**SPP elective: The Political Economy of Non-democracies**

Professor: Cristina Corduneanu-Huci Phone: +36 1 327 3000/ext. 2365

Time: Every Friday, E-mail: Corduneanu-HuciC@ceu.hu

11:00pm – 3:10 pm Office hours: TBD

Course Credits: 4

Several waves of democratization taking place in the XXth century led to initial expectations that democracy will come to dominate as a political regime type. This turned out to be premature. Many polities in the developing world experienced either brief moments of democratic experiments followed by reversals to authoritarianism, or got stuck in partial equilibria characterized by seemingly democratic elections combined with autocratic tools of repression. The events of the Arab Spring and the recent wave of autocratization are a cautionary tale with respect to overenthusiastic predictions.

Because the type of political regime is consequential for outcomes that matter ranging from public good production and poverty to human rights and conflict, understanding the political economy of non-democracies will help students make sense of the public policy contexts of most developing countries.

The sessions will deal with the following questions: how do non-democratic leaders survive in office? What are the political incentives at work in different types of autocracies with respect to public policy making? Are economic policies and outcomes independent from the political constraints of the regime? Are there certain social groups empowered by autocrats at the expense of other marginalized constituencies? What role does repression play in autocracies? Why do we observe democratic features such as elections and legislative institutions co-existing with it?

The course is structured around four themes: key actors in non-democratic politics, authoritarian political institutions, public policy-making in non-democracies, and regime vulnerabilities. The coverage of the topics will be both theoretical and geographical. The course format will alternate between lectures and concrete case studies co-designed by students and instructor. As a rule of thumb, every theme develops over two consecutive sessions. The first will expose course takers to general debates and empirics, whereas the second will apply the theoretical concepts to a specific case. Some sessions will feature interactive activities and documentary film selections. The final assignment for participants will be based on original research with primary documents from the Open Society Archives.

**Course requirements**

Attendance is mandatory. Exceptions are allowed only in cases complying with the general university attendance policy, and following the approval of the instructor. Students are required to complete all assigned readings prior to class. The course is designed in an interactive manner, and will allocate time for lecture and interactive activities.

Electronics are permitted in class only as long as their use is strictly related to the course.

**Good academic practices**

Academic dishonesty – plagiarism, cheating, breaking other norms stipulated by the CEU Code of Ethics - will result in a failing grade. For detailed information on what constitutes plagiarism or cheating and their serious consequences, please go to the following link:

<http://archive.ceu.hu/sites/default/files/P-1009-1%20v%201211%20Code%20of%20Ethics_final.pdf>

**Learning outcomes**

By the end of the course, students are expected to be familiar with major theoretical debates and findings related to public policies in non-democracies, as well as to improve their primary research skills.

**Grading policy**

The final course grade will evaluate the completion of the following assignments:

1. *Reading notes (20%)* You are expected to submit one reaction-to-readings paragraph 24 hours before the first session of each theme (12 entries in total). These submissions to Moodle should cover three areas: a) the one most important point that you take away from the readings assigned that week; b) a one-sentence critique to an argument; c) one question to guide class discussion.
2. *One individual diary entry (20%) and participation in the case study (10%):* Throughout the course, for the second session of each theme, you will keep a diary on an autocratic regime or leader of your choice. Each entry is expected to link the relevant theme to what you discover during research.
3. *Final paper (40%):* students are expected to write a 15-20 page research paper on any feature of autocratic politics, based on primary documents from the Open Society Archives. This assignment receives 40%.
4. *Participation and discussion* (10%) To receive the maximum number of points for class participation, you must arrive on time, miss no more than one class, and contribute to the class discussion every week.

At the end of the semester, the final score is converted to a letter grade according to the CEU grading scale, as follows:

**A** 3.68 – 4.00

**A-** 3.34 – 3.67

**B+** 3.01 – 3.33

**B** 2.68 – 3.00

**B-** 2.34 – 2.67

**C+** 2.33 (minimum pass)

Additional information concerning grading procedures and specifications for turning in the assignments is also included in the CEU School of Public Policy Student Manual.

**Two useful textbooks:**

Clark,William Roberts, Matt Golder, and Sonal N. Golder. 2013. *Principles of Comparative Politics 2nd edition.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Siaroff, Alan. 2009. *Comparing Political Regimes: A Thematic Introduction to Comparative Politics 2nd edition.* Toronto: Higher Education University of Toronto.

**Essential books on the politics and economics of dictatorships**[[1]](#footnote-1)

Ames, Barry. 1987. *Political Survival: Politicians and Public Policy in Latin America.* Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Alastair Smith. 2011. *Dictator’s Handbook. Why Bad Behavior is Almost Always Good Politics*. Philadelphia, PA: Public Affairs.

Blaydes, Lisa. 2010. *Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt.* Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow. 2003. *The Logic of Political Survival.* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Gandhi, Jennifer. 2008. *Political Institutions under Dictatorship*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press

Geddes, Barbara. 2003. *Paradigms and Sandcastles. Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics.* Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan.

Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan Way. 2010. *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War.* Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Lust-Okar, Ellen. 2005. *Structuring Conflict in the Arab world: Incumbents, Opponents, and Institutions.* Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Magaloni, Beatriz. 2006. *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico.* Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Wintrobe, Ronald. 1998. *The Political Economy of Dictatorship.* Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

1. **Why is the study of non-democracy important for public policy?**

**January 11 (housekeeping)**

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Alastair Smith. 2011. *Dictator’s Handbook. Why Bad Behavior is Almost Always Good Politics*. Philadelphia, PA: Public Affairs. Pages 21-75

**January 11 (How do we study autocracies? Technical and epistemological challenges)**

Svolik, Milan. 2013. "Incentives, Institutions, and the Challenges to Research on Authoritarian Politics." *APSA Comparative Democratization Newsletter* 11.2

Brancati, Dawn. 2014. "Democratic Authoritarianism: Origins and Effects." *Annual Review of Political Science.* 17(X)

1. **Varieties of non-democratic regimes and leaders**

**What is a non-democratic system of government? What types of non-democratic regimes are there? What are their defining institutions?**

**January 18: Types of regimes**

Linz, Juan and Alfred, Stepan. 1996. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, South America, and Post-communist Europe.* Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press: Chapter 3.

Hadenius, Axel, and Jan Teorell. 2007. "Pathways from Authoritarianism." *Journal of Democracy* 18 (1):143-157.

Geddes, Barbara. 2003. *Paradigms and Sandcastles. Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics.* Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan. Appendix A.

*Recommended:*

Remmer, Karen. "Evaluating the Policy Impact of Military Regimes in Latin America." *Latin American Research Review* 13, no. 2 (1978): 39-54.

Diamond, Larry. 2002. "Thinking About Hybrid Regimes." *Journal of Democracy* 13(2): 21-35.

**January 18: Types of leaders**

Wintrobe, Ronald. 1998. The Political Economy of Dictatorship. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Pages 3-104

*Recommended:*

BBC News Magazine. December 5, 2014. “What Do Dictators Like to Eat?” Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-30313326

**Case studies:**

***Singapore:***

Zakaria, Fareed. 1994. “Culture is Destiny. A Conversation with Lee Kwan Yew” *Foreign Affairs* 73(2): 109

***Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, and Uganda***

Decalo, Samuel. 1998. *Psychoses of Power: African Personal Dictatorships*. Florida Academic Press

1. **Leaders, parties, bureaucracies in non-democratic politics**

**January 25: Bureaucracies, parties, armies, and secret services in autocracies**

Brownlee, Jason. 2008. "Bound to Rule: Party Institutions and Regime Trajectories in Malaysia and the Philippines," *Journal of East Asian Studies* (January)

Svolik, Milan. 2013. "Contracting on Violence: Moral Hazard in Authoritarian Repression and Military Intervention in Politics." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (X)

Geddes, Barbara. 2009. How Autocrats Defend Themselves Against Armed Rivals. APSA Toronto Meeting Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1451601

Recommended:

Michael Albertus, and Victor Menaldo. 2012. “Dictators as Founding Fathers? The Role of Constitutions under Autocracy” *Economics and Politics* 24(3): 279-306.

**January 25**

**Case study: Egypt**

Brownlee, Jason. 2008. "The Heir Apparency of Gamal Mubarak," *Arab Studies Journal* (Spring).

1. **Leaders and their coalitions of support**

**February 1: Businesses, unions, and interest groups in autocracies**

Bellin, Eva. 2000. "Contingent Democrats: Industrialists, Labor, and Democratization in Late-Developing Countries." *World Politics* 52(2): 175-205.

Darden, Keith A. 2001. "Blackmail as a Tool of State Domination: Ukraine under Kuchma." *East European Constitutional* *Review* 10: 67.

Haber, Maurer, and Razo. 2003. *The Politics of Property Rights*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press: Chapter on industry

**February 1: Public support, trust, distrust, middle class, de-politicization**

Geddes, Barbara, and John Zaller. 1989. “Sources of Popular Support for Authoritarian Regimes” *American Journal of Political Science* 33(2): 319-347.

Schedler, Andreas. 2002. "The Menu of Manipulation." *Journal of Democracy* 13(2): 36-50.

Diwan, Ishak. 2013. “Understanding Revolution in the Middle East: The Central Role of the Middle Class” *Middle East Development Journal* 5(1).

**Case study: Morocco**

Maghraoui, Abdeslam M. 2002. "Depoliticization in Morocco" Journal of Democracy 13(4): 24-32.

Cohen, Shana. 2003. "Alienation and Globalization in Morocco: Addressing the Social and Political Impact of Market Integration." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 45(01): 168-189.

1. **Autocrats and human rights**

**February 8**

Vatulescu, Cristina. 2004. “Arresting Biographies: The Secret Police File in the Soviet Union and Romania.” *Comparative Literature* 56(3): 243-261.

Vreeland, J. R. 2008. "Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships Enter into the United Nations Convention Against Torture." *International Organization* 62(1): 65.

**February 18 - Case study**

**Tony Judt + Tamara Ratz on the House of Terrors in Budapest**

**Group visit to Terrorhaza**

1. **Autocrats, taxation, spending, development, public services**

**February 15: Taxation and spending**

Blaydes, Lisa. 2010. *Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt.* Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, pages 64-77.

Wintrobe, Ronald. 1998*. The Political Economy of Dictatorship.* Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, pages 127-160.

Mulligan, Casey, Ricard Gil, and Xavier Sala-i-Martin. 2004. "Do Democracies Have Different Public Policies Than Non-democracies?" *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 18(1): 51–74.

*Recommended:*

Cheibub, Jose A. 1998. "Political Regimes and the Extractive Capacity of Governments: Taxation in Democracies and Dictatorships." *World Politics* 50(3): 349-76.

Hausken, Kjell, Christian W. Martin, and Thomas Plümper. 2004. "Government Spending and Taxation in Democracies and Autocracies." *Constitutional Political Economy* 15(3): 239-59.

McGuire, Martin C, and Mancur Olson. 1996. "The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule." *Journal of Economic Literature* 34(1): 72-96.

**February 15: Public services, welfare regimes, economic development**

Olson, Mancur. 1993. “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development.” *American Political Science Review* 87(3): 567-576

Mares, Isabela, and Mathew Carnes. 2009. ‘Social Policy in Developing Countries’, *Annual Review of Political Science* 12: 93-113.

Deacon, Robert T., and Sarani Saha. 2006. "Public Goods Provision under Dictatorship and Democracy." In *The Elgar Companion to Public Economics: Empirical Public Economics*, edited by Attiat F. Ott and Richard J. Cebula. 75-90. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.

**Case study: Cuba**

Corrales, J. "The Gatekeeper State: Limited Economic Reforms and Regime Survival in Cuba, 1989-2002." *Latin American Research Review* (2004): 35-65.

1. **Autocrats, rent-seeking, corruption**

**February 22**

Heydemann, Steven. 2004. *Networks of Privilege in the Middle East: The Politics of Economic Reform Revisited.* Palgrave MacMillan. pages 37-77

McMillan, John and Pablo Zoido. 2004. “How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru,” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* (Fall): 69-92.

Marcouiller, Douglas, and Leslie Young. 1995. "The Black Hole of Graft: The Predatory State and the Informal Economy." *American Economic Review* 85(3): 630-46.

**Case study: Jordan**

Heydemann, 133-166

1. **Autocrats, investment, and growth**

**February 22**

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow. 2003. *The Logic of Political Survival.* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pages 129-171

Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990.* New York: Cambridge University Press, pages 106-122, 142-178

*Recommended:*

Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson. 2012. *Why Nations Fail? The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty.* New York: Crown Publishing, chapter 3

**Case study: China (TBA)**

**March 1: Autocrats, political risk, and foreign investors**

Jensen, Nathan et al. 2012*. Politics and Foreign Direct Investment.* Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, pages 27-52.

Gilson, Ronald J., and Curtis J. Milhaupt. 2011. “Benevolent Dictators: Lessons for Developing Democracies” *American Journal of Comparative Law* 59(1): 227-288.

*Recommended:*

Li, Quan. 2009. “Democracy, Autocracy, and Expropriation of Foreign Direct Investment” *Comparative Political Studies* 42(8): 1098-1127.

**Case studies: Congo, Burma (TBA)**

1. **Information and commitment dilemmas in non-democracies**

**March 1 - Elections, information, and policy outcomes**

Gandhi, Jennifer, and Ellen Lust-Okar. 2009. "Elections under Authoritarianism." *Annual Review of Political Science* 12: 403-422.

Miller, Michael K. 2014. Elections, Information, and Policy Responsiveness in Autocratic Regimes. *Comparative Political Studies* X(X)

Lust-Okar, Ellen. 2009. "Competitive Clientelism in the Middle East." *Journal of Democracy* 20(3): 122-35.

**March 8 – Credible commitment problems** **and solutions**

Gehlbach, Scott, and Philip Keefer. 2011. “Investment without Democracy: Ruling-Party Institutionalization and Credible Commitment in Autocracies.” *Journal of Comparative Economics* 39 (2): 123–39.

Haber, S. H., A. Razo, and N. Maurer. 2003*. The Politics of Property Rights: Political Instability, Credible Commitments, and Economic Growth in Mexico, 1876–1929.* New York: Cambridge University Press. Pages 18-30

**Case studies: Iran and Venezuela**

World Bank. 2005. “The Islamic Republic of Iran. Report on Public Financial Management, Procurement, and Expenditure Systems in Iran.” Washington, DC

Monaldi, F. 2001. “Sunk-Costs, Institutions, and Commitment: Foreign Investment in the Venezuelan Oil Industry.” Unpublished manuscript, Stanford University, Department of Political Science

1. **Democratic processes in non-democracies (public deliberation, transparency, accountability)**

**March 8: Open institutions and public spaces of deliberation in autocracies**

Gandhi, Jennifer. 2008. *Political Institutions under Dictatorship*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, pages TBA

Chandra, Siddarth, and Nita Rudra. 2014. “Reassessing the Links between Regime Type and Economic Performance: Why Some Authoritarian Regimes Show Stable Growth and Others Do Not” *British Journal of Political Science* (X)X: 1-33

Wedeen, Lisa. 2007. “The Politics of Deliberation: Qat Chews as Public Spheres in Yemen.” *Public Culture* 19(1): 59-84.

*Recommended:*

Wright, J. 2008. "Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain? How Legislatures Affect Economic Growth and Investment." *American Journal of Political Science* 52(2): 322-43.

**March 15: Policy responsiveness in authoritarian parliaments**

Gandhi, Jennifer, and Adam Przeworski. 2007. "Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats*." Comparative Political Studies* 40 (11):1279-1301.

Malesky, Edmund, and Paul Schuler. 2010. Nodding or Needling: Analyzing Delegate Responsiveness in an Authoritarian Parliament. *American Political Science Review* 104(3): 482-502.

**Case study: Tunisia**

Hibou, Beatrice. 2011. *The Force of Obedience. The Political Economy of Repression in Tunisia.* Cambridge: Polity Press, pages 77-132

1. **Quick sands: fragility, vulnerability, transitions**

**March 15:** **Anticipating potential transitions**

Acemoglu, Daron, Tarek A. Hassan, and Ahmed Tahoun. 2014. “The Power of the Street: Evidence from Egypt’s Arab Spring” *NBER Working Paper Series*: WP 20665.

Bunce, Valerie, and Susan Wolchik. 2010. “Defeating Dictators: Electoral Change and Stability in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes” *World Politics* 62(01): 43-86

Fisman, Raymond. 2001. “Estimating the Value of Political Connections.” *American Economic Review* 91(4): 1095-1102.

**March 22: Diagnosing and misdiagnosing regime vulnerabilities**

Marinov, Nikolay. 2005. "Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?" *American Journal of Political* Science 49(3): 564-76.

Robertson, Graeme. 2007. “Strikes and Labor Organization in Hybrid Regimes.” *American Political Science Review* 101(4): 781-98

Kuran, Timur. 1991. “Now out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989.” *World Politics* 44(1): 7-48.

**Case study: student examples**

1. **Student presentations of preliminary findings from the OSA archive**

**March 29**

1. Relevant excerpts are uploaded on the Moodle website for the course. Full books are available for temporary loan on the SPP Required Reading Shelf in the CEU library. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)