

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE
OF MONISM



MONISM AS THE
GOAL
OF CIVILIZATION

BY

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Monism as the goal of civilization.

The subject to be discussed in the following presentation is a problem of the first rank, which must be unconditionally designated as a central one. In its different ramifications, it fills the entire life of any person who has once grasped it, and lays claim to his entire active energy. For what is to be here set forth is not a single thought, nor a narrowly limited group of thoughts, of which it is possible to take intellectual possession for a moment, only to forget it almost immediately. It is rather a question of something which is to permeate the whole life, both internal and external. My purpose is to draw your attention to thoughts which are not brought out now and then for public exhibition, and on account of their rare and splendid nature viewed only rarely and on occasions for the display of magnificence, but which are of such a nature as to dominate the entire life from the hours of supreme elevation to the most trivial affairs of everyday existence. I would give you a philosophy which is destined to be a science and an art of life, and therefore to reduce the whole man to a unity, as no doctrine of the kind has ever before done. It is the whole man who is to be the subject. The influence of the new thoughts is to reach from man as a vertebrate animal to man as ruler of the world, ruler of the earth, the water and the air, and finally ruler of himself, the most complex and turbulent of all worlds included in the larger world.

On account of this all-embracing unity, we call the complete doctrine Monism or doctrine of unity. This is a doctrine which excludes all double-entry bookkeeping, which removes all barriers,

hitherto regarded as insurmountable, between inner and outer life, between the life of the present and that of the future, between the existence of the body and that of the soul, and which comprehends all these things in a single unity, that extends everywhere and leaves nothing outside its scope. Just as we at present observe among the different peoples, in spite of all preparations for war and other dangers which menace the general peace, a constantly increasing psychical and social unification, which finds its outward expression in the rapidly increasing international arrangements and relations, so we will no longer leave the microcosm, the single man, divided into provinces which are separated from one another by frontiers or by insuperable heights; but every part of the man is to be brought into organic union with every other part in mutual functioning, so that every part receives help and strength from every other part, and the whole man joyfully fulfils the purpose of his existence as a being characterized by harmonious internal and external conditions.

The history of philosophy teaches us that such a struggle toward unity is to be discerned in the earliest thought-experiments of humanity. In fact, the matter rests here just as in the sayings and stories of all peoples, that what men wish is represented in the sayings and stories as realized. Through the fact that what is at present impossible is represented as possible, the fanciful soul of the primitive peoples makes itself at home in this kingdom of the future, the desirable, the ideal. So we see that the Greek natural philosophy, with which the whole philosophy of Western Europe begins, has through its first and eldest representative, Thales, impressed its ineffaceable stamp on the course of human thought for more than two thousand years. Thales explained that everything had been created out of water. The question whether this thesis, which evidently rests on the animation of the sea and other bodies of water with countless animals and plants, could be scientifically supported by him, is relatively insignificant in comparison with the other, whether it is at all possible actually to derive the whole world with its monstrous complexity from an essence which is homogeneous and in itself wholly indivisible. At the present day, we know that water is a chemical union of oxygen and hydrogen, and that there is no

single living being; either in the vegetable or in the animal kingdom, which can find these two elements sufficient for the building up of its body. For the production of a living being, carbon and nitrogen are always likewise necessary, to say nothing of phosphorus and sulphur and iron as well as a whole series of other elements. So from the standpoint of contemporary science the idea of Thales is to be rejected as wholly untenable; it contradicts all that is known to science. At that time, more than two thousand years ago, it was not possible to apply this criticism to the view of the first natural philosophers. There arose, however, another criticism, based on the ground that although many forms of life are to be found in the water, not every form of life can be discovered there. Men and birds move about on the earth and in the air; and the production of all life from the water is consequently very doubtful.

We need not let ourselves be interrupted here by the suggestion, which a modern philologist would perhaps be inclined to make, that in fact the contemporaneous theory of descent makes it in the highest degree probable that life actually established itself originally in the water, and that the land animals evolved out of water animals by a lengthy process of transformation. Such an objection would be philological in the narrowest sense of the word; for it would rest on an intentional or unintentional confusion of the different significations which attach to the word "from". If we say that everything came from the water, we may mean either that water is the raw material of all that exists, or that in the water forms of life may have been fashioned out of other raw material. In the first case, therefore, water would be the material, and in the second the place or environment out of which everything has been fashioned. The second conception is recognized to be correct; while on the other hand the view of Thales rested on the first conception, that the water furnished not only the place, but also the substance for all other existences. So Thales did not long remain unassailed in his scientific position. After him arose a whole succession of other philosophers, who in place of water adopted fire or spirit, atoms or being, or yet more abstract primal elements of all existence.

The conflict among these different conceptions has naturally

remained undecided. For if we can now prove that water could play the part of primal element as little as fire or spirit, the whole conceptual method becomes doubtful and suspicious. It must be asked whether it is possible to carry out at all this opinion thrown by Thales into the world, that whole complexity of the world is derivable from a single homogeneous material. The first working out of a scientific opinion in a department which had hitherto not yet been entered by science has of course an almost magical influence on all later thinkers who are at work in the same department. Exactly as in an oversaturated solution the first crystal which is produced there now attaches to itself all the residue of the dissolved substance and grows at its expense, no matter in what place it is produced, so a fixation of ideas occurring for the first time controls the oversaturated solution of thought-requirement in such a way that all thinking irresistibly orients itself in accordance with this first thought-germ, and that all apparently contradictory or critical thought-experiments still have exactly the fundamental quality as that first germ. So in the evolution of natural philosophy criticism has not concerned itself with the question whether it is at all thinkable and possible to carry out the thought-process here regarded as fundamental, and therefore to evolve the complex world out of a primal unity; but the thought-requirement has felt itself so strongly satisfied by this formal possibility that the first road has been accepted as once for all the correct one. Only the point, „out of which life sprang,“ was, on account of the insufficiency of the first opinion, sought for in other places.

Here we hit on a psychological phenomenon of the greatest universality, that in such first thought-shapings people always make use of a thought which is about the falsest and most impossible in the department under consideration. To make the sense of this clear, I mention the thoroughly general conception of the whole primitive world as to the relation of motion between the earth and the sun. Nowhere is there a people of average culture which did not base its standard on personal observation, and consequently picture the earth to itself as a flat disk; over which the blue heaven is fixed like an inverted bowl, along which the sun makes his daily circuit. The fact that the sun must in some sort of secret way

travel until the next morning back again toward the East, did not customarily disturb to any great extent the thinkers who had reached this stage of development. In this instance we recognize exactly the basis of the psychological error; and we know why science did not until a relatively late period arrive at the discovery that the matter stands in just the opposite way, and that the observed facts are much more consistently and coherently represented by viewing the sun as relatively motionless and the earth as in motion, and by explaining the change of day and night with reference to the rotation of the earth. This lies in the primitive anthropocentric quality of every conceivable form. What is most familiar to us in our daily life we transfer in our first attempts at thinking to the general and great appearances. Afterwards, more than half of the history of science consists in the gradual overthrow of such previous absurdities, which had presented themselves as the views which were most obvious and simple and therefore accepted without further critical consideration. Therefore, because man involuntarily conceives of all motions relatively to his own body, he naturally conceived also of the motion of the sun relatively to the earth, which appeared to him fixed; and it required more reconcile and difficult deliberations to show him that this first conception was that most remote from the truth.

In quite the same way the present incontestable requirement of unity (we shall later see how this requirement of unity can be placed on a psychophysical basis and shown to be necessary) has at all events led to the seeking of unity in the complexity of the world. What thought lies nearer to this than putting unity right at the beginning of all existence, or reaching the unity of the complex expression through viewing it as composed of one uniform material? Just as the potter can fashion out of the same substance vases, utensils and objects of every sort, presenting as great a variety of shapes as he could possibly wish or intend, so Thales imagined the whole immense variety of the rest of the world to be formed out of the plastic material known as water. And his followers added that if water proved inadequate, perhaps another primal material could perform the service which water refused.

Another example, which clearly sets forth the same inverted order of thoughts, is taken from a department to which I have for a number of years devoted a very substantial part of my energies, namely the language-problem, especially the artificially constructed common auxiliary language. I will not in this place begin for the first time to set forth in detail what an indescribable blessing the existence of a completely neutral and likewise easily acquired auxiliary language, intelligible to all the rest of the world, would be for the evolution of human culture. Here I will only point out the fact that in one of the oldest and most interesting fables of the human race the language-problem is also treated; I refer to the fable of the Tower of Babel. I recommend to all of you a careful rereading of the original text in the first book of Moses; it is from very many points of view interesting and instructive in the highest degree. For today, however, we need only the essential contents, which, as you will recall, consist in the legend that the people of that time on the earth joined together, in order to build a tower all the way up to heaven. The godhead saw himself threatened in respect to his domination over the peoples, and in order to bring a decisive ending to the undertaking, so afflicted mankind with a confusion of tongues that nobody could any longer understand his neighbor, and all union of labor, all co-operation and organization among men, on which their menacing power rested, was wiped out. I will here only point out the far-reaching insight into the powerful effectiveness of organization, which this legend brings to light; what immediately interests us is the naive conception, set forth as self-evident, that originally all men spoke entirely one and the same language. This is such a conception as every child has, until it is greatly astonished by running against another man, who speaks a language different from that learned by the child. Exactly, then as the child does not possess the conception of a difference of language, until it meets this experience, those creators of the old myth-material, so deeply penetrative in one sense and so naive in another, represent that obviously all mankind had formerly spoken a single language. This was indeed also accompanied by the assumption that the whole of humanity descended from a single pair of ancestors. Therefore

according to the conception of that period, the primal phenomenon was not the diversity of languages, but their unity. Our judgment teaches that in consequence of the evolutionary progress of man from animal progenitors in different parts of the earth, separate languages arose, which were independent of one another. For those old thinkers the diversity of languages called for an explanation, because the observation of the actual variety of languages stood in contradiction to the naive representation of their original unity.

So we could bring forward numerous other examples, the effect of which is in part operative even up to the present time. But the general indication of this involuntary perversity of human thought, which must be understood as a psychological necessity, will suffice us here, in order to make possible a quite general criticism of all such monistic world views, which proceed from a primal unity of all being, which therefore make the anthropomorphic assumption that just as the potter can create all his diverse objects out of the same clay, some world-creator has created the whole world out of an identical foundation material, whether it be water or fire or anything else whatever.

Any person interested can read in different works (I name only the works of Drews and Klimke, in order to mention two authors of opposite camps,) the historical recital how in the course of time more than a dozen monistic systems of the foregoing kind have arisen, as men have thought it possible to endow all conceivable things with the attribute of allowing the whole world to be constructed out of them. From those who look at these kinds of Monism and in accordance with a quite common logical error regard them as the only possible kinds of Monism, we quite naturally hear the criticism that a general view, which leads to so many contradictions, cannot possibly be correct; that there can as little be one true Monism, to the exclusion of all others, as in the story of the rings related by Lessing in Nathan the Wise there could be a single true religion to the exclusion of all the rest. In other words, by this kind of Monism, established by Thales, by an a priori Monism, as we can generally define it, the problem of the unified and self-consistent world-view is in fact not solved; and we modern Monists must still more carefully and decisively

than ever before repudiate the essential and logical connection of our endeavors with that a priori Monism.

The taking of so decisive an attitude will perhaps frighten many a man, who will ask himself: "Yes, but where, then, do we get here any Monism at all, if we do not see the possibility of reducing the whole world to one conception, and of deriving it from one point?" And many a man, who has perhaps incidentally occupied himself somewhat intimately with my personal philosophy and world-view, will say to himself: "The man is surely talking against himself; for we certainly know that he is the representative of the Monism of energy, that he views energy as the single world-principle, from which everything else must be derived. And even if we do not believe that he is right with regard to energy, we do not understand at all how he can convert his conceptions in this manner." I may as well, therefore, take advantage of the opportunity to make clear that I myself have never advocated such a Monism of energy. On the contrary, that is a wretched and false conception, which my opponents have imputed to me after the pattern of their own conceptions. Whether the misrepresentation is intentional or not, does not concern the issue itself. Of course, they found it comparatively easy to combat this kind of Monism; so much easier, in fact, since I myself hold it to be false and untenable, and with hand and foot guard myself against the putting forward of it as my conception.

That is not said in order to detract from the significance of the conception of energy. We will later learn to recognize its real and actual significance, which belongs to it in the present of human knowledge. But in this personal example my opinion shall explained as determinatively as possible, that no a priori Monism at all is thinkable or maintainable.

On this point it is easy to bring forward proof in a logical way. A world-view is a condensed representation of actual world-relations. Nothing is more certain and undubitable than that our experience represents the world as a monstrous and unlimited variety. It is actually so diversified that never is even one single thing like another, or one occurrence like a different one. It has already been often asserted that among the many thousand leaves grown

on a single tree, no special one is ever exactly like any other one whatever. Just so, nobody in this hall is precisely like any other person whatever either in this hall or outside of it. Yes, every single one who sits here is included is an object of perpetual change. While I am speaking this word, which is now being formed by my vocal cords, I have already become another person than he who pronounced the words immediately preceding it. Therefore diversity and difference form the foundation, the primal phenomenon of all our world-knowledge, and in order to represent this diversity conceptually, we obviously need a thought-material, which has at least the like character of diversity, which, to speak mathematically, contains at least so much of what is changeable as amounts to the sum of the possible changes in the world. If we wish now to proceed from a fundamental existence which shall be unconditionally single, homogeneous and in no way in himself possessing differences, the principal element is wanting in what is to supply this material, that is do say diversity. In order to add diversity, we must summon to our assistance some other thought-medium, some new principle.

The ancient nature philosophers did not specially trouble themselves about this logical or general scientific necessity. In their own way they were justified, because just at that time there was no logic or general natural science. But when Kant, for example, occupied himself with these thoughts, and criticized the opinion of Democritus (whetether it was exactly his opinion, or whether it is only a question of an inexact reproduction of a thought of this sharpwitted and scientific thinker, shall here rest undecided), that originally the whole world was produced out of nothing but equal atoms, which had fallen through space in parallel lines with equal velocity, whereupon then some one of these atoms had deviated from its straight line, come into collision with the others and then out of this perturbation caused the whole diversified world to evolve itself, why then, the same Kant who was otherwise so tranquil and so careful in expressing himself, curtly termed this assumption a piece of impudence. From his standpoint, too, he was entirely right; for this assumption is completely arbitrary. Kant's indignation at it is thoroughly well founded, for the reason that in fact in an environment conceived as originally homogeneous and uniform in every relation there can

be no production of the germ of difference and variety, which is nevertheless necessary, in order even conceptually to shape the world out of this primal homogeneous material.

But the criticism here applied by Kant to Democritus is in precisely the same way justifiable with relation to a priori Monism in general. The idea that the diversity of the world could be derived from a single homogeneous material cannot be mentally realized, quite apart from its physical impossibility, which the preceding supposition has established. As a matter of fact, we can find no sort of a physical realization of such a relation in the world. For, to recur to the example which has been cited several times, in order that the various different forms should be produced from the homogeneous clay, there is absolute need of the man in whose mind these forms are preshaped, which he then creates from the clay with his hands by various movements. By itself alone the clay is not in condition to bring out any systematic variety of forms.

To sum up all that has been said, we can point to the fact that from any one point only divergent lines can be drawn. If we think, therefore, that the world actually and ideally evolves from one single point or conception, the consequence of such a process can only be such that the single lines of evolution gravitate apart more and more, and that therefore the unity which has been sought and hypothetically assumed in the beginning, must more and more become lost, the further the evolution of the world extends. That is obviously not what has been wished. With the genetic conception of unity men have sought to attain not a philosophy of divergence, but one of convergence.

If we wish, therefore, to conceive the world from the standpoint and unity, we can obviously do nothing more foolish than to wish to evolve it from a single point; for by that means we are necessarily and irresistibly led into an ever increasing diversification. This is shown to us, for example, by the religions, which are in their way also monistic philosophies, that is to say the monotheistic religions, which posit a single or at least a supreme God. One group of monistic religions is comprised of Christianity with the inclusions of Mohammedanism, which is closely related to it; and we see from the diverse forms of Christianity and from the schisms in

Mohammedanism to what diversities and to what irreconcilable differences the divergence of the various lines of evolution from the single point of an all-ruling, omnipotent, omnipresent God leads. And the whole history of mankind teaches us that a monistic premise of that kind, whether of profane or of ecclesiastical philosophy, can never yield anything else but ever-widening divergencies. If the experiment has once incidentally been made, as actually occurred on the side of the Prussian government in the first half of the nineteenth century, to unite the religions which had become widely separated from one another, in this case the Protestant and the Reformed Churches, the result has been nothing further than a new third form, which separated itself from the two preceding forms just as these had separated themselves from each other.

By this I think I have sufficiently convinced you how impossible proved this earliest and accordingly most false idea of thinking mankind, which desired and strove with all means to assure the unity of the world-conception by attempting to derive the world from one point. We see ourselves, then, irresistibly compelled, whether avowedly or involuntarily, to smuggle into this unity by supplementary additions all the diversities which are afforded us by experience. By that means the conception of unity is necessarily metamorphosed in accordance with the most dissimilar tendencies, which are mutually incompatible and must indeed diverge further and further with the advance of evolution.

If we ask ourselves how, in view of this result, we are to conduct ourselves with relation to the problem of Monism, we can here make use of a historical experience, which we have been able to acquire in very diverse departments of human thought, and which shows us how we can still make serviceable the seemingly wholly lost mental labor, which had been controlled by such a false point of departure. For example, the idea prevailed in physics that work could be created out of nothing, because by the use of the lever small forces can be made great. Archimedes, the discoverer of the principle of the lever, indeed declared that the universe could be pried off its hinges, if it were only possible to find a fixed point for the fulcrum. From this recognition of the indefinite multiplication of given forces was then conjectured an equivalent indefinite multi-

plication of work, since the conception of work approaches very closely the conception of force. Thereupon resulted the long search for the perpetuum mobile, which led, as everybody knows, to a decisive, but negative result: a perpetuum mobile is impossible. Work cannot be indefinitely multiplied; but, however cleverly and in whatever variety machines may be constructed, in the most extreme case only so much labor is taken out of the machine as was put into it; never more, generally less. Sharp reflection over this negative result has then, as we know, led to the positive formulation of the law of the conservation of work, or as commonly expressed, the conservation of energy, which is one of the very greatest discoveries which the previous century has to show in its so exceedingly rich store of treasures. I could further verify the same statement further through the fact that I point to a like evolutionary process in chemistry. I will, however, only mention briefly that the idea followed during about a thousand years of making gold out of humble material, such as lead or copper, led to the negative result that such a transmutation of other metals into gold is not possible. Here, too, the transfer into positive form of the negative result has given, in the law of the persistence of the elements, the basis for the whole modern evolution of chemistry. To be sure, modern chemistry cannot make gold out of lead; but it can in other ways obtain enormous values, by the utilization of the law of the persistence of elements, as well as the other laws of scientific chemistry, which are founded on the law of persistence. So we again constantly see how we only need to translate such negative results of fruitless efforts into positive form, in order at once to attain the most valuable and thoroughgoing progress which the thought of man has traced at all.

So lies the affair also here. The complete miscarriage of all a priori monistic constructions of the world out of a single or simple elementary material must lead us to recognition of the fact that the road must be thoroughly retraced. If an a priori Monism is not possible, then only an a posteriori Monism is possible, if indeed any Monism at all is possible, a Monism which proceeds from the diversity of the world as from the data afforded by experience, and which accordingly draws its lines of evolution convergently from all points of the world of experience to a definitive middle point, a central ideal.

As in the case of every ideal, so this one is not wholly to be reached, but to be gradually more and more approximated. That is the true scientific Monism. It is scientific Monism in a double sense, first because it is striven for in a scientific way, and second because it is science itself, which reveals itself as this Monism which has been sought.

This reflection accordingly brings us to a Monism which is directly opposed to the many previous Monisms. It is not a Monism of the starting-point, but rather one of the terminus; the unity of all thought and being is not, as in the former kinds of Monism, an ideal which lies in the past, but one which we strive after in the future. I have already explained it often enough, that all actual and operative ideals can be only such as lie in the future, since only to such ideals is an approach possible. With ideals that lie in the past, the steady progress of time makes the question only one of separation; they can therefore be for us no ground of exaltation, but rather cause for despair.

What, then, is this a posteriori Monism, this idealism with the future ideal of unity? The answer to this has already been given: it is science. Science is that application of the human mind, which proceeds from the endless variety of reality known to experience, and sets itself the task of always more and more reducing this variety to unity by intellectual labor.

What last and inmost ground belongs to this striving after unity in science, we will examine later, and will in that connection rediscover wellknown treasures of thought. Here let the following be also premised. Those advocates of a religious or philosophic Dualism, who believe it necessary to combat Monism on general principles, have directed their labor almost exclusively against the different forms of a priori Monism; and it has of course been easy for them in every separate case to point out that neither water nor fire, neither matter nor energy suffices, in order to build thereon a complete and exhaustive world-system. Therefore all a priori forms of Monism have been refutable from the side of ecclesiastical and philosophical authors; and we ourselves are the last to be astonished at that, because we ourselves have recognized these kinds of Monism as not vital. On the other hand, we find in so energetic and circum-

specit an antagonist of Monism as the Jesuit Klimke the admission that the "methodistic" or scientific Monism, namely that kind and manner of arranging the facts, which establishes their ideal unity not in the starting-point of their origin, but in the terminus of their abstract realization, is fully justified, yes, to some extent even viewed as self-evident. If we take this substantial admission into consideration, which must indeed be made under all circumstances, we ask ourselves: Where, then, remains a boundary between science and religion? What argument can religion still adduce, to justify its existence before the forum of science?

For that must be looked on as generally granted at present: science decides in the last instance what ideas must be received and granted by mankind, and what must be rejected. A little over a hundred years ago, a German professor in a northern university was notified by the higher authorities that he was required to refrain from lectures or publications on religious questions, and that he must discontinue his entire public activity in that direction, so that it should nowhere come into contradiction with the views of revealed religion. The university, in which this took place, was named Königsberg; and the professor, to whom this decree was delivered, was named Immanuel Kant. He answered it most readily, to the effect that he was willing to refrain from all public utterance on religious questions.

In the short bit of human history, which has elapsed since Kant's surrender, the relative situations of religion and science have been fundamentally changed. The representatives of religious opinion now no longer try to repel, as standing in contradiction to religion, recognized and generally received results of science, such as the movement-relations between the earth and the sun. Their efforts have taken a wholly opposite direction. They strive to convince themselves that the teachings of religion can never in any wise come into conflict with science. In other words, they recognize, without further parley, science as the superior tribunal, since they surrender on the part of religion all provinces which are claimed by science for itself and its management. Only they explain: "There are certain provinces reserved for us, into which science can never penetrate, and for which we alone are justified in advancing doctrines and claims."

The facts of the case cannot be sharply enough emphasized. They stand out also in the just mentioned change of attitude of the Christian-ecclesiastical camp towards Monism. That science itself strives for unity, is treated as a self-evident central truth. Therefore the idea that modern Monism could possibly be this scientific Monism is rejected, with the intimation that the postulate of scientific unity is indeed self-evident, and is also disputed by no representative of the church. We must recognize the fitness of this technical procedure, which seeks to push aside the special position of the opponent as outside of all strife and combat, in order to be able to celebrate a glorious seeming victory at that point where the opponent, namely modern Monism, has no troops at all stationed. We wish, however, not to be on our side so stupid as to agree to this jugglery, but rather with all our energy to insist on the fact that in reality modern Monism is nothing else than the Monism of scientific thought and scientific method, and that all a priori forms of Monism belong in the same category of abandoned mental experiments to which also belongs the Monism which consists of the religious belief in Monotheism.

The chief means of methodically and purposely accomplishing the independence and where possible the superiority of religion over science consists in the assertion that an insuperable barrier exists between the provinces which religion claims for itself and covers, and those to which science has access. Of course, the province of religion is in that case regarded as the higher, for which there is of course wont to be a lack of theoretical or scientific information. From the asserted existence of these two provinces, separated from one another, the wellknown reproaches are accordingly brought against science that it abandons the field conceded to it, and undertakes unlawful trespasses into the other province, that of religion. We have in this place to deal with a wholly coined Dualism, even a Dualism within the intellectual life itself, in consequence of which one question or affair is to be treated without reference to science, the other without reference to religion. Out of the very existence of such a Dualism, it will become at once necessary to acquire a serious scruple against the correctness of the whole conception. And out of the observation of the actual relations it follows

further that this scruple is in the highest degree justified. The so-called barrier between religion and science is shown by historic research to be extremely moveable; and in truth it keeps shifting only in one direction. It shifts, that is, only in the direction of always enlarging and expanding the province which belongs to science, while the province which religion tries at times to claim becomes in the course of time narrower and narrower, and at present is logically reduced to nothing.

As proof of this we can point to the situation which has just been described, in consequence of which religion has practically surrendered its earlier claim to exercise a supreme censorship over all human thought. At present, this office is concededly transferred to science. Therewith has been completed an extremely important and in the separate places axiomatically logical destruction of the barriers between the two provinces. But the fact is further to be observed, that no province whatever of human thought and business can keep itself free from apprehension and treatment through science. It belongs to my most vivid and interesting recollections that I was permitted, when I migrated in the fall of 1887 to the University of Leipzig, to make the acquaintance there of a colleague whose name had long been known to me as that of one of the greatest and most venerable among my future associates. I found on my visit an extremely modest dwelling. The vestibule, as I had been accustomed to see in my Livonian home, but had never observed in Germany, was strewn with fine sand; and a few bits of fir branches spread their fragrance. I was conducted to an elderly gentleman with enormous spectacles, who dwelt in an extremely modest apartment, and who at once began a lively conversation with me about the number of experiments aggregated by me in my scientific labors. It was of importance to him to gather regarding numbers of experiments as abundantly as possible acquired in relation to one and the same object. For he was at that time laboring on a work dealing with collective facts, which has also been published since his death. This man of evident pedantic habits, who lived in a style which has long been traditional for a German professor, who almost up to the end of his life took his daily walk out to the Rosental, where he drank a cup of coffee and read the newspapers, whose existence

seemed therefore ordered in as close and commonplace a manner as possible, had at that time already set abroad in the world a train of thought, which has worked intensively on the general opinion with staggering and beneficial effect, and has meanwhile evolved into a great and complicated science, provided with a rich literature numerous laboratories and dozens of regular professorships. This man has done nothing less than to draw likewise into the province of exact science the domain which had hitherto been claimed by the religions and their priesthoods as their inalienable possession, namely the human soul. And it was in fact a question of the employment of the methods of natural science, proceeding by way of measuring, recording and experimenting.

Everybody perhaps guesses of whom I speak. It was Gustav Theodor Fechner, himself a mystic and natural philosopher in the sense of that old school, which had sought to prescribe to matter its conduct and its characteristics as proceeding outward from the spirit. But none the less he has brought it about that the doctrine of the soul, instead of being as hitherto exclusively handled by theologians and the philosophers closely associated with them, has reached the point of being a scientific or exact discipline, and now is undergoing just those interior transformations which will bring it from a purely theoretic discipline to an important practical technique.

Here we have before our eyes an example of the manner in which by the labor of a single man, who is an abstract scientific investigator, a department hitherto exclusively governed by the priesthood is irrevocably withdrawn from it and transferred to the sphere of science. Vainly, therefore, will the modern theologians still at the present day explain: "However far science may reach out, there is a point which it cannot reach, namely religious experience." Religious experience is represented as an entirely individual phenomenon, which any given person perceives only in his inner consciousness, and which gives him an immovable feeling of the certainty of his unity with God. Just on account of this individual peculiarity it is insisted that this experience is completely removed from the province of scientific research. Here, too, the opposite is the case. Again it was an investigator of genius, with marked leanings toward

mysticism, but with a scientific (in this instance a medical) education, who has given a scientific explanation of even this most intimate fragment out of the department of the mental life of man. The religious awakening, sanctification, the inward conversion, or however else this characteristic phenomenon may be called, he has drawn with a penetrating psychological analysis. He has shown the completely fixed conformity to law, in accordance with which this appearance is produced, wholly independent of the question whether it fulfills itself within Christian or Hindu, Mohammedan or any other form of mysticism. This man is William James, deceased a few years since, the pathfinding psychologist of Harvard University in Cambridge, North America.

Therefore religion with its most intimate experience is by James reduced to a subject of scientific research; and we can now with great security instance the separate steps which must be passed over by each individual in whom this religious event comes to completion. He undergoes primarily a deep depression and despondency, the sensation of incurable sinfulness; and then succeeds, following almost on the minute, a sudden inner change out of blackest grief and helplessness to a blessed rest and the certainty of the salvation of the soul in God. Then follow at somewhat regular intervals relapses into the earlier melancholy condition; and there is also developed with a certain regularity a special technique, to call forth that "euphoristic" sensation voluntarily, with more or less certainty. I cannot particularize more closely in this place; but what has been said will suffice to make clear how here too science has forced its way in, and how through its methods it has made this innermost department of the religious share in our mental life a subject for methodic work, in which the regular working out of law is no less to be discovered than in the evolution of a plant or the crystallization of a chemical substance.

Therewith it may be expressed as the last result of this investigation that the absolute boundary maintained by the priests between the respective departments of science and of religion does not exist; that rather even if the boundary did formerly exist, it has been more and more pushed back in favor of science, and properly speaking has reached the vanishing point. There is assuredly no department

whatever of the entire life of man to which application cannot be made of the logical conceptions of order and regularity and later of those of number and mass, and therefore none which would not be in the strongest sense subject to accessible to scientific consideration. Thereby we see already in an ideal sense the completion of that process which continues throughout the entire history of human civilization in the shape of the lasting struggle of the priests against science, and whose separate phases, as they are recognizable through the centuries, always allows us to discern the incessant and irresistible advance of science into the departments hitherto occupied by religion.

The primary cause of this evolutionary process we must now try to grasp from the point of view of culture-history and psychology. The totality of all human knowledge was uniform in the primitive conditions of civilization, and was controlled by a fixed class of men, which had shown itself especially qualified for this purpose among those of the same race and habitation, on account of a stronger development of brain activity. This class of men we are accustomed to designate as the priesthood. It consists, however, properly speaking, of the representatives of the collective knowledge of the time, since in this place were collected the particulars of knowledge, which at the beginning increased extremely slowly. Sooner or later, then, the complete mastery of this collective knowledge became no longer possible for the individual. Specialists inevitably arose, one of whom especially developed the part of knowledge relating to the cure of diseases and wounds; while others were active in the technical side of administration and in the apprehension of jurisprudence and in the adjustment of differences of opposing wills. So we see how in the course of the development of civilization one discipline after another diverges from the collective knowledge under the control of the priesthood. At this point appear the wellknown variation belonging to the history of evolution. For example, in the Middle Ages the priesthood overcame the profane science which had been transmitted by a thin thread of connection from Greek and Roman culture, and provided it with its religious stamp.

We can now also understand why those especially gifted investigators, who as a result of their special labors (chiefly in the

province of mathematics and astronomy) had freed themselves from theological tutelage, were straightforwardly persecuted by the church, and, so far as they would not subject themselves to the lordship of the church, were punished, even put to death. As a matter of fact, the establishment of the Frankfurt University the final point of this the Occurrences which are associated with the names of Giordano Bruno and Galileo relate to fundamental experiences of the church to the first beginnings of those processes, through which the annihilation of priestly rule and of church dogma could not fail thereafter to be evoked. It does all honor to the foresight of those priests that they foresaw with certainty the extraordinary danger, even if they found no means of permanently resisting its fulfillment. I need not describe these processes in detail; for every one will by a glance through history easily be able to convince himself how the process of splitting off one scientific discipline after another from the control of the church has become complete, how physicians and jurists have first organized their special callings, always subject to the energetic resistance on the priesthood. Finally, in the course of time, out of the earlier condition of the universities, where the curriculum essentially constituted a system of training for the clergy, and all the other faculties were subordinate to this principal one as systems of instruction or systems of specialized training, the relation has gradually become reversed, so that the theological faculty has become, compared to all the rest, the smallest, as well as intellectually the least important. In our days, we can view in the evolutionary series: a university is founded without any theological faculty; and nobody in the circle of the exponents of the sciences has the feeling that an essential and indispensable branch of instruction is thereby eliminated; formerly the opposite sentiment would have been predominant. It is therefore this slow process of displacement, which involved in the previously pictured conception of the theologians, as if there were two separate provinces, one of which belonged to science and the other to faith, and which is now reaching a conclusion. There were two separate provinces, and are still in many places; we will later have to call special attention to an important point of the sort. But the line of separation between these two provinces has in the course of historic evolution completely shifted to the side

of science, on the issue of growing dominance; and we can already tell in advance, without a more exact investigation of the single case, that those divisions of the sum of human knowledge, which are still claimed by the church for itself, are surely such as have not yet been thoroughly worked out in a scientific manner, and have therefore not yet been raised to the special culture level of the twentieth century.

If we have recognized, then, that the philosophy which we in our time must indicate as Monism is nothing else than the carrying out without a rest of the principle of science and of the scientific method in relation to all sides of our common life without the slightest exception, we have thereby established the necessity of Monism beyond the least doubt within the numerous currents of our time. In the conception of Monism is embodied, as we have seen, the totality of all culture-efforts and all separate culture-labors of our time; the unity, for example, of mass and weight, of coinage and law. The whole irresistible flow toward the international organization of human affairs represents a specimen of practical Monism just as well as the scientific inclusion of great provinces which had hitherto been separated. I mention only the immense procedures in physics, by which electrodynamics, optics and recently also mechanics have become chapter-divisions of one and the same great unitary science. All these processes represent themselves only as different sides of one and the same great unitary Monistic movement, which has laid hold of our whole epoch, and which has imposed on itself the beautiful and great task of guiding, in the shortest and most successful manner, the German Monist Union, hand in hand with the Austrian sister society and with the unions of Monists in all civilized lands where such organizations exist.

Here, however, we will try to dig a bit deeper. We have seen that Monist thought lets itself continue through the whole intellectual and cultural evolution of mankind. It appears first in the childish form of the postulate realized ideally or in fancy. Stories and fables were the first material; then followed an a priori philosophic principle, which did not stand much too high above the clearly mythical, and finally the acceptance of the scientific method, which does not fix the principle of unity in the past, at the starting-

point of all being and existence, but on the contrary seeks for it in the ideal conquest of the world-chaos, in the transformation of chaos to cosmos. But we will nevertheless have to ask ourselves in the presence of this great and fundamental fact: Whereto will the principle of unity serve? What is the cause that all mankind, so long as it has learned to think at all, has striven to think monistically? And why does it first seek to realize this unity of thought in a false way, directly opposed to the right one? There must evidently be an imperative and decisive moment in the existence of thought, which gives to the principle of unity, in contrast to the numerous dualisms involuntarily presented in connection with the ideal conquest of actual occurrences, so great an impulse that the whole tendency of human intellectual evolution surrenders to its grasp: out of multifariousness to unity, especially out of the many dualisms to the one Monism.

As answer to the foregoing, two points of view present themselves to close observation, which in the sequel are proved to be but one; so that here too the process of unification, the imperative dominance of the fundamental Monist ideal will be found valid. We have first the postulate of foresight, and second the postulate of economy of energy.

I need not repeat in this place what I have already so often explained, that all science in the last analysis has no other aim than to foresee future events, that the man of science of today is nothing else but the immediate and direct successor of the prophets of times gone by. For the past lies there beyond the possibility of change; we can influence it in no way; we can at the most learn to know it; and that is all that we can do with it in a scientific way. On the contrary, the future is the peculiar object of our practical and thereby also of our theoretical interest. In the mass, as we can foresee the possibilities of the future, we can also influence it in our way. Prophecies can fortunately live and hang together as cause and effect. This gives us at the same time the single authoritative viewpoint for the distinction between that knowledge which we must recognize as science in the Monistic or unifying sense, and that other which is only paper science or scholasticism, and which proceeds from an erroneous conception of the value of know-

ledge. Through the fact that the knowledge of the present rests mainly on the labors of the past, there is an evident and pressing interest in making the labors of the past accessible to us and our posterity. Of course, this interest relates only to the actual labor-results of that past activity, not to the numberless splinters and side-products, which have naturally fallen off the more richly, the further behind the labor lies, because the labor had necessarily been carried in in so imperfectly organized a manner. So only a relatively small part of what the past has done and thought is of importance to us, and can serve as substratum of our own broader labor. This part is to be carefully sought out, and kept ready for the broader evolution. From it as being the only valuable part the chaff is, however, to be sifted. This can be quietly left to forgetfulness, since it is only ballast for the labor of the present and of the future. Even if in this sifting some few particles of nutritive substance should be destroyed, that is not altogether the question. For in many cases the remaking of such intellectual labor is actually simpler, more useful and also more agreeable than the toilsome digging out of the few good and reliable fragments out of the enormous sum of useless material which has been handed down to us out of the clumsy technique of antiquity.

But this point of view, as follows naturally and self-evidently from the unprejudiced observation of the actual relationships, is in no way the point of view of the present scientific trend, especially as science is treated at the universities. The technical high schools are much more modern in their relation to it. To them the real content of knowledge is of much, yes of incomparably greater concern, as it adapts itself to direct use, than the working out of the traditional methods, by which we have arrived at the knowledge of the present. That depends on the fact that scientific work in the technical schools is wholly subject to immediate control by experiment or by technical application, and is thereby automatically freed from superfluous and irrelevant elements. In the universities the situation is exactly opposite. Here provision is made for those branches of knowledge that are able to spin threads reaching farthest into the past, but refuse consideration of the future. Here, therefore, through the farreaching alienation of many representatives of the

science of the universities from the problems of life, it has come to the point that the knowledge of the past is held to be so valuable a knowledge, and that a great mass of energy is directed to the point of simply collecting, recording and where possible reproducing facts, because they once occurred at some earlier period or other. Therefore the criticism of the labor of earlier generations, from the viewpoint of adaptation to prophetic ends, completely fails in a very important part of the university administration. With this criterion, how far knowledge adapts itself to prophecy, it can be shown that, for example, perhaps half of the work of the philosophic faculties is not scientific work, but scholasticism in quite the same sense in which we designate as medieval scholasticism certain logical subtleties and researches into problems which we have to-day come to recognize as without content. These scholastic divisions of knowledge are also marked by the fact that they in no way draw our actual knowledge to a unity. They far rather remain involved in the complexity of the single event, and allow no recognition in themselves of the characteristic life of the intrinsically real science, through which one single cell after another is laid hold of and incorporated into the complete organism.

On the other hand, the significance of prophecy through knowledge is so notorious, that we need refer to only a few points in this connection. We fill up the greatest part of our life with things which we do not wish to do for their own sakes, that is on account of their immediate effect, but with which we occupy ourselves in view of the future. If every one of us checks up his daily life from morning to evening from this point of view, he will see that only quite insignificant parts of it remain restricted to themselves and their moment, that ninety or ninety-five per cent, of life is directed entirely toward the future. If I am now sitting at my dictating machine, and speaking these words into the cylinder, I am not doing it because it is directly worth the effort (although I will not deny that the very shaping of my thoughts and the ready retention of them without trouble through the cleverly devised apparatus gives me a certain pleasure), but because I assume that, when hereafter many other future proceedings, the copying, composing, printing and circulation of the written matter in question have taken place,

then this writing will operate on minds ready to receive it, and will bring the world a little forward in the direction of my efforts. It is to be seen how far removed the future lies in this case, indeed how indefinite is the future result, which I strive toward in the work of the moment. None the less, I am well contented to carry on the work. For the thought that by this means a repetition of this discussion will be rendered unnecessary, that this idea will be the common property of civilized humanity, fills me with inward satisfaction in such a degree that the labor bestowed at present appears to me as quite trivial, in fact as not to be regarded at all, in comparison with the joy which I here again experience as prophet and as man, who gazes into the future and anticipates a part of it.

Now there is yet a second decisive viewpoint for science; it is that of the rational shaping of life. We know that all sciences have their origin in technique, that is in the solution of some sort of problems which concern practical life. We know, for example, that geometry arose in Egypt out of the fact that the Nile in its annual overflows obliterated the boundaries between the different tracts of land, and that it was consequently necessary to reestablish by fixed structures these boundaries, the physical indications of which were no longer recognizable. We likewise know that chemistry arose out of medicine, out of the art of the restoration and working of metals, out of dyeing and a succession of other arts. Every time, therefore, the case has been that the individual has first transmitted to his immediate successors, who undertook the business, certain recurrent and reproducible experiments which he has made. This knowledge has then slowly grown, until it finally became so rich and complex that it had to be systematically arranged, that its single elements might be available. That then brought about the beginning of a science in the modern sense. So we see in the case of all sciences this origin in practical needs; in fact, we even recognize that the pseudo-sciences, scholasticism in its medieval and modern forms, have likewise a similar origin. The transmission by writing of the earlier knowledge made the technical acquisition of language and of the art of writing a practical necessity; and out of this practical necessity the old and modern scholasticism has arisen by warping and deformation.

We must now ask ourselves whether with reference to this practical tendency of the shaping of our lives any quite general viewpoint is to be found, in accordance with which we can grasp the monstrous multiplicity of the individual elements of this activity. The answer is in the affirmative. We have in the present ideal unification of physics and chemistry, as they can be worked out in the most practical and most comprehensive manner in the conception of energy, the foundation, in order to reach a universal judgment concerning all human action. We know that we all live by virtue of the free energy that streams from the sun to the earth like a broad and powerful flood, available in an infinitesimal portion for affecting human beings; and that we, who live on the shores of this flood, can draw off a part of this mighty river by dams and machines, and can take possession of it for our purposes. This takes place in the first instance through agriculture and the (still somewhat primitive) cattle breeding by which the chemical energy collected by the plants from the sun's rays can be assigned to the service of man, and changed into the form of nourishment for his various kinds of aims.

Now the decisive law for the application of the free energy, on which therefore all life depends, is to the effect that the whole of the free energy is never transmutable into the desired object-form, but only a part of it, while the remaining part, as waste matter corresponding to the shavings or the dust in other technical operations, is not transmutable for the object which is the result of the effort. But exactly as in technical operations the more rationally the construction is managed, the less is the amount of waste matter, mankind also strives quite universally and fundamentally to make the waste of free energy, which it transmits to its purposes, as small as possible. By that means it is brought about that the mass of transmutable energy devoted to the object becomes so much greater, that man can therefore dispose in his interest of so much greater values.

This tendency of world-occurrences and of the small human share in them is avowedly to be grasped in the energetic imperative: "Waste no energy; turn it all to account!" And we can easily point out in fact that there is no human action which could not be brought

within the viewpoint of this energetic imperative. Here, therefore, we have a genuine and far-reaching Monism. From the simplest technical trade, yes from the daily acts of our half-animal life, to the very highest sociological and ethical problems, it is the same energetic imperative which teaches us in every case the how and what of our business, which in every case puts a measure into our hands by which we can judge whether the manner in which we transform the free energy for our aims and the aims of the collectivity is actually the best conceivable, or whether there is a still better way. The whole culture-evolution, which has led us from the invention of the slingstone, the lever, fire and whatever else the primitive human tools are called, to a modern giant steamer, all this technical evolution signifies nothing further than an always finer and more multiform manifestation of the energetic imperative. The same may be said of our moral evolution. If we no longer carry on the rude warfare of all against all among individuals, but live in a constitutional state, this change in the last analysis signifies nothing but an economy of the energy which the individual formerly had to apply to attack and defence, while he can now apply it to useful work. And if now the farthest-sighted and most eminent men of all nations unite their efforts to overcome the cruel madness of war, and also to find for the opposition of wills among the nations the same way of legal agreement, as it has existed for individuals during centuries, this effort, which indeed here in Vienna possesses a notably genuine representative, or rather a leader in the person of a distinguished woman, has no other final ground. The need of dealing as economically as possible with the highest energy of which mankind disposes, namely, human energy, and not destroying it in great masses, as happens in a modern war without any corresponding equivalent whatever, is the final ground of Pacifism.

In what connection does this doctrine of the energetic imperative stand with the universal tendency to prophecy heretofore attributed to all science? We recognize at once that this connection is the very closest that we can in any represent to ourselves. For prophecy assuredly serves only to render our actions as proportionate as possible to the ends in view. However, to be proportionate to the end in view is equivalent to the most satisfactory utilization of the

existing energies. For these are not to be created out of nothing, but always only more or less favorably transformed. Therefore the whole prophetic quality of science is only directed to the point of always more completely realizing the energetic imperative. So we in fact recognize decisively in the energetic imperative the authoritative foundation idea of all human impulse and consequently also of its highest and most valuable part, that of human science. Here we again have an example of true, genuine and real Monism; here we can observe how through energetic and purposive thinking the elements, originally lying far apart, as they are contained in the multifariousness of all human conduct and impulse, are bound together in a great synthetic unity, that is to say, the observation of all this impulse from the viewpoint of the energetic imperative. Only by such an ideal treatment and the domination over all human events, which results from it, is it possible to gain the certainty of uniting „inharmonious masses of existence“ in the unison of common efforts, and of forming a harmonious concord of will and accomplishment.

From this standpoint we also recognize that it is not a mere play on words, if we view all efforts for the unification of diverse objects, which interest mankind, as belonging to Monism and as worthy of furtherance by every Monist who is conscious of the end in view. We have just seen that the escape from waste of energy is the most general tendency of all conscious human conduct, and that the energetic imperative is the present farthest reaching Monistic idea, to which we subordinate all our action and volition. From this we must necessarily conclude that the Monist must support common efforts and labors, which aim at such unification of human work and the corresponding improvement of favorable conditions surrounding the expenditure of human energy. There are many among the Monists of the present time, who will have shaken their heads, when they recently read or heard that I am making considerable sacrifice, and that not only of time and labor, for an institution which under its name of "The Bridge" is not yet so widely known by far as it will be in a few years, and have asked why I do not prefer to devote this sacrifice rather to the Monist Union. The "Bridge" is an international union, which has the task of organising collective intellectual labor. But what is organization?

is bringing things so closely together that with given masses of energy the most and best can be applied to average human work. We see ourselves here in the midst of the application of the energetic imperative, in the midst of Monism, as we have now come to recognize it. Whether, therefore, it is a question of the peace movement or of the introduction of a single format for printed papers; whether we are striving to extend the metric system of weights and measures also into English speaking countries or of settling differences between nations by a permanent court of justice: in all these cases the question is one of the application in different departments of the like fundamental Monistic idea, which for its part finds its inner justification only in the ceaseless application of the energetic imperative.

And this brings us now to a point which at present interests us Monists in the highest degree, because it is in most pressing need of our help. We have seen in a previous analysis how originally all human knowledge had become united in a single class or rank, that of the priesthood, which controlled not only the religious phase, but also the technical branches of the knowledge of that period; and we have seen how subsequently one branch after another withdrew itself from the control of the priesthood and made itself independent, until finally in our time the just arising Frankfurt University lets us triumphantly recognize the complete liberation of knowledge from the original domination of the priesthood.

If we now look at the system of the sciences, as it at present is seen to develop on the foundation of their abstract character and in conjunction with the researches of Auguste Comte, we see that of the most general sciences, logic, mathematics, physics and chemistry, not one is in any important degree any longer subject to the authority of the church. That it is no longer quite so with the following branch of science, known as biology, is clear from the passionate conflicts, waged by church circles against the idea of Darwin regarding the genetic connection of all forms of life including man. At present the church conducts itself toward this doctrine just as did Catholicism toward the teaching of Copernicus of the movement of the earth around the sun. In certain single places, some persons are even on the point of proving in addition that

Darwin's ideas are nothing more than a special application of the fundamental opinions which are to be found in de Old Testament. We have here an example to add to the many previously cited by us, which brings to view the perpetual displacement of the boundaries between faith and knowledge, between the branches which are claimed by religious doctrine and the branches which are governed by science. After all, biological science also is at present so far freed from the control of the church that its teachings, even the most modern of them, can without serious outward resistance, even if perhaps against many phases of inward opposition, be publicly expounded and applied. It is not yet quite so with psychology. The doctrine of the soul, of its immortality and what is connected with this conception, is still often claimed as the peculiar possession of the church; and the representatives of science, who make these things the object of their researches, are accused of trespassing on the other side of the boundary-line, and are pursued as smugglers. But here too the defence has already become rather weak; and the decisive victory is without great difficulty to be foreseen. On the other hand, in the highest province of science, sociology, the theological influence still makes itself predominant. Great departments of our juridical existence still stand under this influence, which I perhaps need not particularize. In particular, however, applied sociology, the doctrine of the mutual relations of men in their community, otherwise known as ethics, is still at present entirely credited to the church as her special domain, in which science has nothing to do, and from which it must accordingly keep away in all respects. The popular religio-moral collections, which are found incessantly repeated in the writings of the churchmen of our day, have no other aim than to keep alive the suggestion that virtue is possible only in the path of religion; while on the contrary, it is at present more and more recognized that to link the hitherto existing technique, the moral conceptions, to religious faith, must lead and has led, owing to the fragile nature of such faith, to a farreaching weakening and even to the destruction of practical morality. In fact, therefore, the matter is in this condition, that just as the other sciences have gradually freed themselves from the influence of the church, ethics must now also be set free from the old influences which the different

churches have exerted on it, and still at present claim to exert. It is not that ethics has not made progress in many ways while under the domination of the churches, nor that the higher civilization of Christianity has not operated favorably on the peoples which have reached a very high stage of culture. But the fundamental unchangeableness of every religious conception which rests with respect to the content of its doctrine on a belief in revelation, and is thus systematically and organically bound up with the whole doctrine, so unconditionally contradicts the fundamental law of all organic life, the fundamental law of evolution, that even without special examination of the separate contents of the doctrine, we must say that no religion can ever exist, which can establish a code of ethics for all time. For if it establishes a system of ethics which may possibly be usable for the twenty-fifth century, this is certainly not available for the twentieth century; and if on the other hand it establishes a system of ethics which was serviceable two thousand years ago, we can then say with the same or even much greater certainty that this system of ethics in its entirety can indubitably not be available in the twentieth century. Accordingly, at the present time, the principal task of scientific or Monistic thought and labor is manifestly to free the final science in the succession of sciences, sociology, from the hitherto existing influence of the priesthood, and to establish in place of the traditional ethics dependent on revelation a rational scientific ethics, based on facts, and taking into consideration the present condition of mankind as well as the course of its evolution into a better future.

That this is imperatively necessary, and a demand of the day, we are taught by the collisions, which daily become unendurable, between the representatives of that unchangeable churchly morality and the demands and needs of our modern life. We wish to become finally free from the tutelage of earlier centuries and ages; we wish our life, which we have placed technically and scientifically on a new and better basis in such a fundamental manner, also in our consciousness to be placed by us on a new and better basis. We do not wish to let ourselves be told by a priesthood (largely influenced by self-interest) that we are sinful and cannot reach the heights by our own strength; whereas we can daily convince ourselves of the fact

that all which is good and honorable, that has occurred on earth, has been brought to earth by men, and that we daily are winning new victories in our war against misery and disease, against misfortune and the assaults of an untamed nature.

Therefore, what we Monists strive for and are determined to effectuate is the formation of a new, completely unified civilization. More than two thousand years ago, there existed a unified civilization, that of the Greeks; it rested, however, on slavery, and was limited to the narrow circle of the few hundreds or thousands who, by making use of an abundant number of slaves attained a life free from toil and adapted to the expression of their personality. Such a civilization, whose fruits were apportioned to a quite insignificant percentage of the entire body of human beings concerned in it, carried in itself the germ of its own decay. So the civilization of that period did not develop in the direction of labor, which was in fact despised by the Greeks, but in that of art, that is in the filling up of idle time. This is also a consequence of that fundamental misconception of the civilization of that period; and we must therefore recognize its downfall under the harsh events of the later time as fully justified and even necessary.

Then, under the influence of Christianity, there came forward a dualistic conception of life and a reshaping of life in accordance with that conception. The Christian direction of human activity toward the other side, the life after death, had at once as its consequence a corresponding neglect of life on this side and a retardation of its development. The discrepancy between the primal conception of Christianity and the actual activity of mankind then became so much the greater, the more strongly the life in this world developed itself by virtue of the irresistible force of life itself, in opposition to the tendency of Christianity. That which we have heretofore seen in science, the gradual elimination of the influence of the priesthood, has of course not been limited to science; but the process is becoming complete in our entire life. In the mass, when we eliminate the otherworldly tendency of Christianity; in the mass, when we do not merely grasp with the intellect but realize with our whole being that we are children of this world, and that the good and the beautiful, in a word the paradise for which we all strive, must be achieved step by

step in this world and cannot be postponed to a future over which we have no control; in the mass, we free ourselves from that otherworldly tendency of Christianity, which leads us off the track, and bring ourselves nearer to a unified, in other words a Monistic civilization. This possesses in itself the guarantee of a much stronger, greater and more comprehensive life than that Greek civilization which was onesidedly directed toward art. For our civilization is founded on labor, in other words on the subjugation and guidance of the rough energies which man find existing on the surface of the earth, and through the management of which he can make his life increasingly better, happier, richer and more worth living; and it therefore finally extends to all men, instead of remaining like that Greek civilization confined to a certain few.

Proceeding along this pathway of thought, we have come to recognize that the highest values of Christianity, the kindness and love of the individual towards his fellowman, do not yet represent the highest ethical ideal which mankind can attain. Monism leads far more to the perception that the individual is more and more a mere cell in the collective organism of humanity. Accordingly, the evolution of kindness and love, the evolution of the spirit of self-sacrifice and devotion to the great whole of humanity, becomes more and more a demand of the energetic imperative, therefore an immanent demand of our whole Monistically ordered life. Only through the fact that we have come to recognize kindness and love as a necessity for community life, for the social organization of mankind, has there also been gained by the individual the sole sure and immovable foundation. That we practise mutual kindness and love, is no longer the demand of a Godhead standing outside of ourselves, which has once for all transmitted it to us by an unverifiable revelation; but it is a demand of scientific intelligence. To it, of course, only those can belong who dedicate themselves to Monism unreservedly and without any remnants of dualistic thinking and feeling. With the increased broadening and deepening of this intelligence we see arrive the Monistic century, which will not remain the only one of its kind. But it will inaugurate a new epoch for humanity, just as two thousand years ago the preaching of the general love for humanity had inaugurated an epoch.