, among others, exerted enormous influence over poets and philosophers alike. Romantics would stress the importance of sensory perception in giving rise to thought and drew attention to the role of feelings, moods, and internal perceptions in shaping mental life.[5]

Yet Romantics would not confine perception to the material elements in the natural world: nature is pervaded by "magic, mystery, and wonder," and this, too, can—indeed must—be explored by means of the senses.[6] Romantics believed that God inheres in every object, even the smallest and most trivial. By opening our senses to and contemplating these objects, especially the most ordinary ones, we create new experiential possibilities, including the possibility of an epiphany concerning the inherence of God in nature. These west-European conceptions easily transferred themselves to Russia.[7] As fascination for the physiology of the mind spread in Russia during the 1840s, however, key writers would reject the notion that nature is pervaded by the supernatural, which is subject to sensory experience.

In Russia, physiological explanations of mind began to draw widespread interest in the mid–late 1840s. All of the major Russian journals published Western popularizations of physiology in translation, and they were greeted with acclaim by such influential literary figures as Alexander Herzen and Vissarion Belinsky. Both Herzen and Belinsky had undergone their intellectual formation in the 1830s, when Romanticism was predominant in literature and philosophy. During the 1840s, however, both would turn away from it, arguing that Romantics had maintained a dualistic approach to ideas and matter, privileging metaphysical abstractions over the organic and corporeal. As Valeria Sobol has shown, Herzen and Belinsky turned to physiology as a remedy to show that even "elevated emotions" have a physical basis.[8]

When radicals stepped forward in the late 1850s and early 1860s, they took over the journal where Belinsky and Herzen had published during the mid–late 1840s, *The Contemporary*, and they also adopted their critical attitude toward Romantic 'dualism.' Nikolai Dobroliubov and Maxim Antonovich were the first radical journalists to venture into detailed descriptions of the mechanisms by which ideas could form and develop in the nervous system.[9] The process, as they outlined it, begins with an event that leaves an imprint on nerve fibers; the imprint is then transmitted by the nervous system to the brain, which registers it as a sensory impression (*chuvstvennoe vpechatlenie*). As impressions collect in the brain, they are transformed into perceptions and from perceptions into thoughts. Prior experiences influence the process, as does the chemical condition of the brain and the person's affective state at the moment of perception. While each individual will processes impressions somewhat differently, such discrepancies do not compromise the reliability of the nervous system as a whole, which nature has designed to yield correct information about the environment.[10]

Dobroliubov and Antonovich were also convinced that sense impressions cannot yield any information about the supernatural; on the contrary, they will impress upon the mind that nature consists entirely of matter and force and that it operates according to its own—natural—laws. Antonovich, for example, argued that feeling must prove that there is no such thing as an immortal, incorporeal soul: if our mind contained a "second self," some faculty of mind separate from the nervous system, it would have to manifest itself in some tangible way, yet we do not notice its presence. Here Antonovich exploited the vagueness of the Russian word for feeling, *chuvstvo:* one would have to feel its presence, he wrote, but since one does not feel it ("*ono ne chuvstvuetsia*"), it cannot exist. On the contrary, man has come to sense that this theory of mind has somehow deformed him ("*on pochuvstvoval nakonets neestestvennost' svoego polozheniia*").[11] As Dobroliubov explained, it is only when the nervous system malfunctions that sensory experiences can lead to the false impression that immaterial beings, such as the soul, spirits, or gods, operate in the world. Illness and hunger, for example, can stimulate the nervous system in such a manner as to produce hallucinations, and a weakened brain may misinterpret these stimuli as real events in the world.[12]

The brain also draws false inferences from sensory data when some intervention takes place as it is transforming perceptions into thoughts. "Prejudices" and "artificial" ideas, for example, can intervene in a deleterious manner. Over the centuries, human societies developed numerous false conceptions of the operation of the world, which each generation

conveyed to its children, creating bad mental habits. Parents, nannies, and teachers inculcate preconceived ideas in children from infancy on. Those ideas then clutter the brain, confusing the mind and leading it, in some cases, to cancel out data furnished through sensory experience, or to misinterpret the impressions it does receive. In this way, people are left with a weakened ability to benefit from sensory perception, and the conclusions they draw from what they see or hear are often false.[13] The worst kind of upbringing is one in which abstract moral principles are impressed on children's minds. Dobroliubov surmised that in the current state of affairs, the best kind of upbringing would be one of benign neglect.[14]

The more one had been taught as a child, the more one had to unlearn. This, they said, was especially true of members of the Russian nobility, raised in the Romantic era, who had been encouraged to live in idleness, fleeing from the real world into a world of the imagination.[15] While radicals suggested that there was nothing to be learned from the previous generation, however, their own understanding of the mind was clearly influenced by the proclivities of their predecessors.

THE CLASH WITH ROMANTICISM—MANIPULATION OF AFFECTS

Radicals' view of affective states, inclinations, and impulses was very similar to their view of sensation. Sensory experience tells us about the world around us; affective states allow us to judge our experiences. Both define what is unique to us as individuals: our minds and personalities are shaped by our experiences from early childhood on, and our outlook and preferences express themselves most clearly through our affective dispositions. Varfolomei Zaitsev put it most succinctly: "The human being is the product of his feelings."[16] Without the help of affects and dispositions, we might not know what is unique about us.

Here, Sentimental and Romantic traditions offered radicals material both to draw on and to reject. On the one hand, Romantics argued that moods, dispositions, inclinations, and impulses need to be taken seriously and should be studied extensively through introspection. The celebration of feeling, and of introspection, reached its apogee early on, during the *Sturm und Drang* movement of the pre-Romantic period, when it was argued that feelings come with their own "rights": they must be indulged, acted on, and fulfilled.[17] Radicals agreed and sometimes even credited Romantics with this discovery. Dobroliubov, for example, praised the Russian Romantic poet and thinker Nikolai Stankevich for having advocated the principle of self-fulfillment: "He firmly recognized that man cannot be satisfied (*udovletvorit'sia*) other than in complete harmony with himself,

and that every person is not only capable of finding such satisfaction and harmony, but is obliged to do so."[18]

Yet Sentimental and Romantic writers, both in western Europe and in Russia, had also thought it legitimate to cultivate particular affective states.[19] As Andrei Zorin observes in his contribution to this volume, literature in the late eighteenth century became a "school of sensibility . . . Readers were taught to react correctly to the set of the basic events that may occur in their lives: falling in love, losing their relatives, retiring to solitude, admiring beauties of nature and art, and so on."[20] To Dobroliubov and other radical writers, the view that there are "correct" affective responses to events that can be taught was anathema. Cultivating some particular responses and emotions always takes place at the expense of others. The result, according to Dobroliubov, was a state of inner war. Moreover, the cultivation of particular wishes, moods, aims, or needs meant that these lost their naturalness, became artificial. Chernyshevsky emphasized that Romantics permitted only "elevated feelings" and fanned their flames artificially, turning them into inauthentic, "pretend, imaginary" (*mnimye, fantasticheskie*) dispositions.[21] As he saw it, Romantic feeling became even more stilted as a result of attempts to repress feelings that were deemed base. Over time, the feelings that had been denied would build up, only to explode with tumultuous and potentially destructive force. The repression of feeling led to unhealthy, unnatural hypertrophy of sentiment.[22]

Most of all, the twin practices of cultivating certain affective dispositions while repressing others bothered radicals, because they deprived affects of any value as indicators of personal wishes and needs. As Dmitrii Pisarev readily admitted, the problem concerned every person to some degree. People are suggestible, and even the most elemental feelings, such as attraction, are subject to manipulation.[23] Again, education, or upbringing, was greatly to blame. Dobroliubov and Pisarev both noted that people are trained to manipulate their emotional states from childhood on. By the time they become adults, they have lost track of their natural inclinations and have little idea what their true feelings are.[24] Worst of all, most are unaware that their dispositions and inclinations are in fact learned preferences, believing them to be spontaneous, specific to them as individuals.

Dobroliubov and Pisarev urged their readers to learn to distinguish between their true "nature" and the "deformations" that society imposes on them.[25] But how? Pisarev found two solutions: one is self-observation, examining one's responses to events in the same way that one might observe the dissection of a frog.[26] The second is to place faith in spontaneity, letting one's impulses go unchecked. He advocated "being oneself" and defined this around the free flow of feeling: "that every feeling might manifest

itself freely, without the control of invented constraints [imposed] from outside." One should behave "as living feeling inclines one."[27] The more spontaneous an emotion, the more likely Pisarev was to accord it authenticity and value; hence he spoke of "immediate inclination" as a safe guide, along with "taste" and "caprice."[28]

From the radical perspective, the problem with Romantics was not that they failed to appreciate the importance of affects, but that they failed to practice what they preached. The men of the 1840s, in their view, were guilty of the same sin. Even if Alexander Herzen emphasized the "physical basis of elevated emotions,"[29] the very distinction between elevated and base affective states was likely to raise radicals' suspicions. The fathers might emphasize the primacy of feeling, but they consistently meddled with their affective dispositions, and thereby greatly diminished their reliability as sources of information about individual distinctiveness and as guides to action.

DECISION-MAKING AND ETHICS

The notion that one should be true to one's feelings was common to all radical writers; it was central to their ethics and to their program of social activism. Chernyshevsky was the first among many to argue that there is nothing unethical about acting on feeling; indeed, "egoism" of this sort is the best guarantee of leading a good life. By nature, people are disposed to pursue pleasure, to avoid pain and harm, and to act in such a way as to give other people pleasure. Here again, radicals drew on the physiology of the nervous system to support their views: there is no separate faculty of the mind that regulates human behavior. All actions are the result of physical impulses.

To radicals, human behavior is primarily reflexive, a response by which the organism promotes its own well-being. In his review of G. H. Lewes's *Physiology of Common Life* (1859), Antonovich would discuss the operation of the reflexes through the nervous system at great length to explain how action is stimulated. The body's movements, Antonovich emphasized, are only partially controlled by the brain. They are regulated by the nervous system as a whole, which works to protect the well-being of the organism. The pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain, therefore, are programmed into the body and do not constitute the choice of an incorporeal mind.[30] Antonovich's claims received confirmation in 1863, when the physiologist Ivan Sechenov published his study *Reflexes of the Brain*. Having worked under the leading lights of Germany, Austria, and France, Sechenov demonstrated how reflexive stimuli are coordinated in

the nervous system. Though he was not himself a radical, Sechenov's study was greeted with great enthusiasm by the radical community: it was seen as proof that no immortal soul exists, and that "egoism" is the natural basis for decision-making.[31]

Before proceeding, it should be noted that radical "egoism" did not mark an abrupt departure from views on ethics that had been put forward in the later 1840s. It was Alexander Herzen who first defended the principle that egoism and the pursuit of pleasure are the core element of human life, the inalienable "living foundation of the individual."[32] Further, Herzen had sought, in his highly influential novel, *Who Is to Blame?* (1847), to demonstrate that individuals' actions are not governed by freely exercised moral choices. The physical organism has needs that demand fulfillment; the body even appears to have a "memory" of its own. For Herzen, however, the limitations placed by the body on moral choice do not eliminate the possibility of choice, nor do they efface the possibility of forming authentic moral judgments on the basis of principle.[33]

Drawing on Herzen's works, Chernyshevsky, Dobroliubov, and Pisarev would adopt the term "egoism" as their own. Yet they questioned whether principles should play a role in decision-making. As Dobroliubov argued in "Literary Trifles" (1859), an important article spelling out the differences between the two generations, the men of the 1840s had worked out principles that they attempted to live by. These, however, were never more than abstract formulae, derived from "abstract logic" and "syllogisms" rather than from experience. Members of the new generation, he claimed, attached weight only to those impressions that they had directly experienced. They had not only "understood," but "felt" (*prochuvstvovali*) that there is no such thing as an absolute principle or moral law to live by.[34]

To radicals, therefore, the decision-making process is to be governed not by principles, or by a separate faculty of reason within the mind, but by impulse. Even so, radical ethics have often been represented as a kind of science in which moral questions should be solved "rationally," by calculating how to maximize pleasure and utility as if these were mathematical equations. The expression scholars have used to designate radical ethics is "rational egoism" (rather than the radicals' simpler term, "egoism"), and those ethics are generally said to have derived from the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and J. S. Mill.[35] The radical treatise most often called upon to document "rational egoism" is Chernyshevsky's article "The Anthropological Principle in Philosophy" (1860). Here, Chernyshevsky not only asserted that the good can be equated with utility, but couched his statement in pseudo-mathematical language and claimed that all "reasonable people" would agree with him.[36] Scholars also frequently point to

Chernyshevsky's novel *What Is to Be Done?* (1863), particularly to a passage in which the hero, Lopukhov, advances the slogan, "Calculate what is for you most useful!" ("*Rasschityvaite, chto dlia vas poleznee!*")[37]

In both works, however, Chernyshevsky expressed considerable ambivalence about the role reason and calculation play in ethical decision-making. He repeatedly referred to ethical judgment as "feeling" in "The Anthropological Principle in Philosophy."[38] What is more, Chernyshevsky explicitly denied that reason could always be called upon in making important decisions. The point came up in the context of a discussion of the political philosophy of J. S. Mill, where Chernyshevsky criticized Mill for "wishing too hard" that the life of a society or of an individual could develop in an "entirely reasonable" manner. Human psychology, Chernyshevsky asserted, does not work this way. "Only relatively unimportant things are done completely coldly, calmly, reasonably, after careful consideration." In life, the most important steps are usually taken without any thought at all.[39]

Similar caveats are introduced in the passage of the novel *What Is to Be Done?* where Lopukhov calls upon the heroine, Vera Pavlovna, to "Calculate what is for you most useful!" Vera Pavlovna's first response is to comment that she finds the theory "cold, pitiless, and prosaic"; she then persuades Lopukhov to revise it by deemphasizing the thought-process in explaining how ethical decisions are made. Lopukhov's slogan implies that he views ethical decision-making as a free and rational thought process. By prompting Lopukhov to expound on the decision-making process more generally, however, Vera Pavlovna brings him to explain that people do not choose their course of action through a process of reasoning, but under the influence of various motives and inducements. On this basis, Vera Pavlovna can conclude that so-called "calculation of interest" is nothing but a "play" of inducements inside the person, the outcome of which will be determined by whichever one proves strongest.[40] People, it seems, are not in control over how their "calculation of interest" will turn out.

Chernyshevsky attributed a much greater role to dispositions of preference and avoidance in determining our actions than has commonly been recognized. He added that there should be no harm to society if people act according to their dispositions, so long as they are natural and healthy. By nature, people are disposed to increase not only their own pleasure and utility, but those of other people as well, because they take pleasure in helping other people. They only begin to do harm when their organism has been compromised by hunger and pain. Even then, people cannot be condemned for causing others harm precisely because there is no separate faculty in the mind that can override the impulses of a malfunctioning nervous system.[41]

Radical ethics, therefore, formed around the principle of egoism, which was borrowed from Herzen, but developed the notion of egoism in such a way as to contradict his view that principles must play a key role in moral decision-making. Chernyshevsky and his followers argued that people are driven by the impulse to pursue pleasure and avoid pain, and that they should not attempt to override the inducements of the body by acting according to abstract conceptions of morality.

FEELING AS A FORCE MOTIVATING RADICAL ENGAGEMENT

Radicals thought that the inducement to act for the benefit of others must come from inside, from an inner impulse. They accepted that people ought to think through their priorities before acting, yet thoughts must arise out of experience. Radicals touted solidarity, for example, as a concept that could organize people's choices: it is not an "abstract principle," which radicals derided, but simultaneously an idea and a feeling.

In 1868, Nikolai Shelgunov described the young generation as having "matured amid firmly established ideas and amid living human feeling."[42] This assertion had been standard among radicals for almost ten years, elaborated by Nikolai Dobroliubov in 1859. As Dobroliubov explained, "young people" draw their principles from "life experience"; their responses to the events they live through show them what they should regard as true and useful. Solidarity occupies an important place in their mindset and stimulates their activities, but only because it arises out of the "consciousness of our living, blood-relation to humanity." Solidarity is not just a moral "principle," therefore, but the product of experience. It is an "internal inducement" that prompts people to help humanity.[43] Years later, Petr Tkachev continued to emphasize solidarity as an affective state: it is not an abstract principle, but a "felt idea."[44] For both Dobroliubov and Tkachev, the idea's roots in affect mean that acting in solidarity with others will come naturally.

Radicals believed that the greatest mistake of the 1840s generation had been to divorce reason from feeling in establishing principles on which people should act. The artificiality of their principles deprived these men of any inclination to act in accordance with them, plunging them into inactivity and despair.[45] Radical journalists would highlight this mistake in their literary reviews, subjecting the heroes of novels by Turgenev and Goncharov to searing criticism for their physical and emotional impotence. Chernyshevsky attacked the heroes of Turgenev's stories in "Russian Man at a *Rendez-Vous*" (1858); they had a wealth of feeling, yet proved incapable of action at the crucial moment. They stood motionless as beautiful young women threw

themselves at their feet; they proclaimed their sympathy for the plight of Russian serfs, but would not lift a finger to aid them.[46] To Dobroliubov, Goncharov's Oblomov, too, embodied this culture of passivity: lying on his couch, he dreamed of heroic feats, but undertook nothing.[47]

The heroines of these novels, however, were a different case entirely. Radical critics used them to illustrate the means by which inner feeling could serve as an inducement to altruistic behavior. They did not have in mind the "sensitive gentry girl" (*chuvstvitel'naia baryshnia*), whom they mocked for her superficiality and falsity.[48] Not every woman was a gentry girl, however: Dobroliubov praised Turgenev's Asya ("Asya") and Ostrovsky's Katerina (*The Storm*) for their capacity to follow the dictates of their hearts. Nor was every gentry girl impervious to the elemental force of the emotions: Turgenev's Elena (*On the Eve*) and Pomialovsky's Lenochka (*Molotov*) escaped the nobility's reputation for affectation and were celebrated for powerful, "deep," and sincere feeling.[49]

The primary emotion for which radical journalists praised these women was love. Erotic love could undermine considerations of social status and social norms, and the passionate heroines whom radical literary critics admired most were willing to defy the wishes of their parents and husbands.[50] Critics also greatly admired those women whose love for a particular man was connected to passionate commitment to the well-being of humanity. Elena's romance with Insarov (*On the Eve*) was portrayed this way by Dobroliubov in "When Will the Real Day Come?" (1860). Elena is highly sensitive and "impressionable" (subject to *vpechatlitel'nost'*), a woman of strong feeling. This does not make her sentimental: "Sentimentality is characterized precisely by a superabundance of feelings and words in the complete absence of active love, while Elena constantly strove to manifest feeling in action." Her character traits are love and compassion for the suffering and poor, and a wish to bring them happiness, but her most important attribute is her yearning for someone who can show her how to save those in need. The latter feeling is the basis of Elena's attraction to Insarov, a man driven no less than she by a "passionate wish" to help others. According to Dobroliubov, Elena embodies the best tendency in Russia, namely its longing—for change and for the knowledge of how to bring change about. Dobroliubov staked the future of Russia on that feeling, noting that a savior cannot fail to appear to those who yearn for him.[51]

When radicals began to produce their own literature, these patterns persisted. Unlike the masculine heroes of radical literature, who could be laconic, heroines were permitted lyrical monologues in which they described their faith in a better future. Their distinctive trait, however, is their determination to make their dreams a reality. In Chernyshevsky's *What Is to Be Done?* Vera Pavlovna is accorded prophetic powers: she dreams of a goddess, who identifies herself first as "the bride of your bridegroom," and then as "love for the people." The goddess instructs Vera to heal the sick and release those who are entrapped, directions that Vera loses little time in putting into action.[52] Similarly, the heroine of Vasilii Sleptsov's short story "Hard Times" (1865), is characterized by her commitment to social change and her faith that this can be accomplished. Maria Nikolaevna believes that she can begin a "new life" among "good people" who will show her "what to do." She notes that her concern about inequality and the abuse of the weak is not based on understanding, but "only on" feeling and instinct.[53] Her passion is contrasted to the apparent lack of feeling in her male counterparts. She is the only character who visibly suffers from the poverty and abuses she observes in the countryside.

As the literary historian V. N. Konovalov observed, passion and lyricism became an ever more common feature in novels by radical authors in the late 1860s, and these bore ever greater similarities to Romantic literature of the 1830s. Konovalov attributed this shift to declining radical optimism about the likelihood that a revolution would occur and produce the desired social change. In this time of hopelessness, it was necessary to reassure readers, to "infect them with faith," and to convince them of the righteousness of the radical cause.[54] Historians of Russian radicalism agree that the movement changed fundamentally in the mid-1860s. Having seen their ranks decimated by state repression, radical journalists wished to cultivate in their readers a passionate devotion to the people that could motivate self-sacrificing behavior. Simultaneously, they expressed a growing sense of embitterment about "turncoat nihilists" who refused such sacrifice, choosing to pursue comfortable careers as professionals instead.[55]

THE NEW ECONOMY OF FEELING

In the same period, and for similar reasons, radical journalists backed away from the position they had adopted in the late 1850s, namely that it is always right to follow the call of one's feelings, so long as they are natural. Instead, in the mid-1860s they would create a new hierarchy of affects, encouraging their readers to cultivate some at the expense of others. These were now ranked according to the criterion of usefulness, which became ever murkier: useful to whom? Individuals were forbidden to act in accordance with affects and dispositions that bring pleasure only to them.

The new hierarchy of feeling found proponents beginning in 1864, most notably in the writings of Varfolomei Zaitsev, who was then becoming a leading journalist at the radical organ *The Russian Word:* "When the

concept of pleasure becomes the concept of utility, then people will be delivered of the greater part of their sufferings. Consequently, there will be no reason to despair of their future; on the contrary, each may contribute to the realization of these *pia desiderata* by rising up against everything of a luxurious type, i.e., of a useless type."[56] Zaitsev's first sentence appears to confirm Chernyshevsky's ethical theory of egoism by equating pleasure and utility with the good of the majority. Yet Zaitsev backs away from Chernyshevsky's position by introducing the category of "useless" pleasures: while Chernyshevsky recognized that some types of pleasure are more useful than others, he would never have categorized them so rigidly.[57] By arguing that the cultivation of luxury ought actively to be repressed, Zaitsev was introducing an important innovation into radical ethics, a new willingness to intervene in the process by which people make choices. Some inclinations are to be privileged over others. The new spirit of interventionism can also be detected in articles Pisarev published in *The Russian Word* in 1865, where he argued that radicals should attain pleasure from helping the poor, adding that more ordinary indulgences were a waste of time and should be avoided.[58] The position that radicals adopted in the mid-1860s, namely that some feelings ought to be cultivated at the expense of others, brought them back to the very stance for which they had criticized the generation of the 1840s: the privileging of "elevated" feelings over base ones.

Radicals, however, developed their new economy of feeling to an unprecedented extreme. In revolutionary circles of the mid-1860s, asceticism became the order of the day.[59] The *Revolutionary Catechism* by Sergei Nechaev and Mikhail Bakunin, published in 1869, marked the apogee of the new asceticism. The *Catechism* was written as a set of guidelines for any would-be revolutionary and demanded that every other aspect of the individual's life had to be entirely subordinated to the revolutionary cause. Revolutionary "passion" must exclude every other "feeling" and loyalty. "Hard with himself, he [the revolutionary] must be hard toward others. All the tender feelings of family life, of friendship, love, gratitude and even honor must be stifled in him by a single cold passion for the revolutionary cause."[60] These words eloquently display how thoroughly that movement had changed: just ten years earlier, Dobroliubov had argued for self-fulfillment and inner harmony.

THE RADICAL MALE HERO AND THE PROBLEM OF "COLDNESS"

The new asceticism in Russian radicalism followed the development of a new literary type in radical fiction: the cold man, one who puts his dedication to the revolutionary cause above his personal inclinations,

and who, unlike his feminine counterpart in literature, avoids declarations of faith and feeling.

The literary origins of this type can be traced to Turgenev's novel *Fathers and Sons,* with its character Bazarov, in whom Turgenev had intended to portray the new generation. In part, Turgenev based his portrait on articles he read by Chernyshevsky, Dobroliubov, and Pisarev in *The Contemporary* and *The Russian Word.* One distinguishing feature of their reviews of Russian literature was their stated contempt for loquacity: their ideal male was a laconic type, one who greeted others' declarations of "sympathy toward human needs" with skepticism.[61] In part, Turgenev's representation of Bazarov was also based on personal interactions with radicals, most notably Dobroliubov, who is said to have been not only reserved, but cold and brusque in his dealings with Turgenev.[62]

Scholars have pointed to a third source for Bazarov, however: he remained a romantic hero, modeled on the previous protagonists of Turgenev's literary *oeuvre.* Various romantic traits have been identified in Bazarov: his apparent "alienation" from other people, from the natural world, and from his own nature.[63] In this sense, Bazarov is at once a representative of the 1840s and of the 1860s. Intentionally or unintentionally, the conflation of the two types in Bazarov signaled that the fathers remained present in the sons.

To contemporary readers, most notably Antonovich, Bazarov's coldness was his most marked romantic trait. Antonovich described Bazarov as "demonic, or Byronic;" "something like Hamlet." He was infuriated by Turgenev's attribution of coldness to his radical hero: "Never did one single feeling steal its way into his cold heart; not the slightest trace of enthusiasm or passion can be seen in him; even hatred he releases in calculated measures." Worse still, Bazarov seemed intent on destroying any manifestation of human emotion in the people around him: "He kills their noble feelings and elevated instinct with his contemptuous smile."[64] Yet Bazarov's cool gaze did not antagonize all radical commentators. Pisarev, most notably, was delighted by Bazarov's brusque manner. Bazarov was not devoid of feeling, but he had no inclination toward "tearful sentimentality." Further, his coarseness was a token of Bazarov's sincerity: he could not help it if his interlocutors were foolish and vain, and he could not act on false pretenses merely to spare their illusions about themselves.[65]

Several of these features can also be found among the protagonists of Chernyshevsky's *What Is to Be Done?*—particularly in Rakhmetov, whose coldness and austere habits made him an object of fascination to scholars. Rakhmetov became an ideal of personal comportment for revolutionaries from the mid-1860s on, and a Russian by-word for self-discipline. He ate

little and read much. Devoting every moment to the service of the people, he "denied himself love" as an unnecessary distraction.[66] Rakhmetov, however, was only one of several cold heroes in radical novels, and their authors appear to have been aware of their typological links to earlier models. This stands out most clearly in Sleptsov's Riazanov, the nihilist hero of "Hard Times." Riazanov, too, lives an austere life and avoids romantic entanglements. He sees everything, but has difficulty expressing sympathy; his coldness is at once his strength and his fatal flaw. Riazanov falls in love with the heroine, Maria Nikolaevna, who reciprocates his love, yet he refuses to express or act on his feelings. Mocking everyone he speaks to, he appears unable to alter the tone of his conversation.[67]

Riazanov's interactions with Maria Nikolaevna bring his limitations to the fore. Caught in an unhappy marriage and marooned on her husband's provincial estate, the heroine believes that she might still contribute to the cause of humanity by beginning a new life among better people. Yet Riazanov's first impulse is to ridicule her by quoting German Romantic poetry, Goethe's "Mignon" ("*Kennst Du das Land, wo die Zitronen blühen,*" with its refrain: "*Dahin, dahin, möcht ich mit Dir, o mein Geliebter, ziehn*"). Riazanov asks: "What draws you *thither, thither?* You don't seriously think that lemons grow there, do you?" Maria Nikolaevna disregards Riazanov's cheap ridicule, reaffirming her faith in the existence of "good people," and thus forces Riazanov to drop his act. He grudgingly assents: those better people do exist, and she will find them if she tries.[68]

By quoting Goethe's "Mignon," Riazanov connects himself to the generation of the 1840s, and the link would have been apparent to all of Sleptsov's readers. To Herzen, the words, *dahin, dahin* became a shorthand for the stance of transcendental yearning that characterized his early, Romantic years, a stance that he had turned away from in the 1840s.[69] Riazanov is trapped in this negating stance, relegating himself to the fate of the superfluous man. Yet the character was not there to evoke the readers' derision. Sleptsov was already at this time established as a radical writer, and his readers were prepared to admire coldness and asceticism in their hero. They were to sympathize with Riazanov as a tragic hero, whose very strengths had become a fatal flaw. Transposed from the literature of the 1840s into the 1860s, Riazanov is at once a father and a son.

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Radicalism has often been understood as a rejection of all the philosophical and literary codes of the first half of the nineteenth century. Radicals also represented themselves in this way. By analyzing their views on feeling, however, historians may gain a much more nuanced understanding of

their relationship to previous intellectual and cultural trends in appreciating their debt to Romanticism and to the generation of the 1840s. To speak in Hegelian terms, the relationship was dialectical—one of *Aufhebung*. In negating their predecessors, radical writers did not cancel out their ideas and attributes, but took them up and carried them forward.

Nineteenth-century opponents of Russian radicalism proved unwilling to acknowledge its Romantic elements. Many would identify coldness and lack of empathy as the chief radical trait. Alexandra Oberländer's chapter in this volume displays how engrained this image became at the end of the nineteenth century, when Bazarov reappeared in Russian literature as the cruelest of villains. Interested only in pursuing coarse pleasures, he was not only shameless, but cold to the core.

NOTES

1. These journalists did not see eye to eye on every issue, sometimes engaging in bitter polemics against one another. Further, their own views were not always consistent. Due to restricted space, few of these inconsistencies can be addressed here.

2. The most overt statement of this kind was Ivan Panaev's 1861 obituary of Nikolai Dobroliubov, where he contrasted the two generations, characterizing the older one as marked by warmth of feeling, while the young was marked by coldness. I. I. Panaev, "Po povodu pokhoron N. A. Dobroliubova," *Pervoe polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, 6 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1888–1889), 6:321–23.

3. This was especially true in the Anglo-American literature on radicalism produced in the 1960s and 1970s, which emphasized the "rationalism" of 1860s radicals. See, for example, E. Lampert, *Sons against Fathers: Studies in Russian Radicalism and Revolution* (Oxford, 1965), 101–2; 235; Alan J. Pollard, "The Russian Intelligentsia: The Mind of Russia," *California Slavic Studies* 3 (1964): 15; Vladimir C. Nahirny, "The Russian Intelligentsia: From Men of Ideas to Men of Convictions," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 4, no. 4 (July 1960): 425–26. 433. These writers may have been guided by the assumption, widespread among historians of the mid-twentieth century, that reason was incompatible with emotion. Barbara Rosenwein has commented on this phenomenon in "Worrying about Emotions in History," *American Historical Review* 107, no. 3 (June 2002): 834–36. In Soviet scholarly literature, by contrast, especially that of the early twentieth century, radicals' emotional sensitivity was strongly emphasized.

4. Ilya Vinitsky, "'The Queen of Lofty Thoughts': The Cult of Melancholy in Russian Sentimentalism" (included in this volume).

5. Alan Richardson, *British Romanticism and the Science of the Mind* (Cambridge, UK, 2001).

6. Frederick C. Beiser, *The Romantic Imperative: The Concept of Early German Romanticism* (Cambridge, MA, 2003), 100–101.

7. M. H. Abrams, *Natural Supernaturalism: Tradition and Revolution in Romantic Literature* (New York, 1971), 388–89, 396–403; V. M. Zhirmunskii, *Nemetskii romantizm i sovremennaia mistika* (St. Petersburg, 1996), 8–10, 19–22, 46–47. I should add that Romantics did not always draw firm boundaries between sensory experience as a physical event and sensory experience as a kind of intuitive moment. Some

Romantics, did, however, contrast the "inner eye" and "inner senses" which, they believed, provided superior insight to the "outer eye" and "outer senses." On this distinction, see Judson S. Lyon, "Romantic Psychology and the Inner Senses: Coleridge," *PMLA* 81, no. 3 (June 1966): 246–60.

8. Valeria Sobol, "*Febris Erotica:* Aleksandr Herzen's Post-Romantic Physiology," *Slavic Review* 65, no. 3 (Fall 2006): 507–11. See also Alexander Vucinich, *Science in Russian Culture,* 2 vols. (Stanford, 1963–1970), 1:348–50.

9. As is well known, Chernyshevsky, Dobroliubov, and Antonovich drew much of their knowledge of physiology from the German scientific materialists Carl Vogt, Jacob Moleschott, and Ludwig Büchner. They also appear to have been familiar with studies in the physiological basis of psychology by Etienne Esquirol, Jules Baillarger, Alexandre Brierre de Boismont, and Richard von Krafft-Ebing.

10. N. A. Dobroliubov, "Organicheskoe razvitie cheloveka v sviazi s ego umstvennoi i nravstvennoi deiatel'nost'iu" (1858), *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii,* 6 vols. (Leningrad, 1934–41), 3:108–9; M. A. Antonovich, "Dva tipa sovremennykh filosofov" (1861), *Izbrannye filosofskie sochineniia,* ed. V. S. Kruzhkov (Moscow, 1945), 48–52; Antonovich, "Sovremennaia fiziologiia i filosofiia," *Sovremennik,* 1862, no. 2:246–53, 259; D. I. Pisarev, "Fiziologicheskie eskizy Moleshotta" (1861), *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii,* 12 vols. (Moscow, 2000–), 3:171–72.

11. M. A. Antonovich, "Sovremennaia filosofiia," *Sovremennik,* 1861, no. 2:271. Antonovich "Dva tipa," 33. In the first article, Antonovich polemicizes against Idealist philosophy; in the second, he argues against theological explanations of mind. Antonovich's claim that a "second self" cannot exist because one would have to "feel" it was derived from N. G. Chernyshevskii, "Antropologicheskii printsip v filosofii" (1860), *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii,* ed. V. Ia. Kirpotin et al., 15 vols. (Moscow, 1939–1953), 7:240, where he produces a similar argument against Idealism.

12. N. A. Dobroliubov, "Zhizn' Magometa" (1858), *PSS,* 3:338; Dobroliubov, "Organicheskoe razvitie cheloveka," 3:93; N. G. Chernyshevskii, "Etiudy: Populiarnye chteniia Shleidena" (1862), *PSS,* 10:482.

13. Dobroliubov, "Organicheskoe razvitie cheloveka," 3:107–10.

14. Dobroliubov said this with regard to Elena, the heroine of Turgenev's *On the Eve,* in "Kogda zhe pridet nastoiashchii den'?" (1860), *PSS,* 2:215; D. I. Pisarev, "Obrazovannaia tolpa" (1867), *PSS,* 9:40–42.

15. N. A. Dobroliubov, "Chto takoe oblomovshchina?" (1859), *PSS,* 2:12.

16. V. A. Zaitsev, "Poslednii filosof-idealist," *Russkoe slovo,* 1864, no. 12:163.

17. Paul Kluckhohn, *Die deutsche Romantik* (Bielefeld, 1924), 11.

18. N. A. Dobroliubov, "Stankevich" (1858), *PSS,* 3: 72–73.

19. Radicals described Romantics this way, but scholars have agreed. William Reddy has used the term "emotives" to claim that the words people use to describe their feelings fundamentally alter those feelings and describes the systems by which emotions are controlled as "emotional regimes"; both emotives and emotional regimes are present in all societies. According to Reddy, such regulation became especially intense among Sentimentalists of the late eighteenth century, softening but remaining an important feature of the Romantic period. William Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions* (Cambridge, UK, 2001). Radicals of the early 1860s would have found both emotives and emotional regimes disturbing; sensitive as they were to the problem of the manipulation of affects, they seem to have assumed such manipulation was avoidable; a "regime" was, by definition, something that needed to be abolished.

20. Andrei Zorin, "Leaving Your Family in 1797: Two Identities of Mikhail Murav'ev" (in this volume).

21. N. G. Chernyshevskii, "Avtoretsenziia" (1855), *PSS,* 2:96–97; N. G. Chernyshevskii, "Russkii chelovek na rendez-vous," *PSS,* 5:161; D. I. Pisarev, "Populiarizatory otritsatel'nykh doktrin" (1866), *PSS,* 8:386.

22. Chernyshevskii, "Avtoretsenziia," 2:97.

23. As Pisarev explained in "Realisty," one of his most important articles, people often confuse internalized cultural norms with spontaneous feelings. For example, many young women claim to adore men in uniform: "They hotly substantiated their position by referring to the voice of unmediated feeling, and they were prepared to swear that this was just how nature made them, that they could neither feel nor think any other way." Pisarev was certain the preference for men in uniforms was unnatural. D. I. Pisarev, "Realisty" (1864), *PSS,* 6:275.

24. Dobroliubov, "Organicheskoe razvitie cheloveka," 3:108; D. I. Pisarev, "Zhenskie tipy v romanakh i povestiakh Pisemskogo, Turgeneva i Goncharova" (1861), *PSS,* 3:365; Pisarev, "Motivy russkoi dramy" (1864), *PSS,* 5:372.

25. N. A. Dobroliubov, "Temnoe tsarstvo" (1859), *PSS,* 2:53. Here, Dobroliubov praised Ostrovsky for his capacity to distinguish between people's natural tendencies and the "disfigurements" they had received at the hands of others. Dobroliubov returned to this in "Luch sveta v temnom tsarstve" (1860), *PSS,* 2:328.

26. See Peter C. Pozefsky, *The Nihilist Imagination: Dmitrii Pisarev and the Cultural Origins of Russian Radicalism (1860–1868)* (New York, 2003), 64, 66–67.

27. D. I. Pisarev, "Skholastika XIX veka" (1861), *PSS,* 2:255, 270.

28. D. I. Pisarev, "Bazarov" (1862), *PSS,* 4:166, 168. Not all radicals would agree with this. Dobroliubov called caprice "slavish subordination to the first impression" in "Organicheskoe razvitie cheloveka," 3:112.

29. Sobol, "*Febris Erotica,*" 512.

30. Antonovich, "Sovremennaia fiziologiia i filosofiia," 255–56, 260–63.

31. Vucinich, *Science in Russian Culture,* 2:121–29; David Joravsky, *Russian Psychology: A Critical History* (Oxford, 1989), 97–100.

32. Aleksandr Gertsen, "Novye variatsii na starye temy," *Sochineniia,* 9 vols. (Moscow, 1955), 2:382.

33. Sobol, "*Febris Erotica,*" 518, 513. With respect to Herzen's views on moral choice and its limitations, Sobol cites Svetlana Grenier, "Herzen's *Who Is to Blame?* The Rhetoric of the New Morality," *Slavic and East European Journal* 39, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 14–28.

34. N. A. Dobroliubov, "Literaturnye melochi" (1859), *PSS,* 4:58–60.

35. According to one of Chernyshevsky's most important biographers, he "felt . . . the need for a rational ethics, defined with scientific precision." N. G. O. Pereira, *The Thought and Teachings of N. G. Černyševskij* (The Hague, 1975), 36. Paperno speaks of a "rational calculus, with its almost mathematically exact measurement and evaluation of a human being's behavior." Irina Paperno, *Chernyshevsky and the Age of Realism: A Study in the Semiotics of Behavior* (Stanford, 1988), 107. See also William F. Woehrlin, *Chernyshevskii: The Man and the Journalist* (Cambridge, MA, 1971), 131. It has been noted that Chernyshevsky himself never used the term "rational egoism." James P. Scanlan, "The Case against Rational Egoism in Dostoevsky's 'Notes from Underground,'" *Journal of the History of Ideas* 60, no. 3 (July 1999): 549, fn. 1. The term "rational egoism" also appeared in the first major biography of Chernyshevsky, Iu. M. Steklov, *N. G. Chernyshevskii: Ego zhizn' i deiatel'nost',* 2nd ed., 2 vols. (Moscow-

Leningrad, 1928). While referring to Chernyshevsky as "a man of iron logic," however, Steklov also noted that his morality had an important affective component. Steklov concluded: "Whoever acts exclusively according to egoistic calculation acts against human nature" (1:287, 292).

36. "If we think that 'the good is higher than the useful,' we would merely be saying: 'very great utility is higher than not so great utility,' we would only be stating a mathematical truth, of the sort that 100 is more than 2." Chernyshevskii, "Antropologicheskii printsip," 7:290. He also claims that moral judgment can be made according to the "geometrical axiom" that the "whole is larger than its parts" (7:285).

37. In the authoritative Soviet edition, this passage is marked in a footnote as an exposition "on the theory of rational egoism." N. G. Chernyshevskii, *Chto delat'? Iz rasskazov o novykh liudiakh,* ed. T. I. Ornatskaia and S. A. Reiser (Leningrad, 1975), 841, fn. 38.

38. Chernyshevskii, "Antropologicheskii printsip," 7:282–83. Here, he distinguishes between actions made on the basis of "calculation" and those made on the basis of altruistic "feeling," but he then refers to egoism itself as a type of feeling.

39. Chernyshevskii, "Antropologicheskii printsip," 7:231. Chernyshevsky used a man's decision to get married as an example. Reason and calculation do not enter into such decisions: "It is common knowledge that almost all decent men become grooms without themselves knowing how it happened: the blood heated up, a word was spat out, and it was done." "Decent people," therefore, become engaged without thinking through the decision. This seems also to have applied to Chernyshevsky himself. According to Paperno, he spent large amounts of time ruminating about whether to marry, but his engagement to Ol'ga Sokratovna was sudden. Afterward, she notes, Chernyshevsky spent months attempting to rationalize the decision. Paperno, *Chernyshevsky,* 100.

40. Chernyshevskii, *Chto delat'?* 68–71.

41. Chernyshevskii, "Antropologicheskii printsip," 7:264–66, 283–84.

42. N. V. Shelgunov, "Beskharakternost' nashei intelligentsii," *Delo,* 1873, no. 12:24–25.

43. Dobroliubov, "Literaturnye melochi," 4:61.

44. P. N. Tkachev, "Podrastaiushchie sily" (1868), *Izbrannye sochineniia,* ed. B. P. Koz'min, 2 vols. (Moscow, 1932), 1:310.

45. Dobroliubov, "Literaturnye melochi," 4:58–59.

46. Chernyshevskii, "Russkii chelovek na rendez-vous," 5:157–61, 172–74.

47. Dobroliubov, "Chto takoe oblomovshchina?" 2:13–14.

48. Dobroliubov, "Kogda zhe pridet nastoiashchii den'?" 2:206.

49. Dobroliubov, "Luch sveta," 2:359. Pisarev reversed his position on Asya over time: he praised her in "Zhenskie tipy," 3:364–70, but attacked her in D. I. Pisarev, "Roman kiseinoi devushki" (1865), *PSS,* 7:21. Pisarev also attacked Dobroliubov for praising Katerina too highly: Pisarev, "Motivy russkoi dramy," 5:363, 359.

50. Dobroliubov, "Kogda zhe pridet nastoiashchii den'?" 2:213–17; Pisarev, "Roman kiseinoi devushki," 7:21–37.

51. Dobroliubov, "Kogda zhe pridet nastoiashchii den'?" 2:213–14, 216–17, 239.

52. For Vera Pavlovna's first dream, see Chernyshevskii, *Chto delat'?* 81–82. See also the commentary in Paperno, *Chernyshevsky,* 214.

53. V. A. Sleptsov, "Trudnoe vremia," *Izbrannye proizvedeniia* (Leningrad, 1970), 445–602, 490, 590.

54. V. N. Konovalov, "Osobennosti khudozhestvennogo metoda romanov o 'novykh liudiakh,'" *Romantizm v russkoi i sovetskoi literature* 6 (1973): 101–103.

55. See Abbott Gleason, *Young Russia: The Genesis of Russian Radicalism in the 1860s* (New York, 1980), 292–93.

56. Zaitsev, "Poslednii filosof-idealist," 189.

57. Vera Pavlovna, for example, is permitted indulgences in *What Is to Be Done?* She loves to drink cream. Chernyshevskii, *Chto delat'?* 140.

58. D. I. Pisarev, "Posmotrim!" (1865), *PSS,* 8:21, 40–41, 61–65; Pisarev, "Pushkin i Belinskii: Evgenii Onegin" (1865), *PSS,* 7:216. For another example, see P. N. Tkachev, "Liudi budushchego i geroi meshchanstva" (1868), *Izbrannye sochineniia,* 1:174.

59. Claudia Verhoeven, *The Odd Man Karakozov: Imperial Russia, Modernity, and the Birth of Terrorism* (Ithaca, 2009), 114–15.

60. Quoted in Franco Venturi, *Roots of Revolution: A History of the Populist and Socialist Movements in Nineteenth-Century Russia,* rev. ed., trans. Francis Haskell (London, 2001), 366.

61. See, most notably, Dobroliubov's review of *Oblomov.* Here, he declared that when he heard noblemen speaking of their sympathy for human need, he always thought of Goncharov's hero. Turgenev's Rudin was another such character. Dobroliubov, "Chto takoe oblomovshchina?" 2:29–30.

62. M. A. Antonovich, "Iz vospominanii o Nikolae Aleksandroviche Dobroliubove" (1901), in *N. A. Dobroliubov v vospominaniiakh sovremennikov* (Leningrad, 1961), 235; N. G. Chernyshevskii, "Vospominaniia ob otnosheniiakh Turgeneva k Dobroliubovu" (1884), in *N. A. Dobroliubov v vospominaniiakh sovremennikov,* 172.

63. See David Lowe, *Turgenev's Fathers and Sons* (Ann Arbor, 1983), 62–70. William C. Brumfield, "Bazarov and Rjazanov: The Romantic Archetype in Russian Nihilism," *Slavonic and East European Journal* 21, no. 4 (Winter 1977): 495–505.

64. M. A. Antonovich, "Asmodei nashego vremeni" (1862), *Izbrannye stat'i: Filosofiia. Kritika. Polemika,* ed. V. Evgen'ev-Maksimov (Leningrad, 1938), 148–49, 160. Antonovich would be ridiculed in the press for confusing Shakespeare with Byron.

65. Pisarev, "Bazarov," 4:169, 191–92, 193.

66. Verhoeven, *The Odd Man Karakozov,* 40–41.

67. My reading of Riazanov is at odds with that of specialists on Sleptsov, who treat him as the embodiment of radical virtue. See, most notably, Andrei Rogachevskii, "Precursors of Socialist Realism: Vasilii Sleptsov's 'Trudnoe vremia' and Its Anti-Nihilist Opponents," *Slavonic and East European Review* 75, no. 1 (January 1997): 47. Brumfield observes that Riazanov, like Bazarov, is capable only of negation, but Brumfield rejects the view that Riazanov bears any Romantic traits. Brumfield, "Bazarov and Rjazanov," 497, 502.

68. Sleptsov, "Trudnoe vremia," 590. Later in the dialogue, Riazanov is forced to admit that "passion is necessary" to live, but he is so embarrassed about having made this statement that he chides himself, claiming he has had too much to drink (591).

69. A. I. Gertsen, "Zapiski odnogo molodogo cheloveka" (1840), *Sochineniia,* 1:69. "Hard Times" contains numerous gestures at Herzen's novel *Who Is To Blame?* The most obvious is at the end of the story where Riazanov and Maria Nikolaevna's husband argue over "who is to blame" for the heroine's decision to leave. Sleptsov, "Trudnoe vremia," 596.