**Institutions and Actors in the Policy Process**

***Mandatory for Mundus MAPP and MAIPA students,***

***Elective for MAPP and MPA students, Governance Specialization***

**Course Director**: Florian Weiler

**Course Teaching Assistant**: Anton Berezutskii

This course introduces students to how institutions and ideas interact with interests to structure policy making processes and influence actor behaviour, policy output, as well as prospects for participation and engagement. The course adopts a broad understanding of political institutions and takes a governance perspective. Rather than being just branches of government, political institutions – be they formal or informal – significantly frame and affect actor behaviour. Policy making does not happen in a vacuum but it is constrained by different institutional settings which enable or disempower particular actors, include or exclude them, encourage or discourage association or dispersion of actor groups.

Likewise, ideational forces can guide behavior and shape policy praxis, most notably through the formation and/or de-stabilisation of policy paradigms. Whether ideas are an independent source of power in policy or simply a tool in the hands of interests is a perennial question in policy studies. Actors also pursue their interests through institutions where questions such as the following arise: Are minorities more successful in securing their interests in systems of proportional representation? Are authoritarian regimes dependent on the legitimation of their policies? What determines which societal interests prevail when pressure groups seek to get a grip on the policy process? Are presidential systems of democratic representation more effective in delivering policies than parliamentary ones or vice versa?

The approach of the course is both comparative and inspired by multi-level governance. Students acquire core knowledge in analyzing the impact of ideational forces and institutional settings on the policy process and how different groups of actors are affected by them. The course helps students to consider different actors and institutional environments when designing policy and developing strategies for influence. We also explore different causal dynamics behind policy-making – when and how do institutions, ideas, interests and identities matter as driving forces behind policy.

**Learning Outcomes**:

On successful completion of the course students will be able:

* to understand key patterns of how political institutions impact on the policy process, the degree to which ideas do or do not structure policy, and to identify the role of different types of actors and interests within this process;
* to develop a critical understanding of core concepts and approaches in the field including conceptual and empirical limitations;
* have acquired the necessary skills for engaging in team work and discussion when analyzing the causal dynamics of ideas, institutions and interests in policy processes;
* to engage in independent research in the field using multiple sources including scholarly contributions and empirical information also in areas which are new to them.

**Course Texts**:

There are no text books specifically assigned. Nevertheless, you may find the following useful sources:

Béland, D. (2019). *How Ideas and Institutions Shape the Politics of Public Policy*, Elements in Public Policy, Cambridge University Press.

Botterill, L. C., & Fenna, A. (2019). *Interrogating Public Policy Theory: A Political Values Perspective*. Edward Elgar Publishing.

John, P. (2012) *Analyzing Public Policy*, Routledge.

Levy-Faur, D. (Ed) (2012) *Oxford Handbook of Governance*, Oxford University Press.

Peters, B. G. (2019). *Institutional theory in political science: The new institutionalism*. Edward Elgar Publishing.

Florian is available for consultation with appointments via email at [weilerf@spp.ceu.edu](mailto:weilerf@spp.ceu.edu), Anton is available via [Berezutskii\_Anton@phd.ceu.edu](mailto:Berezutskii_Anton@phd.ceu.edu)

**Course Overview**

1. Governance Institutions, Governance Ideas and Governance Actors (11th Jan)
2. The Power of Emotions and Identity in the Policy Process (18th Jan)

Part One: Institutions and Policy Making

1. Historical institutionalism (25th Jan)
2. Rational choice institutionalism (1st Feb)
3. Sociological and Discursive institutionalism (8th Feb)

Part Two: Ideas and Policy Making

1. The Power of Policy Paradigms (15th Feb)
2. Making Social Science Matter (22nd Feb)
3. Think Tanks, Consultants and other Brokers of Ideas (1th Mar)

Part Three: Interests and Policy Making

1. Lobbying and interest groups (8th March)
2. Networked Interests (15th)
3. Bureaucratic interests and bureau-shaping (22th March)

Conclusion

1. What Drives Policy: Ideas, Institutions or Interests? Where are Identities? (group presentations, 29th March)

**Course organization**

The course will run weekly on Monday at 11.00 – 12.40pm.

Room: TBD/online

**Preparation** – You are expected to check in regularly to the Moodle site for the course to check on any up-dates or additional readings. In other words, this is an evolving course document and changes in the form of additions are to be expected.

**Absences** – Please notify Anton in advance if you will be absent from class. Missed classes must be made up with an assignment, unless the absence occurred for medical reasons (sickness notification needs to be accompanied by a doctor’s note). The make-up assignment for missed classes is a 500-word summary of the seminar readings to be sent within a week of the missed class and sent to Anton.

**Adjustments** – If you require any support or adjustments due to a disability to help you participate in class (e.g. handouts printed in advance, larger text, extra time for reading, scheduled absences) you can chat with Florian. You can also meet with the CEU Disability Services Officer Natalia Nyikes ([nyikesn@ceu.edu](mailto:nyikesn@ceu.edu)) or consult the CEU Student Disability Policy (<https://documents.ceu.edu/node/508>).

**Course Assessment**:

Participation: 10%

Seminar presentation: 20%

Group presentation: 20%

Essay 50%

**Participation: 10%**

You are expected to come prepared for the seminar discussion by reading in advance the required readings. Seminars will be a mix of student presentations, mini-lectures, short quizzes, buzz groups, maybe the occasional simulation and other exercises alebeit with general discussion of the key concepts and readings as an important foundation. You are expected to participate by joining the conversation, asking questions (even if you think it is a dumb question) and engaging in critique of the readings.

There will be 2 readings per week posted for each seminar topic, occasionally 3 readings. As a general rule, you are expected to read 2 of the readings.

Each topic has some general questions as a guideline for initial discussion. However, you are encouraged to develop additional questions for discussion, to direct to the student presenters or to the course directors.

Mobile phones should be out of sight / turned off, and laptops closed.

**Seminar presentation: 20%**

Each week, two individuals are required to present 30 minute joint presentation that addresses key aspects of the topic. This is to be followed by a student presenter lead discussion for 30 minutes.

Your presentation should be supported by some kind of product. That is, some power point slides (up to a maximum of 12). Alternatively, you can provide a handout. We will suggest examples of potential products during the course, e.g. the first reading from Seminar 7.

The presentation will be assessed on the following criteria:

* Content and understanding of key concepts
* Critique and evaluation of the core concepts of the week
* Time management and capacity to generate productive discussion
* Production of supporting materials

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| **Date** | **Topic** | **Name** |
| Week 2, Jan 18 | The Power of Emotions and Identity in the Policy Process | 1.  2.  3. |
| Week 3,Jan 25 | Historical institutionalism | 1.  2.  3. |
| Week 4, Feb 1 | Rational choice institutionalism | 1.  2.  3. |
| Week 5, Feb 8 | Sociological and Discursive institutionalism | 1.  2.  3. |
| Week 6, Feb 15 | The Power of Policy Paradigms | 1.  2.  3. |
| Week 7, Feb 22 | Making Social Science Matter | 1.  2.  3. |
| Week 8, Mar 1 | Think Tanks, Consultants and other Brokers of Ideas | 1.  2.  3. |
| Week 9, Mar 8 | Lobbying and interest groups | 1.  2.  3. |
| Week 10, Mar 15 | Networked Interests | 1.  2.  3. |
| Week 11, Mar 22 | Bureaucratic interests and bureau-shaping | 1.  2.  3. |
| Week 12, Mar 29 | Group Presentations | Everyone |

**Group Presentation: 20%**

In the last week of term, we will wrap up the course with some group presentations that will present their ‘case’ for the causal impact on policy of one of four topics:

* Ideas group presentation
* Identities group presentation
* Institutions group presentation
* Interests group presentation

There will be 4 groups of up to 6 people each. These groups will be formed mid-way through the course. Each group must use the materials taught in the course as well as gathering new ideas to make a presentation – power-point, handout, etc – making a case for your allocated “I” as arguably the strongest causal force or factor in shaping policy (or why the other ‘I’s are not).

At the end of presentations, you should have prepared some questions for discussions as well as to expect questions from the participants in the other groups as to why your ‘I’ is not the most powerful force in policy.

Each group will also need to submit the presentation for assessment. This submission may deviate from the oral presentation in some degree by providing more detail and narrative analysis (for example, in the notes section of the ppt slides).

Assessment criteria

* CASE – did you make a strong case or argument in favour of your ‘I’?
* CLARITY- was the presentation and supporting material readable and well organized?
* COMMITMENT- did you cover all relevant material?
* COMPARISON - how did your work compare to the rest of the class?
* COHERENCE- did you make effective connections with your team in covering your ‘I’?

**Essays: 50%**

A list of suggested essay questions will be provided mid-way through the course. Around 8-10 questions will be provided and will reflect the themes covered across the course.

Essays should be 3,000 words in length. This word length is inclusive of everything (thatmeans title, name, text, bibliography, footnotes, annexes, etc).

Essay due date: 5.00pm Friday 16th April 2021.

If you do not like any of the provided questions you may devise your own essay question. However, you must discuss this question and its formulation with the course coordinators. You should provide a draft of one or two versions of your essay question by 4th March after a brief consultation with one of the course coordinators who will discuss how to refine the question and settle on a final essay question.

Late submission will earn a deduction of 2% per day.

**INTRODUCTION TO THE COURSE**

**1. Governance Institutions, Governance Ideas and Governance Actors (11th January)**

* What is ‘governance’? And how can it be distinguished from government?
* What is the ‘old institutionalism’?
* What are the distinctions between formal and informal institutions?

Seminar Reading:

Levy-Faur, D. (2012) ‘From Big Government to Big Governance’, In D. Levy-Faur (Ed.) *Oxford Handbook of Governance*, OUP.

Stoker, G. (1998). Governance as theory: five propositions. *International social science journal*, *50*(155), 17-28.

Further Reading for Essays and Presentations:

Ansell, C., & Torfing, J. (Eds.). (2016). *Handbook on theories of governance*. Edward Elgar Publishing.

Abrutyn, S., & Turner, J. H. (2011). The Old Institutionalism Meets the New Institutionalism. *Sociological Perspectives*, *54*(3), 283–306.

Bache, I., Bartle, I., & Flinders, M. (2016). Multi-level governance. In *Handbook on theories of governance*. Edward Elgar Publishing.

Bevir, M., & Rhodes, R. A. (Eds.). (2016). *Rethinking governance: ruling, rationalities and resistance*. Routledge.

Bevir, M. (Ed.). (2010). *The SAGE handbook of governance*. Sage.

Chhotray, V., & Stoker, G. (2008). *Governance theory and practice: A cross-disciplinary approach*. Springer.

Durant, R. F. (2015). Whither power in public administration? Attainment, dissipation, and loss. *Public Administration Review*, *75*(2), 206-218.

Löffler, E. (2015). Public governance in a network society. In *Public management and governance* (pp. 233-248). Routledge.

**2. Emotions and Identity in the Policy Process (18th January)**

* Are emotions an important component of policy making? If so, how and why?
* To what extent are emotions recognized or neglected in policy studies?
* Is there power in emotion for political and policy outcomes?

Seminar Reading:

Cairney, P. (2011). *Understanding public policy: Theories and issues*. Macmillan International Higher Education. Chapter 3; ‘Power and Public Policy’.

Maor, M. (2016). Emotion-driven negative policy bubbles. *Policy Sciences*, *49*(2), 191-210.

Moisander, J. K., Hirsto, H., & Fahy, K. M. (2016). Emotions in institutional work: A discursive perspective. *Organization Studies*, *37*(7), 963-990.

Further Reading for Essays and Presentations:

Cooper, C. A. (2018). Bureaucratic identity and the resistance of politicization. *Administration & Society*, *50*(1), 30-52.

Croft, C., Currie, G., & Lockett, A. (2015). The impact of emotionally important social identities on the construction of a managerial leader identity: A challenge for nurses in the English National Health Service. *Organization Studies*, *36*(1), 113-131.

Du Gay, P. (1996). Organizing identity: Entrepreneurial governance and public management. *Questions of cultural identity*, 151-169.

Hunter, S. (2015). *Power, politics and the emotions: Impossible governance?*. Routledge-Cavendish.

Hyde-Price, A. (2004). Interests, institutions and identities in the study of European foreign policy. *Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy*, 99-113.

Komporozos-Athanasiou, A. R. I. S., & Thompson, M. (2015). The role of emotion in enabling and conditioning public deliberation outcomes: A sociological investigation. *Public Administration*, *93*(4), 1138-1151.

Meyer, R. E., Egger‐Peitler, I., Höllerer, M. A., & Hammerschmid, G. (2014). Of bureaucrats and passionate public managers: Institutional logics, executive identities, and public service motivation. *Public Administration*, *92*(4), 861-885.

Meyer, R., & Hammerschmid, G. (2006). Public management reform: An identity project. *Public policy and administration*, *21*(1), 99-115.

Risse, T. (2014). No demos? Identities and public spheres in the Euro crisis. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, *52*(6), 1207-1215.

Rosamond, B. (1999). Discourses of globalization and the social construction of European identities. *Journal of European Public Policy*, *6*(4), 652-668.

Shamsul, A. B. (1998). Bureaucratic management of identity in a modern state. *Making Majorities: Constituting the Nation in Japan, Korean, China, Malaysia, Fiji, Turkey and the United State*, 135-150.

Winkler, I. (2018). Identity work and emotions: a review. *International journal of management reviews*, *20*(1), 120-133.

**PART 1: INSTITUTIONS AND POLICY MAKING**

**3. Historical institutionalism (25st January)**

* What is path dependency and how does it constrain policy?
* What are critical junctures and their defining features?
* Is policy a prisoner of history?

Seminar Reading:

Eckersley, P. (2017)  Cities and climate change: How historical legacies shape policy-making in English and German municipalities, *Politics*, 2017, Vol. 37(2) 151–166.

Peters, B. G. (2019). *Institutional theory in political science: The new institutionalism*. Edward Elgar Publishing. Chapter 4

Further Reading for Essays and Presentations:

Ackrill, R., & Kay, A. (2006). Historical-institutionalist perspectives on the development of the EU budget system. *Journal of European Public Policy*, *13*(1), 113-133.

Barrett, B. (2017). Historical institutionalism and change in higher education. In *Globalization and change in higher education* (pp. 35-55). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.

Barzelay, M., & Gallego, R. (2006). From “new institutionalism” to “institutional processualism”: advancing knowledge about public management policy change. *Governance*, *19*(4), 531-557.

Boychuk, G. W. (2016). “Studying Public Policy”: Historical Institutionalism and the Comparative Method. *Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique*, *49*(4), 743-761.

Bulmer, S. (2009). Politics in Time meets the politics of time: historical institutionalism and the EU timescape. *Journal of European public policy*, *16*(2), 307-324.

Drezner, D. W. (2010). Is historical institutionalism bunk?. *Review of International Political Economy*, *17*(4), 791-804.

van Hooren, Franca , Kaasch, Alexandra & Starke, Peter (2014) The shock routine: economic crisis and the nature of social policy responses, *Journal of European Public Policy,* 21:4, 605-623

Lockwood, M., Kuzemko, C., Mitchell, C., & Hoggett, R. (2017). Historical institutionalism and the politics of sustainable energy transitions: A research agenda. *Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space*, *35*(2), 312-333.

Peters, B. G., Pierre, J., & King, D. S. (2005). The politics of path dependency: Political conflict in historical institutionalism. *The journal of politics*, *67*(4), 1275-1300.

Pierson, P. (2016). Power in historical institutionalism. *The oxford handbook of historical institutionalism*, 124-141.

Sorensen, A. (2015). Taking path dependence seriously: an historical institutionalist research agenda in planning history. *Planning Perspectives*, *30*(1), 17-38.

Verdun, A. (2015). A historical institutionalist explanation of the EU's responses to the euro area financial crisis. *Journal of European Public Policy*, *22*(2), 219-237.

**4.Rational choice institutionalism (1st February)**

* How do actors 'act rationally' when deciding on policy?
* How do the notions of rational choice and institutions interact? What role do institutions play in rational choice institutionalism?
* Does rationality have meaning or value in explaining policy making?

Seminar Reading:

Araral, E. (2008). The strategic games that donors and bureaucrats play: An institutional rational choice analysis. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, *19*(4), 853-871.

Peters, B.G.; Jordan A., Tosun J. (2017). Over-reaction and under-reaction in climate policy: an institutional analysis. *Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning*, 19(6), 612-624.

Further Reading for Essays and Presentations:

Dowding, K. (1994). The Compatibility of Behaviouralism, Rational Choice and New Institutionalism'. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, *6*(1), 105-117.

Grossman, P. Z. (2019). Utilizing Ostrom’s institutional analysis and development framework toward an understanding of crisis-driven policy. *Policy Sciences*, *52*(1), 3-20.

Ostrom, E. (1991). Rational choice theory and institutional analysis: Toward complementarity. *American political science review*, *85*(1), 237-243.

Scharpf, F. W. (2018). *Games real actors play: Actor-centered institutionalism in policy research*. Routledge. Schneider, G., & Ershova, A. (2018). Rational Choice Institutionalism and European Integration. In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*.

Weyland, K. (2002). Limitations of rational-choice institutionalism for the study of Latin American politics. *Studies in Comparative International Development*, *37*(1), 57-85.

Little, D. (25/10/2016) Rational choice instituionalism, Understanding society - Blogspot [blog post] <https://understandingsociety.blogspot.com/2016/10/rational-choice-institutionalism.html>

**5. Sociological and Discursive institutionalism (8th February)**

* What are the ways in which institutions create meaning for individuals and shape policy?
* Norms and culture are manifest in institutions how, and with what kinds of impact?
* Is discourse an independent causal force in policy?
* What are coordinative discourses and communicative discourses?

Seminar Reading:

Carstensen, M. B., & Schmidt, V. A. (2016). Power through, over and in ideas: conceptualizing ideational power in discursive institutionalism. *Journal of European Public Policy*, *23*(3), 318-337.

Peters, B. G. (2019). *Institutional theory in political science: The new institutionalism*. Edward Elgar Publishing. Chapters 6 and 7.

Further Reading for Essays and Presentations:

Alasuutari, P. (2015). The discursive side of new institutionalism. *Cultural Sociology*, *9*(2), 162-184.

Béland, D. (2019). *How Ideas and Institutions Shape the Politics of Public Policy*. Elements, Cambridge University Press.

Buhari-Gulmez, D. (2010). Stanford school on sociological institutionalism: A global cultural approach. *International Political Sociology*, *4*(3), 253-270.

Campbell, J. L. (2002). Ideas, politics, and public policy. *Annual review of sociology*, *28*(1), 21-38.

Carstensen, M. B., & Schmidt, V. A. (2016). Power through, over and in ideas: conceptualizing ideational power in discursive institutionalism. *Journal of European Public Policy*, *23*(3), 318-337.

Đurić, I. (2011). The new institutionalism (s): a framework for the study of public policy in post-conflict and post-communist countries. *Politička misao*, *48*(05), 85-105.

Meyer, R. E., Egger-Peitler, I., Höllerer, M. A., and Hammerschmid, G. (2014). Of bureaucrats and passionate public managers: Institutional logics, executive identities, and public service motivation. *Public Administration*, *92*(4), 861-885.

Miller, E. A., & Banaszak-Holl, J. (2005). Cognitive and normative determinants of state policymaking behavior: Lessons from the sociological institutionalism. *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, *35*(2), 191-216.

Schmidt, V. A. (2017). Theorizing ideas and discourse in political science: intersubjectivity, neo-institutionalisms, and the power of ideas. *Critical Review*, *29*(2), 248-263.

Walsh, J. I. (2000). When do ideas matter? Explaining the successes and failures of Thatcherite ideas. *Comparative Political Studies*, *33*(4), 483-516.

**PART 2: IDEAS AND POLICY MAKING**

**6.The Power of Policy Paradigms (15th February)**

* What are ‘Paradigm shifts’ and why do they occur?
* What is first order, second order and third order policy change? Provide examples from a policy sector.

Seminar Reading:

Babb, S. (2013) "[The Washington Consensus as transnational policy paradigm: Its origins, trajectory and likely successor](https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/rripxx/v20y2013i2p268-297.html)," [*Review of International Political Economy*](https://ideas.repec.org/s/taf/rripxx.html), 20(2): 268-297.

Peter Hall (1993) “Policy Paradigms, social learning, and the state: the case of economic policy making in Britain” *Comparative Politics* 25, (3): 275-96

Hemerijck, Anton (2018) Social investment as a policy paradigm, Journal of European Public Policy, 25:6, 810-827

Further Reading for Essays and Presentations:

Blyth, M., & Mark, B. (2002). *Great transformations: Economic ideas and institutional change in the twentieth century*. Cambridge University Press.

Josefina Erikson (2015) Ideas and actors in policy processes: where is the interaction?, Policy Studies, 36:5, 451-467,

Hogan, John, & Howlett, Michael (Editors.). (2015). *Policy Paradigms in Theory and Practice: Discourses, Ideas and Anomalies in Public Policy Dynamics*. Studies in the Political Economy of Public Policy, Springer.

Howlett, Michael. (1994). Policy paradigms and policy change: Lessons from the old and new Canadian policies towards Aboriginal peoples. *Policy studies journal*, *22*(4), 631-649.

Lianne M. Lefsrud and Renate E. Meyer “Science or Science Fiction? Professionals’ Discursive Construction of Climate Change” *Organization Studies*, 33(11) November 2012: 1477–1506.

Kingdon, John W. 1995. *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*. 2nd ed. New York: Addison Wesley Longman. Chapter 8: pp. 165-195

Parsons, C. (2016). Ideas and power: four intersections and how to show them. *Journal of European Public Policy*, *23*(3), 446-463.

Steinmo, Sven. 2003. “The Evolution of Policy Ideas: Tax Policy in the 20th Century.” *The British Journal of Politics & International Relations,* 5(2): 206–36.

Wood, Matt. (2015). Puzzling and powering in policy paradigm shifts: politicization, depoliticization and social learning. *Critical Policy Studies*, *9*(1), 2-21

**7. Making Social Science Matter (22nd February)**

* Why do Social Scientists Fail to Predict Big Events? For example:
  + - Political Scientists and the fall of the Berlin Wall
    - Economists and the Global Financial Crisis
    - Other cases?
* Why has social inquiry and science ‘failed’ to inform policy and engage publics
* Does ‘post-truth politics’ spell the ‘death of expertise’?
* Or are we in danger of epistocracy?

Seminar Reading:

10 reasons why we need Social Science” [[1]](#footnote-1) <https://www.palgrave.com/gp/campaigns/social-science-matters/10-reasons-for-social-science>

Daviter, F. (2015). The political use of knowledge in the policy process. *Policy Sciences*, *48*(4), 491-505.

Reiss, J. (2019). Expertise, Agreement, and the Nature of Social Scientific Facts or: Against Epistocracy. *Social Epistemology*, *33*(2), 183-192.

Further Reading for Essays and Presentations:

Béland, D. (2019). How Ideas and Institutions Shape the Politics of Public Policy.

Drezner, D. W. (2017). *The ideas industry*. Oxford University Press.

Flyvbjerg, B., Landman, T., & Schram, S. (2016). Tension points: Learning to make social science matter. *Critical Policy Studies, Forthcoming*.

Flyvbjerg, B. (2001). *Making social science matter: Why social inquiry fails and how it can succeed again*. Cambridge university press.

Freeman, R., & Sturdy, S. (Eds.). (2014). *Knowledge in policy: Embodied, inscribed, enacted*. Policy Press.

Nichols, T. (2017). *The death of expertise: The campaign against established knowledge and why it matters*. Oxford University Press.

Rein, M. (1976). *Social science and public policy* (p. 107). New York: Penguin Books.

Standbrink, P. (2018). Epistocracy and Democratic Participation in a Post-Truth World. *Democratic Theory*, *5*(1), 1-17.

Stone, Diane,. (2012) ‘Agents of Knowledge’, In D. Levy-Faur (Ed.) *Oxford Handbook of Governance*, OUP.

**8.Think Tanks, Consultants and other Brokers of Ideas (1st March)**

* Are think tanks ‘second hand dealers in ideas’ or do they shape policy agendas and outcomes?
* What is ‘consultocracy’? What is its significance in the policy process?
* Do ideas rule?

Seminar Reading:

Hernando, M. G., Pautz, H., & Stone, D. (2018). Think tanks in ‘hard times’–the Global Financial Crisis and economic advice. *Policy and Society*, *37*(2), 125-139. And other articles in this special issue – open access

Ylönen, M., & Kuusela, H. (2019). Consultocracy and its discontents: A critical typology and a call for a research agenda. *Governance*, *32*(2), 241-258.

Sturdy, Andrew and Morgan, Glenn (2018) Management consultancies: Inventing the future, Futures of Work, September, <https://futuresofwork.co.uk/2018/09/05/management-consultancies-inventing-the-future-2/>

Further Reading for Essays and Presentations on Think Tanks:

Abelson, D. E. (2018). *Do think tanks matter?: Assessing the impact of public policy institutes*. McGill-Queen's Press-MQUP.

Campbell, J. L., & Pedersen, O. K. (2014). *The national origins of policy ideas: Knowledge regimes in the United States, France, Germany, and Denmark*. Princeton University Press.

Lerner, J. Y. (2018). Getting the message across: evaluating think tank influence in Congress. *Public Choice*, *175*(3-4), 347-366.

Rich, A. (2005). *Think tanks, public policy, and the politics of expertise*. Cambridge University Press.

Stone, D. (2007). Recycling bins, garbage cans or think tanks? Three myths regarding policy analysis institutes. *Public administration*, *85*(2), 259-278.

Stone, D., & Denham, A. (Eds.). (2004). *Think tank traditions: policy research and the politics of ideas* (pp. 35-50). Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Xufeng, Z. (2009). The influence of think tanks in the Chinese policy process: Different ways and mechanisms. *Asian Survey*, *49*(2), 333-357.

Zimmerman, E. (2016). Think tanks and non-traditional security. In *Think tanks and non-traditional security* (pp. 41-67). Palgrave Macmillan, London.

Further Reading for Essays and Presentations on Consultants:

Fattore, G., Iacovone, D., & Steccolini, I. (2018). ‘Managing successful change in the public sector’: a view from the consultants’ world. *Public Management Review*, *20*(4), 587-606.

Gunter, H. M., Hall, D., & Mills, C. (2015). Consultants, consultancy and consultocracy in education policymaking in England. *Journal of education policy*, *30*(4), 518-539.

Howlett, M., & Migone, A. (2017). 10 The Role of Policy Consultants:“Consultocracy” or Business as Usual. *Policy work in Canada: Professional practices and analytical capacities*, 155.

Kirkpatrick, I., Sturdy, A. J., Alvarado, N. R., Blanco-Oliver, A., & Veronesi, G. (2019). The impact of management consultants on public service efficiency. *Policy & Politics*, *47*(1), 77-96.

Morgan, G., Sturdy, A., & Frenkel, M. (2019). The role of large management consultancy firms in global public policy. In *The Oxford Handbook of Global Policy and Transnational Administration*.

Steiner, R., Kaiser, C., & Reichmuth, L. (2018). Consulting for the public sector in Europe. In *The Palgrave Handbook of Public Administration and Management in Europe* (pp. 475-495). Palgrave Macmillan, London.

Sturdy, A. (2018). Promoting solutions and co-constructing problems–Management consultancy and instrument constituencies. *Policy and Society*, *37*(1), 74-89.

**PART 3: INTERESTS AND POLICY MAKING**

**9. Lobbying and interest groups (8th March)**

* How far do financial resources sway decision making in the policy process?
* What are the sources of legitimacy of interest groups in policy making?
* Does lobbying have a legitimate role in making public policy?

Seminar Reading:

John, Peter (2012) *Analyzing Public Policy*, Routledge chapter 4 on ‘Groups and Networks’

Klüver, H. (2010). Europeanization of lobbying activities: When national interest groups spill over to the European level. *European Integration*, *32*(2), 175-191.

Sadi, G., & Ramos Meneghetti, M. (2019). A normative approach on lobbying. Public policies and representation of interests in Argentina. *Journal of Public Affairs*, e1907.

Further Reading for Essays and Presentations:

Baum, L., Klein, D., & Streb, M. J. (2017). *The Battle for the Court: Interest Groups, Judicial Elections, and Public Policy*. University of Virginia Press.

Baumgartner, Frank R./ Berry, Jeffrey M. et al, (2009) Lobbying and policy change: who wins, who loses, and why, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Chapters 1 and 6

Berry, Jeffrey M./ Wilcox, Clyde: *The interest group society*, London: Routledge, 2015.

Binderkrantz, A. S., Christiansen, P. M., & Pedersen, H. H. (2015). Interest group access to the bureaucracy, parliament, and the media. *Governance*, *28*(1), 95-112.

Bouwen, Pieter, Corporate lobbying in the European Union: the logic of access, in: *Journal of European Public Policy*, 9(3): 365-390, 2002.

De Bruycker, I. (2016). Pressure and expertise: explaining the information supply of interest groups in EU legislative lobbying. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, *54*(3), 599-616.

Griffin, P., & Thurber, J. A. (2015). Teaching public policy advocacy by combining academic knowledge and professional wisdom. *Interest Groups & Advocacy*, *4*(1), 40-51.

Hillman, Amy J./ Keim, Gerald D./ Schuler, Douglas: Corporate Political Activity: A Review and Research Agenda, in: *Journal of Management*, 30(6): 837-857, 2004.

Klüver, Heike/ Braun, Caelesta/ Beyers, Jan, Legislative lobbying in context: towards a conceptual framework of interst group lobbying in the European Union, in: *Journal of European Public Policy,* 22(4): 447-461, 2015.

Mahoney, Christine, Lobbying Success in the United States and the European Union, in: *Journal of Public Policy*, 27(1): 35-56, 2007.

Mahoney, Christine/ Baumgartner, Frank, Converging Perspectives on Interest Group Research in Europe and America, in: *West European Politics*, 31(6): 1253-1273, 2008.

McGrath, Conor: *Lobbying in Washington, London, and Brussels: the persuasive communication of political issues*, Lewiston, N.Y.: E. Mellen Press, 2005.

Smith, M. J. (1990), Pluralism, Reformed Pluralism and Neopluralism: the Role of Pressure Groups in Policy-Making. *Political Studies*, 38: 302–322

Whiteley, P. F., & Winyard, S. J. (2018). *Pressure for the poor: the poverty lobby and policy making*. Routledge.

**10. Collective interests: ‘iron triangles’, policy communities, advocacy coalitions and ‘issue networks’ (15th March)**

* What are sub-governments?
* What are the main differences between the issue network and iron triangle frameworks?
* To what extent are these frameworks applicable, or can be conceptually stretched, to other political contexts outside North America? Or transnationalised?

Seminar Reading:

Heclo, Hugh. (1978) ‘Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment’, in Anthony King (ed.) *The New American Political System*, Washington DC, American Enterprise Institute.

John, Peter (2012) *Analyzing Public Policy*, Routledge chapter 4

Maclachlan, P. L. (2004). Post office politics in modern Japan: The postmasters, iron triangles, and the limits of reform. *The Journal of Japanese Studies*, 281-313.

Further Reading for Essays and Presentations:

Cerny, Phil. (2001) From “Iron Triangles” to “Golden Pentangles? Globalizing the Policy Process’, *Global Governance*, 7(4): 397-410.

Gais, Thomas L., Peterson, Mark A. and Jack L. Walker (1984) ‘Interest Groups, Iron Triangles and Representative Institutions in American National Government’, *British Journal of Political Science*, 14 (2): 161-185

Gormley, W. T. (1986) ‘Regulatory Issue Networks in a Federal System’, *Polity*, 18 (4): 595-620.

Hayden, F. G. (2002) Policymaking Network of the Iron-Triangle Subgovernment for Licensing Hazardous Waste Facilities, *Journal of Economic Issues*. 36(2)

Hentati-Sundberg, J., Fryers Hellquist, K., & Duit, A. (2019). Iron triangles and subsidies: understanding the long-term role of the government on Swedish commercial fisheries. *Ecology and Society*, *24*(4).Jordan, Grant. (1981) ‘Iron Triangles, Woolly Corporatism and Elastic Nets: Images of the Policy Process’, *Journal of Public Policy*, 1 (1): 95-123

Overman, E. Sam and Don F. Simanton (1986) ‘Iron Triangles and Issue Networks of Information Policy’, *Public Administration Review* Vol. 46, Special Issue: Public Management Information Systems (Nov.): 584-589

Petracca, M. P. (2018). The rediscovery of interest group politics. In *The politics of interests* (pp. 3-31). Routledge.

Peterson, Mark, A. (1993) ‘Political Influence in the 1990s: From Iron Triangles to Policy Networks’, Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law*,* 18( 2): *395-438*

Skok, J. E. (1995). Policy issue networks and the public policy cycle: A structural-functional framework for public administration. *Public Administration Review*, *55*(4), 325.

Tzoumis, K. (2004) Iron Triangles’, in D. Schultz (ed.) *Encyclopedia of Public Administration and Public Policy*, New York, Facts on File Publishing.

**11.Bureaucratic interests and bureau-shaping (22nd March)**

* ‘Yes Minister’ & ‘Yes Prime Minister’: Is this TV show a ‘period piece’ or tool for contemporary policy analysis?
* Can bureaucrats be seen as an ‘interest group’?

Seminar Reading:

Dunleavy, P. (2014). The bureau-shaping model. *The Policy Process: A Reader*.

Jan-Hinrik Meyer-Sahling (2006) The rise of the partisan state? Parties, patronage and the ministerial bureaucracy in Hungary, *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 22:3, 274- 297.

Further Reading for Essays and Presentations:

Borins, S. F. (1988). Public choice: “Yes Minister” made it popular, but does winning the Nobel Prize make it true?. *Canadian Public Administration*, *31*(1), 12-26.

Cline, A. W. (2004) ‘the Executive Agency Revolution in Whitehall: Public Interest versus Bureau-Shaping perspectives’, *International Public Management Journal*, *7*(3), 449.

Considine, J. (2006). Yes Minister: invaluable material for teaching the public choice of bureaucracy. *Economic Affairs*, *26*(3), 55-61.

Cope, S. (2000). Assessing rational-choice models of budgeting--from budget-maximising to bureaushaping: a case study of British local government. *Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial Management*, *12*(4), 598-624.

Dowding, K., & James, O. (2004). Analysing bureau-shaping models: Comments on Marsh, Smith and Richards. *British journal of political science*, *34*(1), 183-189.

Dunleavy, P. (2019). “The Bureaucracy” as an Interest Group. In *The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1*.

Dunleavy, P. (1985). Bureaucrats, budgets and the growth of the state: reconstructing an instrumental model. *British Journal of Political Science*, *15*(3), 299-328.

James, O. (1995). Explaining the Next Steps in the Department of Social Security: the Bureau-shaping Model of Central State Reorganization. *Political Studies*, *43*(4), 614-629.

Marsh, D., Smith, M. J., & Richards, D. (2000). Bureaucrats, politicians and reform in Whitehall: Analysing the bureau-shaping model. *British Journal of Political Science*, *30*(3), 461-482.

**Conclusion: What Drives Policy: Ideas, Institutions or Interests? (29th March)**

* Ideas group presentation
* Identities group presentation
* Institutions group presentation
* Interests group presentation

Seminar Reading:

Previous listed readings.

Botterill, L. C., & Fenna, A. (2019). *Interrogating Public Policy Theory: A Political Values Perspective*. Edward Elgar Publishing

1. This is listed in part as an idea for the final group presentation as a potential style of ‘product’. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)