**Democratic Institutional Design 2023/24**

Nick Sitter and Ihor Moshenets, CEU Department of Public Policy

Mondays, Fall Term, 10:50-12:30

**SHORT DESCRIPTION**

This course provides an introduction to political institutions of democratic regimes, including questions about the concept of liberal democracy, different types of political regimes, the trade-off or dilemmas democracy entails, and some of the problems of contemporary liberal democracies. The course focuses on the key institutions of liberal democracy, including civil society and the rule of law, federal and unitary arrangements, types of electoral systems and party systems; and questions about the relationship between democracy and social structures, nationalism, capitalism, political violence and extremism. Much of the empirical material is centered on central Europe and the European Union, with cases drawn mainly from Austrian, Hungarian, Czech, Slovak, Polish, German and Italian politics. Differences and similarities across states are analyzed and explained along with the origins and consequences of institutional variation.

**COURSE LITERATURE**

* Lijphart, A. (2012). *Patterns of democracy*. New Haven (Conn): Yale University Press, [320.3 LIJ]
* Caramani, D. (2011) *Comparative Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press [320.3 CARA], chapter references are to the 2011 edition, but are also given for the new 5th edition (2020) in parentheses.
* Shepsle, K. A. (2010) *Analyzing politics: rationality, behavior, and institutions*, New York: W. W. Norton, [320./072 SHE]

See the week-by-week reading list for additional journal articles and book chapters.

**LEARNING GOALS**

By the end of the course students should be able to (1) compare existing political regimes according to their institutional setup, and reflect on their vulnerabilities and robustness; (2) produce country political risk report; (3) evaluate the academic and policy debates about democratization, crises of democracy and democratic backsliding; and (4) reflect on how institutions could be designed to foster desirable outcomes.

**EVALUATION AND EXAMINATION**

Political risk assessment (50%). This should be written in groups of 2 or 3 students, and is due at the end of the term: Monday **18 December 2023**, end of "business" 18:00. This tests learning goals (1) and (2). Please **submit the paper by e-mail** to Sittern@ceu.edu

Individual written exam (50%). This an individual in-class exam, on Monday 11 December, 10:50-12:30. It tests learning goals (3) and (4).

**WORKLOAD**

2 US credits = 4 ECTS credits = ca 100 hours work

1) Lectures, seminars and written exam = ca. 25 hours

2) Reading = ca. 50 hours (i.e. ca. 4 hours per week on average)

3) Political risk assessment report = ca. 25 hours

**WEEK 1 - Introductory seminar, Monday 18 September 2023**

**Core reading:**

* Lijphart (2012) *Patterns of democracy* [320.3 LIJ], Ch. 1, 17

**Further reading:**

* Dahl, R. (1998) *On Democracy*[321.8 DAH] – see also 2015 edition, with new chapters by Ian Shapiro

**WEEK 2 - Introductory lectures**

**The is no seminar on Monday 25 September 2023. Please listen to the five 10-minute podcast-style mini-lectures prepared for the course**

**Core reading:**

* Shepsle, (2010) *Analyzing politics* [320./072 SHE] , Ch. 1, 2, 17
* Lijphart (2012) Patterns of democracy [320.3 LIJ], Ch. 2, 3
* Caramani (2011) Comparative Politics [320.3 CARA] , Ch. 1 (5th Ed = 1)

**Further reading:**

* Caramani (2011) *Comparative Politics* [320.3 CARA] , Ch. 5-6  (5th Ed = 5-6)

**WEEK 3 (2 Oct 2023) - Liberal democracy, its critics, and dilemmas**

What are the most important critiques of liberal democratic theory in today’s world, e.g. elitism, Marxism, New right, nationalism, populism, feminism, environmentalism etc.?

**Core reading:**

* Dunleavy, P. and B. O’Leary (1987) *Theories of the State* [320.1 DUN], introduction
* Caramani (2011) Comparative Politics [320.3 CARA] , Ch. 2-3 (5th Ed = 2-3)

**Further reading:**

* Dunleavy, P. and B. O’Leary (1987) *Theories of the State* [320.1 DUN]
* Held, D. (2006) *Models of Democracy*[321.8/09 HEL]
* Dahl, R. (1956) *A Preface to Democratic Theory* [321.8 DAH]

**WEEK 4 (9 Oct 2023) - Liberal democracy, nationalism, and constitutions**

What are the most important dilemmas and trade-offs in designing democratic institutions? Which factors affect the success or failure of transitions to democracy?

**Core reading:**

* Lijphart, A. (1992) “Democratization and Constitutional Choices in Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary and Poland 1989-91”, *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 4:2, 207–23 [https://bibliothek.wzb.eu/pdf/1992/iii92-203.pdf]
* Lijphart (2012) *Patterns of democracy* [320.3 LIJ], Ch. 4, 10

**Further reading:**

* Caramani (2011) *Comparative Politics* [320.3 CARA] , Ch. 4 (5th Ed = 4)
* Shepsle, (2010) *Analyzing politics* [320./072 SHE] , Ch. 11
* O'Donnell, G., P. C. Schmitter and L. Whitehead (1986) *Transitions from authoritarian rule* [321./09 ODO]
* Lijphart, A. (2004) “Constitutional design for divided societies”, *Journal of Democracy*, 15:2, 96-109.
* Kissane, B. and N. Sitter (2005) “Civil Wars, Party Politics and the Consolidation of Regimes in Twentieth Century Europe”, *Democratization*, 12:2, 183-201
* Kissane, B. and N. Sitter (2010) “The Marriage of State and Nation in European Constitutions”, *Nations and Nationalism*, 19:1, 49-67

**WEEK 5 (16 Oct 2023) - Civil society and political violence**

Is a strong civil society necessary for liberal democracy to work? What institutions can help foster a free civil society? What civil society factors can cause democratic breakdowns and/or political violence?

**Core reading:**

* Bernhard, M. (2020) “What do we know about civil society and regime change thirty years after 1989?”, *East European Politics* 36:3, 341-362
* Levi, M. (1996), “Social and unsocial capital: A review essay of Robert Putnam's Making Democracy Work” *Politics and Society*, 24:1, 45-55.

**Further reading:**

* Caramani (2011) *Comparative Politics* [320.3 CARA] , Ch. 14, 19 (5th Ed = 14; 19)
* Shepsle, (2010) *Analyzing politics* [320./072 SHE] , Ch. 8, 9, 10
* Putnam. R. D. (1993) *Making Democracy Work* [306.2/09/45 PUT]
* Lieven, D. C. B (2001), *Empire: the Russian Empire and its rivals* [947 LIE], Ch. 5
* Schöpflin, G. (1992) *Politics in Eastern Europe*, [942./055 SCHO], Ch. 1
* Parker, T. and N. Sitter (2016), “The Four Horsemen of Terrorism – It’s not Waves, it’s Strains”, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 28:2, 197-216
* Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (2004), “Greed and Grievance in Civil War”, *Oxford Economic Papers*, 56, 563-595
* Kalyvas, S. (2006), *The logic of violence in civil war* [303.6/4 KAL]
* Tilly, C. (2004) *Contention and democracy in Europe*, 1650-2000 [320.9/4 TIL]
* Walter, Barbara F. (2022), *How Civil Wars Start: And How to Stop Them* [on order]

**WEEK 6 (23 Oct 2023) – Parties and elections**

Why are some parties and party systems more stable than others? What factors cause electoral volatility? How are these two questions related to democratic stability?

**Core reading:**

* Lijphart (2012) *Patterns of democracy* [320.3 LIJ], Ch. 5 (parties), 8 (elections)
* Katz A. & P. Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organisation and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party”, *Party Politics*, 1:1 (1995), 5-28

**Further reading:**

* Caramani (2011) *Comparative Politics* [320.3 CARA] , Ch. 10,12,13,19; (5th Ed = 10,12,13,19)
* Shepsle, (2010) *Analyzing politics* [320./072 SHE] , Ch. 3 – 7
* Lijphart, A. (1994) *Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies*, 1945–1990. Oxford: Oxford University Press, [324./63 LIJ]
* Dunleavy, P. (1991) *Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice* [338.9 DUN], ch. 4 and 5
* Mair, P. (1997) *Party System Change* [324./2/4 MAI],
* Lipset, S. M. & S. Rokkan (1967) ‘Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: an Introduction’, in S. M. Lipset & S. Rokkan (eds.), *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*, (New York, The Free Press) [324./9 LIP]
* Bakke, E. and N. Sitter (2005) “Patterns of Stability: Party Competition and Strategy in Central Europe since 1989”, *Party Politics* 11:2, 243-263

**WEEK 7 (30 Oct 2023) – Organised interests, capital, and power**

What is the relationship between capitalism and liberal democracy (complementary, trade-off, or dilemma)?

**Core reading:**

* Shepsle, (2010) *Analyzing politics* [320./072 SHE] , Ch. 9 (collective action)
* Olson, M. (1993) “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development”, *The American Political Science Review*, 87:3, 567-576
* Busemeyer, M. (2020) “Corporatism and the Resposiveness of Democracy”, in P. Careja, P. Emmenegger, N. Giger (ed.) *The European Social Model under Pressure: Liber Amicorum in Honour of Klaus Armingeon*, [e-book; text uploaded to the e-learning platform], p. 15-32.

**Further reading:**

* Lijphart (2012) *Patterns of democracy* [320.3 LIJ], Ch. 9
* Shepsle, (2010) *Analyzing politics* [320./072 SHE] , Ch. 8 (cooperation)
* Caramani (2011) *Comparative Politics* [320.3 CARA] , Ch. 14, 20, 21, 22; (5th Ed = 14, 20, 21, 22)
* Dunleavy, P. (1991) *Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice* [338.9 DUN], ch. 2 and 3
* Dahl, R. (1982) *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy* [321.8 DAH]
* Olson, M. (2000) *Power and prosperity* [338.9 OLS]
* Gerber, D. J. (1998), *Law and competition in twentieth century Europe* [KJC6456.G47 1998].
* Picketty, T. (2013) *Capital in the Twenty-First Century* [332./041 PIK]

**WEEK 8 (6 Nov) – The executive, legislature, and separation of powers**

What are the most important dilemmas and trade-offs involved in designing the balance between parliamentary and executive power?

**Core reading:**

* Lijphart (2012) *Patterns of democracy* [320.3 LIJ], chapter 7 (exec-legislative relations)
* Shepsle, (2010) *Analyzing politics* [320./072 SHE] , chapter 12 (legislatures)

**Further reading:**

* Lijphart (2012) *Patterns of democracy* [320.3 LIJ], Ch. 6, 11, 15, 16
* Caramani (2011) *Comparative Politics* [320.3 CARA] , Ch. 7, 8, 11; (5th Ed = 7, 8, 11)
* Shepsle, (2010) *Analyzing politics* [320./072 SHE] , Ch. 14, 16
* Downs, A. (1956) *An Economic Theory of Democracy* [324./6 DOW]
* Persson, T and G. Tabellini (2003), *The economic effects of constitutions* [K3165.P474 2003]

**WEEK 9 (13 Nov 2023) – Presentations of GROUP WORK**

**WEEK 10 (20 Nov 2023) – The judiciary, bureaucracy, and the rule of law**

What are the most important trade-offs or dilemmas linked to the power and independence of the judiciary and bureaucracy?

**Core reading:**

* Dunleavy, P. (1991) *Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice* [338.9 DUN], chapter 6 (bureaucracy)
* Kelemen, D. (2012), “The Political Foundations of Judicial Independence in the European Union”, *Journal of European Public Policy* 19:1, 43-58.
* Metz, J. (2015), *The European Commission, Expert Groups, and the Policy Process: Demystifying Technocratic Governance* [text uploaded to the e-learning platform], p. 21-45

**Further reading:**

* Lijphart (2012) *Patterns of democracy* [320.3 LIJ], Ch. 12, 13
* Caramani (2011) *Comparative Politics* [320.3 CARA] , Ch. 9; (5th Ed = 8, 9)
* Shepsle, (2010) *Analyzing politics* [320./072 SHE] , Ch. 13, 15
* Dunleavy, P. (1991) *Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice* [338.9 DUN], ch. 7 and 8

**WEEK 11 (27 Nov 2023) – The EU and supranational democracy**

Can democracy work at the supranational level? What are the most important trade-offs between supranational governance and democratic legitimacy?

**Core reading:**

* Moravcsik, A. (2002), “In Defence of the ‘Democratic Deficit’: Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40:4, 602-624
* Hix, S. (2018) “When Optimism Fails: Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Citizen Representation”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 56:7, 1595-1613

**Further reading:**

* Caramani (2011) *Comparative Politics* [320.3 CARA] , Ch. 23, 24; (5th Ed = 23,34)
* Majone, G. (2002) “The European Commission: The Limits of Centralization and the Perils of Parliamentarization”, *Governance*, 15:3, 375–92
* Taggart, P. (1998), “A touchstone of dissent: Euroscepticism in contemporary Western European party systems”, *European Journal of Political Research*, 33, 363-388.
* Follesdal, A. and Hix, S. (2006), “Why there is a democratic deficit in the EU: A response to Majone and Moravcsik”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 44:3, 533-562
* Sitter, N. (2001), “The Politics of Opposition and European Integration in Scandinavia: Is Euro-scepticism a Government-Opposition Dynamic?”, *West European Politics*, 24:4, 22-39
* Shepsle, (2010) *Analyzing politics* [320./072 SHE] , Ch. 10 (public goods)

**WEEK 12 (4 Dec 2023) – Democratic backsliding in Europe**

Why is democratic backsliding a more serious threat to liberal democracy in some states than in others?

**Core reading:**

* Rupnik, J. (2007), “Is Central Europe Backsliding: From Democracy Fatigue to Populist Backlash”, *Journal of Democracy*, 18:4, 17–25.
* Bermeo, N. (2016) “On Democratic Backsliding”, *Journal of Democracy*, 27:1, 5-19

**Further reading:**

* Caramani (2011) *Comparative Politics* [320.3 CARA] , Ch. 6, 25; (5th Ed = 6, 25)
* Diamond, L. (2019) *Ill Winds: Saving Democracy from Russian Rage, Chinese Ambition, and American Complacency* [321.8 DIA]
* Mounk, Y (2018), *The People vs. Democracy: Why Our Freedom Is in Danger and How to Save It* [321.8 MOUN]
* Kelemen, D. R. (2017) “Europe’s Other Democratic Deficit: National Authoritarianism in Europe’s Democratic Union” *Journal of European Public Policy*, 24:3, 337–351
* Bakke, E. and N. Sitter (2022) “The EU’s Enfants Terribles: Democratic backsliding in Central Europe since 2010”, *Perspectives on Politics*, 20:1, 22-37
* Batory, A., J. Kostka, A. Krizsan, N.Sitter and V. Zentai (2016), *Mapping Backsliding in the European Union*, Horizon 2020 TransCrisis Report 6.1, <https://cps.ceu.edu/publication/working-papers/transcrisis-mapping-backsliding>

**WEEK 13 (11 Dec) – Written exam**