

**Wilhelm Jerusalem, *Der Krieg im Lichte der Gesellschaftslehre [The War in Light of Social Theory]* (Stuttgart, 1915), 1-20.**

*Foreword*

This essay is my intellectual reaction to the disturbing experience of world war. I venture the attempt to bring the violent phenomenon closer to understanding with the aid of *sociological method*.

I am an Austrian through and through and feel like a German. Naturally this finds expression also in this objective investigation and should in no way be concealed or suppressed. In this difficult and great time one feels also in the course of scientific investigations how right Goethe had it with his saying, "I can promise to be candid [also with connotation of "upstanding"], but not nonpartisan."

I place the greatest emphasis here on the newly formed concept of *state dignity* [*Staatenwürde*]. Perhaps this claim is a path to future understanding among the states and nations.

Vienna, June 1915

*I. The war as sociological problem*

Sociology is the philosophy of human society. Its object is human groups joined together in unity, as it has confronted us especially clearly in the nation and the state. Such a group is more and is something different than the sum of the individuals composing it. Through society something new emerges, something super-personal, that stands opposed to the individual and that is in turn augmented and modified through the work of individuals. All social phenomena therefore offer the observer a remarkable Janus face [*Doppelantlitz*]. They are *exterior* to us and confront us as power and authority. They influence, they constrain, they offer and they coerce. This is doubtless the effect of all products of the collective spirit [*Geist*], as for example of language, of enforceable laws, of prevailing mores, of religious doctrines, of ritual exercises, of fashion and prevailing taste. Yet social phenomena are not just *exterior* and *above* us, they are also *in* us. They fill our souls with rich content, they give us connection and inner resolve that we could not attain by ourselves, and they give our thought fuel, direction and aim.

This double function of everything social that forms the actual object of social theory was first discerned scientifically in recent times. The core of this truth is nevertheless already contained in the equally profound words of Christ: "For where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them." [Matthew 18:20] Wherever several people unite in a common ethical task, there arises *between* them and *over* them a higher, a super-personal [thing] that confronts the individual as something objective, but that also penetrates deep into the soul, broadens the self and lifts it up to a higher consecration.

This interpretation of the object and being of sociology, one which I have elsewhere developed in greater detail [citing his *Introduction to Philosophy*], is now experiencing through the world war an affirmation that is as unforeseen as it is overwhelming. In the early days of the mobilization, in the great scenes at the Reichstag on August 4, that was where you could see with your own eyes the German people and state in their incarnate wholeness. The

fatherland whose existence was threatened by a world at arms stood above the will of every individual there. Its power and its authority were unconstrained. Each followed his summons, and without hesitating and vacillating for even a moment. And this great fatherland standing above all was simultaneously alive in the breast of each German, it lifted and expanded the feeling of life and duty and became an inner force that spurred each to lively haste.

Here in Austria as well the gratitude and feeling toward the State [*der Staatsgedanke und das Staatsgefühl*] has shown itself much more strongly than our enemies and perhaps also we ourselves had expected. People frequently believed that we were only a conglomerate of nations [*Völkerschaften*] that fought fiercely among themselves in peacetime. At the first prodding, as our enemies announced, this rotting structure would disintegrate into its parts. Thank God the centuries-long legal and cultural community had however put down much deeper roots in the souls of Austrians. The war did not create the feeling of belonging, but just retrieved what was already present from the depths of the breast and brought it to light.

Hegel once said, “In order that a mass [*Menge*] forms a State, it is necessary that it have a common force of defense and State [*Wehre und Staatsgewalt*].” We have a common defense and our army is the living expression of our State. Whoever in the first weeks of the war saw the long railroad trains full of singing soldiers who were joyfully greeted and cordially served at all stations had to have gotten the impression that here a powerful unified will was emerging in visible and tangible manifestation. I had the occasion on a brief rail journey to speak with a young man who came from German Bohemia. He was barely twenty years old and had already worked his way up to a reputable position at a large trading firm in Danzig. He gave up all of this without any thought, voluntarily enlisted and traveled to Graz, where he was supposed to be trained for military service. This kind of unmediated experience is more meaningful to me and enriches sociological insight more than column after column of newspaper reporting, reporting that, however true it may be, still just sits there on paper.

The war thus offers us a host of sociological facts, and since these experiences [*Erfahrungen*, with more empirical connotation] take on the character of one’s own experiences [*Erlebnisse*, with more subjective connotation], they grab us much more strongly and push much deeper into the soul than historical, statistical and other “objective” investigations. We are forced to think sociologically, and I believe that I am not asserting too much when I say that sociology would have to create a thinking view of world war if it wasn’t already there. It is however already there, and if the still-young science is not yet entirely clear about its methods and bounds, it has prevailed as an intellectual trend [*Denkrichtung*] and proven itself as a new approach.

For me it was thus a firm conviction right at the beginning of the war that only a sociological investigation can bring us closer to understanding this horrible global event. War is an overwhelming, sociological phenomenon in which we perhaps for the first time since mankind appeared can almost visually observe the interaction between the social whole and its parts. The more we occupy ourselves with it, the more clearly we perceive that this phenomenon will simultaneously be a thoroughly difficult problem, a problem of overwhelming size, of confusing complexity and simultaneously of absolute urgency. The contradictory thoughts and feelings that the war summons in us with elementary violence will be ever more unbearable and we must at least make the attempt to arrive at some inner clarity. But it is not only our personal need to think that drives us to this, we must all the more hope to find guidelines for the social and cultural development of the future via sociological soul-searching.

If I now undertake in the following pages to understand the present world war in sociological terms, I proceed from the conviction that internal contradictions can only be resolved if one has discerned the sources from which they issue. Such a genetic procedure can nonetheless lead to the recognition that the contradiction lies in the essence of the phenomenon [*Erscheinung*] and must remain unresolved. Merely discerning the insoluble contradiction is itself a gain. As soon as one perceives the unavoidability, one knows finally how to come to terms with it. But it is also likely that the path to resolution is also found when discovering the causes of contradictory phenomena. In any case it seems to me that a more audacious effort, one that runs the risk of error, is more valuable and more worthy in the great time in which we live than philosophically formulated commonplaces and feats of eloquence calculated for the present moment.

Right at the beginning of the war one could notice individual changes in the sociological structure of society that on closer inspection nonetheless bore a more symptomatic than organic character. The most important of these will be indicated shortly.

A characteristic monument of modern culture is the continual expansion of specialist roles [*Spezialistentum*] in all civilized and highly developed States. In trade and in industry, in science and in art, in technology [*Technik*] and in commerce the division of labor had caused such a differentiation that the only ones with any prospect of success were those who understood how to look after a small domain with verve and talent. In Ostwald's opinion the education principle in school thus ought to form strong one-sidedness [imbalance]. The production of material and intellectual goods has risen via division of labor to immeasurable levels and the product itself has become much improved. Whether we are dealing with the production of pocket watches, steel springs, cotton materials, agricultural equipment, a large Latin dictionary, a Leibniz edition, or a conversational dictionary, the whole will be decidedly better if its individual parts are produced solely by specially trained experts [*Facharbeiter*]. Through close constraint and through continued practice the individual workers will become ever more skillful and unerring. He will thereby become ever more valuable and indispensable for company operations. He receives a larger salary, and only his soul runs the risk of languishing in routine pursuits. In the narrow circle the senses constrict themselves. Continual specialization can easily lead to people becoming mere work machines [*Arbeitsmaschinen*].

At its beginning the war seemed to have done away with this *Spezialistentum*, at least in Germany and Austria. There was then really only one vocation, and that was to work for or in the war. Göttingen professors declared themselves ready to become rural postmen. Whoever could not himself go to the front pondered and pondered how to show himself useful to the common cause. One likewise rummaged about to locate an ability, a readiness, a knowledge that would be needful for the great cause. "An emblem only counted to defend the fatherland." [sic: from the Greek]

This already shows us a symptom of how the war is countering continual differentiation. It effects a compromise [*Ausgleich*] among the professions, it brings all of them at once to a common denominator, it pushes toward concentration and unification, insofar as it gives to every individual a great purpose and to all a common one.

Another symptom, less significant but still discernible to the sociologically trained gaze, arose in the phenomenon. Toward the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth one could note the rise of a strongly individualistic line of thinking and feeling in

all civilized countries [*Kulturländer*]. It was not the high-minded and lofty individualism once fostered by Goethe and Wilhelm v. Humboldt. They sought to bring that which was common to all humans [*das allgemein Menschliche*] to its highest development in themselves. Whatever was allotted to humanity as a whole, they wanted to enjoy in their own selves. Nurtured by a consciously idealized Greek world, this neo-humanist line of thought is metaphysically based and universally oriented. Modern individualism has an expressly isolating and antisocial tendency.

In the business world this line of thought confronts us as coolly calculating egoism that seeks its economic advantage and does not concern itself further with the social effects of its activity. Here individualism ties itself to a strongly rational procedure, to a merciless logic completely free of feelings, one that likewise works with scientifically methodical rigor and pursues its aim with reckless consistency. I believe Vierkandt in his substantive book about the persistence of cultural change draw attention to the fact that rationalism in scientific and economic life was most strictly instituted. There now exists – as an aside – a connection between rationalism and individualism that has heretofore gone unnoticed and is as yet unresolved. In a future investigation of the social factor in human knowledge I hope to shed some light on this. Only modern individualism shows itself also in those domains where the purely rational calculation has little or nothing to say. We find it clearly formed in modern aestheticism, in the reawakened turn to religious mysticism and most especially in the treatment of the problem of education.

The modern aesthete wants to educate and actuate his personal taste. The more he thereby deviates from the reigning trend of art and fashion, the more personal, the more original he appears to himself and to others. The religious mystic wants to know nothing of doctrines and rituals handed down, he much more seeks to win his own, his personal, his private relation to his God. In pedagogy they teach that every child brings his own nature [*Eigenart*] ready-made into the world. The educator must foster and coddle this nature so that it develops wholly unbroken and unconstrained into a brilliant original. If the child does not want to eat something or do something, then one has to conclude immediately that it contradicts his nature [*Natur*] and it would be an inhuman brutality to want to exert force here, because certain precious spiritual germs [i.e., of seeds] would thereby have to be stunted. In recent times youth themselves have appropriated these theories and tried with the cry “Down with parents,” “Down with school” to found their own “youth culture,” which consists in youth living their own lives, taking themselves seriously, and creating new ideals for the aging world.

In sharp contrast to Goethe’s admirable counsel this kind of individualism cultivates idiosyncrasies much more than qualities. Each wants to unconditionally assert his autonomy, and indeed primarily with regard to other individuals, and then also with regard to the whole.

The relation of the individual to the State is frequently determined by this manner of thinking. In peacetime the State confronts us as inspection commission, as police force, as tax authorities, and we perceive it thus as a force that constrains our personal freedom, as a sum of restraints and disturbances. That only via the State are we in a position to send letters and packages, to speak by telephone; that it protects us from epidemics, guarantees our property and our rights; that it enables us to have our children educated—these are all goods of which Schiller has so rightly said: “Custom and uncontested ownership so happily steal our gratitude.” Continual differentiation and the individualistic trend of thought developing out of it have in any case made the feeling of solidarity weaken and go into retreat.

Here the beginning of the war has now brought about a strong change of mentality [*Seelenwandlung*]. The otherwise invisible State [sic!] now stood there in concrete exuberance, in tangible reality. The awful armies that Germany and Austria arrayed against their enemies embody the State in a completely different way than hired mercenaries and slaves forced to become soldiers. The equally numerous and internal connections between the whole population and the army, the many urgent tasks that fall to those left at home, this all has the consequence that the small special-ego that had been so highly inflated in peacetime and had taken his private desires, his private interests as the sole important thing, was for a moment completely repressed or, better to say, was merged into the great ego, into the State-ego. The self-confidence [*Selbstbewusstsein*] that earlier had been a peculiar mentality [*Sonderbewusstsein*] has not however been diminished in any way. On the contrary, everyone feels his belonging to the whole that he now sees clearly before him. Everyone knows exactly that he must himself live or die with this whole, and through this his small ego, which has been freed from trivialities for a while, is filled with new great content and feels itself thereby enhanced and engorged.

This is how the war acts also in this sense against isolation, detachment, and continual differentiation. It means grand integration, it leads individuals toward the whole, and it forces them to subordinate themselves, to blend in, to link themselves up and to turn their entire ability to the great common cause. It also makes the whole vivid in the mind of each individual, it thereby gives the mind a new impetus, and it gives unity and a center to life.

Like the antisocial individualism of the individual, so also have the parochial endeavors of parties and nationalities been repressed. In Germany on August 4 there were actually no parties but only Germans and also here in Austria the nationalities have put away the divisive and blended themselves into the State, whose existence and validity means the most important protection for their private life.

The strongly socialized effect of war also emerged then in the magnificent welfare activity in which women participated and continue to participate in particularly marvelous fashion. Care for the wives and children of soldiers in the field, the battle against unemployment, the erection of feeding stations, the collection of Christmas gifts for our fighters, and above all the operation and management of improvised hospitals, the care of the wounded, their provision with cigars, cigarettes, pipes, with books and newspapers, all of these are activities that promote hidden talents into the open, that create new motivations, that draw different layers of society closer together, and most especially clearly demonstrate that despite all the thoroughly justified liberation efforts of women the most primordial, the most genuine, the truest, and the most blessed calling of the female sex is still to provide care and aid.

The sociological effects of the war regarded thus far seemed to me in the first weeks to be the most striking and meaningful. I was inclined to think that the essence of the present war of the nations was to be sought in its concentrated and integrated effect in the strengthening of the feeling of belonging, in the engagement of the individual with the great whole, in the suppression of special interests, in the blocking of the differentiation leading to isolating and antisocial individualism. In fact I am still persuaded today that this socializing tendency of the war in Germany and in Austria will remain significant for later times as well, and that the move toward the whole, and the consciousness of the significance of the State for the individual have experienced a substantial strengthening whose consequences will not disappear any time soon.

Yet the further course of the war and the sociological phenomena revealed thereby let me perceive that the matter is not so simple after all. *Spezialistentum* has not disappeared at all. We even see that the war itself has brought about a series of new special professions. The antisocial individualism has not been destroyed, but only partly and temporarily repressed. In the course of the war we have repeatedly had occasion to see how it often asserts itself in a quite unpleasant manner, but in many cases also in a deeply justified and in psychological terms fully understandable manner. If a big industrialist who has earned millions via war deliveries wears his patriotism on his sleeve, the motives are all too transparent. If a large landowner or grain merchant withholds their equipment in order to extract still higher prices from the war situation, we are rightly enraged about this brutal egotism and wish nothing more fervently than for the prosecutor to put a stop to these social wreckers as quickly and energetically as possible. Yet if a mother who has lost her only son in the war asks herself in her nameless pain whether this genocidal struggle was really avoidable, if she in her painful wrath curses those who bring such misfortune upon humankind, who here should summon up the courage to want to console the unfortunately woman with state obligations. The State may emerge from the war ever so victorious and powerful, yet it cannot give back what it has taken from her, and thus there is no social counterbalance to her personal pain. If we only consider that countless women have been visited by such grief, then we must indeed concede that the overwhelming quantity of personal pain also comes into consideration compared with war enthusiasm, the urge to sacrifice, and social commitment, and that the war thereby brings about profound contradictions, that it summons powerful spiritual conflicts that are unbearable over the long term.

Only if we ourselves wanted to harden our hearts against the suffering of those left behind, against the deprivations of refugees, against sympathy with the numerous destroyed existences [sic] and especially also against sympathy with the almost superhuman exertions that our warriors must bear, if we reassured ourselves for a single moment that these are the unavoidable consequences of the great struggle that has forged us anew with our States and will achieve a new revival for future races [*Geschlechter*], if we rise to a purely theoretical, general sociological view, we still arrive at the same conclusion.

The individualism that has been repressed so energetically and successfully by the war has now been recognized by the sociological approach as an essential condition of any cultural progress. It belongs namely to the most important and at the same time to the most certain conclusions of social theory, that the independently thinking and independently willing individual was not there from the beginning. Aristotle already said that the State in a certain sense precedes the individual, and the latest research has demonstrated beyond a doubt that the intrinsically strong personality has been formed first by social differentiation and the complex social organizations from which it stems. But since man has developed from socially bound herd animal to independent individual, the cultural possibilities have increased immeasurably, and the spiritual inventory of humankind has been enriched to virtually incomprehensible degree. It was first through ever-expanding individualism that science, art, and morality became possible, and religion itself, which is social and authoritative in its essence, has thereby experienced an essential deepening and internalization. The history of civilized peoples is full of the continuing struggles of the individual for his independence versus other individuals and versus the State. If Hegel said that world history is the progress in consciousness of freedom, we comprehend only now the profound and substantial truth of this statement. In millennia of long struggle humankind has won a collection of rights for the

civilized person of the present, and the consciousness of these rights has deeply penetrated the structure of our souls.

If the war now hinders us in the practice of these hard-won human rights, if it for example strongly restricts the right of free exchange of opinion, if it makes unconstrained economic activity impossible, if it discounts the value of the individual human life, if it releases the laboriously tamed raw instincts back into power and bring our ethical views into confusion, it doubtless takes something from us and what it takes are things that we had thought ourselves justified in counting the most valuable property of our souls. It gives us indeed a substitute for it, it increases our capacity for sacrifice, our devotion to the whole, our sense of belonging, and gives unity and grandness to our interior. Its sociological effects are, as we said, first of all concentration, integration, and socialization. Yet these effects are not attained without strong inner inhibitions and conflicts. They demand difficult renunciations of goods that we had been able to regard and had to regard as the most valuable achievements of culture.

The war thus contains a difficult and thoroughly urgent sociological problem. We must fix our gaze with complete impartiality and relentless sincerity on the contradictions that it brings up, we must seek out the sources of these spiritual conflicts, and indeed not in the symptoms that show on the surface. It is much more essential to dive into the historical and psychological depths in order to locate the driving forces in which we are able to recognize the true causes of unbearable contradictions. The way out is to be sought from there, upon which the irrefutable demands of state power so powerfully strengthened in the war can be merged toward a commonality of purpose with the equally justified wishes and claims of independent individuals who have become inwardly rich [in culture].

We venture this attempt and want first of all to present the basic ideas that have emboldened us to do so.

Ludo Hartmann has indicated in his substantial lecture "War in world history" (Vienna 1915) that among the oldest human societies known to us the state of "absence of peace" dominated, one that the Greek city-state, the polis, also did not fundamentally overcome. From this nonetheless stems the historical fact that war is an age-old epiphenomenon of human state formations. Drawing on an abundance of facts from ethnology [*Völkerkunde*], Letourneau, a zealous apostle of peace, has demonstrated and proven this for various races in his instructive book about war. Steinmetz goes further in his *Philosophy of War* (Leipzig 1907). Steinmetz, a zealous defender of war, seems have intended to demonstrate as true the famous saying of Heraclites that war is the father of all and the king of all. He claims that aggressiveness and horror belong to the fundamental characteristics of ancient man. These brought about the founding and further expansion of primitive communities and thereby first created the possibility of further cultural development. In any case it also follows from his presentation that war represents a kind of Ur-state of the human race.

It is not far from this to the thought that war, which we have taken down from our ancestors, has kept for itself a certain connection with the Ur-state of humanity and carries the tendency in itself to bring us closer again to the primitive state of our race [*Geschlecht*]. Many signs speak in favor of this. The raw instincts that almost exclusively rule the life of primitive man all too easily find the opportunity in every war and unfortunately also in the present one to win back the power that has been laboriously and by no means completely stripped from them by reason and humanity. Our moral and judicial views also experience a transformation

that seems turned toward ancient times. We must treat the individual person – in strict contradiction to Kant’s second formulation of the categorical imperative – “merely as means,” and we may not let his life count as an end in itself. The individual is once again absorbed in the whole, and as Otto v. Giercke has nicely expressed it, “the ancient times of man” are returning. “Here the frightful principle of collective punishment once again holds, so that the individual is responsible for his people and must also atone for its guilt.” We have laboriously worked our way to the conviction that veracity is not just a social duty, but is also a commandment of human dignity. Today we must now experience official representatives of enemy states speaking conscious untruths about us, not only publicly, but with the entire apparatus of state power providing for its propagation. Trickery and deception are generally deemed permissible in war, even as required and glorious, and thus do we approach closer as well to the primitive states where the thought of human dignity was not yet cultivated [sic: *aufgedämmert*].

But highly developed economic life also shows similar tendencies. World commerce is everywhere perceptibly destroyed, the import of breadfruit, meat, and raw materials strongly stifled. If it continues like this, or even if the war should encompass further circles, then every State remains directed towards its production and is everywhere forced to withdraw the sale and distribution of foodstuffs from competition and take it into its own hands. That means nothing other than the return to primitive natural economy in somewhat different form.

This tendency of the war to bring us closer to the Ur-state has now become clear, but stands in crude contradiction to the fact that it has broken at a time when technology and commerce, science and economy are highly developed and at the same time internationally organized. War uses the achievements of technology and modern transportation apparatus, and it is indeed no longer possible without them. War is thus in no way a negation of modern culture. It puts its results to use, yet by its primordial nature tosses us nonetheless violently back to early phases of development. The spiritual structure of modern man has now become thoroughly complicated as a result of the technical and economic transformations of recent centuries and the political, scientific, religious, ethical, pedagogical, and aesthetic movements caused for the most part by them, and it has fallen into a fluctuating and volatile state. That is why many feel the simplification, consolidation, and unification of the soul brought about by the war as a blessing, as a purifying storm, as beneficial purification. Yet for all our commitment to the whole we still cannot entirely forego the hard-won claims to private activity, to free criticism, and we say it only openly, to justified isolation and non-intervention. We are no longer ancient humans and cannot become them again. We gladly toss some ballast of modern culture overboard, we gladly let ourselves free of the slack [in the reins] that extreme individualism has deposited upon us, but we cannot cease to treasure the intrinsic value of man and to hold high the demands of human dignity.

These are the contradictions whose source sociological research has discovered, and the problem consists now in seeking a path to the solution. Since we are always dealing here with the relation of the State to the individual and the individual to the State, the connections between war and State must be researched more precisely. War has founded most states and states have not been able to forego or replace – at least heretofore – the unifying bond that war and war preparedness loops around its citizens. As yet there is nothing, as Steinmetz rightly says, that so powerfully and so effectively hammers the feeling of belonging into the souls of citizens as war. Whether this will be different in the future no one at present can



know. One thought however seems to me to glimmer and shine before us from the achievements and behavior of Germany and Austria in this war.

In both states by far the greatest portion of the populace was taken by the conviction that we did not cause and did not want this genocidal war. The struggle for our existence has been forced upon us by our enemies, and indeed mainly because English statesmen were of the opinion that the wealth and power of Great Britain could grow and be increased immeasurably by destroying Germany. This deep-rooted moral awareness that we are carrying on a just war has proved itself as a power factor during the mobilization and has moreover shown itself also in our treatment of the subjects of enemy states situated here, which stood in crude contradiction to the horrible measures of our enemies against Germans and Austrians. When the Serbian Chief of the General Staff was placed in confinement at the beginning of the war, Kaiser Franz Josef gave the order to release him; when Kaiser Wilhelm learned that Russia was mobilizing, he telegraphed the czars, urged the greatest possible acquiescence in Vienna, and left no stone unturned to maintain the peace in the final hours.

The engaged attitudes of the two allied monarchs seem to me to be heralds of a new interpretation of the duties of states. I will be highly strengthened in this opinion if I regard the military, economic, administrative-technical, juridical, philanthropic, and cultural measures that Germany undertook in the early weeks of the war. Professor Jastrow has brought to vivid view the transformation of public life in the early weeks of the war through a comprehensive and enlightening summary of these measures in his book "In the state of war" (Berlin 1914). The impression is almost overwhelming. One does not know what one should be more amazed at, the comprehensiveness and scope of the order, or the precision and speed of the implementation of the measures. The great era that gave birth to the century has never yet found such a veritably great race [*Geschlecht*] as this world war in the German people of today. This is not just the now so often emphasized gift of the Germans for organization. Here lie rather more the seeds of something new and great in the future life of the State [*im Staatenleben der Zukunft*].

The State is above all a power organization, and that has become especially apparent in the war. It shows that it is the first and highest duty of the State to protect and defend its power and authority from without and from within. In recent decades the State has also set other tasks, however. It long ago already became a constitutional state, yet this is intimately connected with its power organization. Yet in the domain of social insurance and public health it is gradually developing into the welfare state and insofar as it is taking the educational system in hand, and rendering its contributions to the cultivation of art and science, it is involved in forming a civilized state [*Kulturstaat*].

Where does this tendency toward expansion of state duty come from and what is its innermost motive? I believe it is the same as we also see at work in the development of the individual-ethic. The essence of all moral compulsion consists originally in society demanding from each of its member accomplishments and attitudes that guarantee the existence of the whole. This social imperative I have summarized under the concept of human duty. New motives and new demands are manifested with the strengthening of the individual personality, however, and they form one of the most important conditions of moral progress. The empowered human initially resists such laws that discount his dignity as a human. He gains rights for himself that the State may not infringe. But for this he also demands more of himself. He no longer satisfies himself with fulfilling social demands, and he sets himself obligations and is initially only satisfied when he has done his best. Then

again I consolidate the sum of these demands dictated by individual conscience under the concept of human dignity. Human duty and human dignity are now the driving forces of moral development and that clearly determines their harmonious unification, if also as a still distant goal. As in most questions of intellectual culture, Greek antiquity has also shown us the way here once upon a time. The image of Socrates, as outlined for us by Plato, is the example for the moral task of humanity. "Wherever a man stations himself, thinking it is best to be there, or is stationed by his commander, there he must, as it seems to me, remain and run his risks, considering neither death nor any other thing more than disgrace." (Plato, *Apology*, ch. 16 [28d]) The synthesis of human duty and human dignity is both concisely and clearly advanced and characterized in these words.

Something similar is now being accomplished in the life of the State. In addition to state power, which is the first and highest duty of every State and all its citizens to protect, consciousness of *state dignity* is arising as a new motive. In peacetime state dignity validates itself in the creation of welfare institutions and in the advancement of apparently superfluous cultural goods. In wartime however state duty shows itself in the observance of international law provisions, in care for those left at home, in the humane treatment of enemy subjects and prisoners.

When our Kaiser released the Chief of the Serbian General Staff, when the High Commander of the German navy announced the blockade sometime beforehand, both men had *state dignity* in mind. Germany showed by its measures at the beginning of the war that it demands more of itself than other states, and in this self-imposed and so brilliantly fulfilled commitment it has practically become exemplary for the development of *consciousness of state dignity*.

The much-discussed questions of international law also belong here. In his instructive lecture "Do we still have an international law?" (Bonn 1914) Ernst Zitelmann has most decisively answered this question in the affirmative despite the breaches that have occurred during the war, and he has directed Germany to the task of taking up the leading role in rebuilding and continuing international law after the war. It is my conviction that Germany is called to this precisely because it has so far put consciousness of *state dignity* the most strongly and clearly on the agenda.

If this demand is pushed through after the war and the consciousness of state dignity in similar fashion has an effect on the international commerce of states among themselves, just as the thought of human dignity has affected the personification of the criminal code and the expansion of personal freedom, then hope is at hand that international law will be a vital force, and that future generations will be spared such disastrous world wars. The war has decisively strengthened the power of the State, and may it also contribute to increasing and invigorating state dignity. Then world history is not only the progress of consciousness, but also the *progress in consciousness of state dignity*.

These thoughts that I have just sketched out on the sociological understanding of war are nonetheless in need of more precise elaboration and presentation.

## II. *War and the primitive state [Urzustand]*

### III. *War and modern culture*

#### IV. *War and State*

This expansion of the functions of the State is so sociologically significant, yet it has only become possible because the original foundations of state organization have remained undisturbed. The State is and remains a powerful unity and a unified power. The power issuing from this is alone what enables it to expand the rights of its citizens and to care for welfare and culture. The extreme individualists that modern culture has produced in such great numbers should always keep this in mind. The civic education that was already required before the war in Germany and Austria should not consist so much in the addition of political proficiencies. Its primary task ought to consist much more in bringing students at every opportunity to the clear sense that the existence and the chance for development of each of them is dependent on the condition and power of their State. Daily experiences, as for example putting a letter in the mailbox, a short train ride for a school outing, every newspaper, the morning coffee, all provide the most productive and appreciative material to the talented teacher for convincing demonstrations of the indispensability of the state organization. The world war naturally multiplies these opportunities in quite extraordinary fashion and I would know verily no better utilization of the war for schooling than the strengthening to be gained from it of state consciousness. (71-72)

The State is even – and our sociological treatment should make this clear – a power organization that has been all the more spiritualized [*vergeistigt*] by the cooperation of individualist and national development tendencies. Conceptually the State is developing into a cultural organization which must keep on strengthening the spiritual/intellectual and moral powers in man, so that they ever more energetically and comprehensively define the cooperation of man as clearly conscious motives. Man of himself can never rise to such spiritual/intellectual power. That is why he needs the State, which is there to bring man and humanity higher... (73)

The economic successes of Germany in the forty years of peace border on the fabulous. They were so great that one almost had to fear that the pan-economic life view would also overpower the nation of poets and thinkers. Then came the Great War and showed us that the wealth that Germany gained is rendering an invaluable means in this great struggle. Yet it also showed us that money is still not everything to the German. The unquestioned fulfillment of duty, the quiet confidence, and the vital self-assurance with which this violent war, recognized as necessary and just by the whole German nation, has been taken up and directed, has shown clearly that we have still remained the nation of Schiller and Goethe, Kant and Fichte. Germany, as Meinecke very tellingly remarked, was a nation of culture long before it became a nation-state. (76)

War and constant war readiness is not only a source of power for states, but also a heretofore scarcely avoidable promoter of inner unity. As a result of progressive differentiation in peacetime sundry oppositions and partisanship form within the State. The quarrels that stem from this even turn their pikes against the State itself, whose demands and interferences have often been found too high and too burdensome. This struggle of interests and the preservation of the claims of the individual connected with it is from a sociological viewpoint in no way an inauspicious sign. It is much more a proof of the vitally pulsing life that brings about more new possibilities of development. From this often grow new claims of individuals and expanded tasks of the State. In war however this quarreling ceases for the most part. In state with general military conscription, where the entire nation takes part in the war, everyone has a common great aim, and individual interests and the oppositions that grow out of them

markedly retreat behind this goal. In this way central power is strengthened, and the State stands there as vital unity and produces in the souls of its citizens a powerful feeling of belonging. (77)

#### V. *State power and state dignity*

The more the State takes into account the needs of the strengthened personality and the more decisively it recognizes the right of human dignity, the more intensively it grows in the depths and the stronger state consciousness is anchored in the souls of its citizens. In this way the State gradually manages to form a kind of *personality*. The State has often been compared to an organism and occasionally the implementation of this comparison down to the details has not infrequently led people astray and sometimes even had a strange effect. If we limit the organic in the State to the one domain where it is apparent, by which I mean the domain of intellectual activity, then we are not moving onto the field of false analogies, but remaining in the realm of living realities. Here the State shows itself entirely in the same manner as concentrated unity, as consolidating force, just as with the individual person we call the bearer of his centralized organization the Ego or personality. If we then speak of State personalities, then this is more than an image, more than a mere likeness. State personality is a piece of living reality. We find this personality active in the laws and institutions of the State, in its culture, and in its social framework, above all however in its relation to its citizens and in its ties to other states. The formation of characteristic State personalities has been substantially promoted by the strengthening of *national* consciousness. The nation as community of fate and character is itself already nature [*Eigenart*] and unity. A firm bond is thrown around national comrades by the common language and by the national literature in which it is recorded, who thereby perceive themselves as connected and at the same time sharply elevate themselves from the members of other nations by means of these common goods. Once a great nation has now created a State suited to it and is fused with it in powerful unity, then this social form bears still more clearly the marks of an inwardly secure, strongly concentrated, distinctive personality standing out sharply from others. Germany's nation and state provide the clearest and brightest example of this in this difficult time.

If we now ask ourselves what really constitutes the most profound essence and the clearest feature of the distinctive personality, we reply briefly and definitely: Power and dignity. In order to make clear in what sense we wish to employ this definition of personality, we would like to recall a profound and heretofore little known saying of Kant from the final years of his life. Kant wanted to conclude his lifework with a system of transcendental philosophy. But since 1799 he had encountered the infirmities of old age and he was only able to write down more fragmented thoughts on this. These have been published in a collection. Among them one finds the following sentence about God: "God is conceived as a person, i.e. as a being who possesses rights." Kant here strips the concept of person of its visual liveliness and leaves it only the feature of the legal subject. Not in entirely the same sense, but still in a similar one I would now like to say: The nation-state merged into unity is a *personality*, i.e. it is a being which possesses power and dignity. (103-105)

#### VI. *Concluding remarks*

Translation: KH