

SCHOENBERG AND HIS WORLD

EDITED BY WALTER FRISCH

Schoenberg and the Audience: Modernism, Music, and Politics in the Twentieth Century

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I. Polemical Preliminaries

These festival weeks have had nothing to do with music. Schoenberg's followers have overdone it. What the consequence of the absolute domination by dodecaphony will be . . . is that in ten years, I am convinced, no one will talk about the twelve-tone system.

—G.F. Malipiero, June 1932¹

It seems that the last twenty years of eclecticism in contemporary music may have finally undone what "Schoenberg's followers" have "overdone" for nearly half a century. It is now respectable and even fashionable to concede that perhaps audiences have been right all along. Abstract, inaccessible, unfriendly, harsh, hard to follow, dense, even boring are still the adjectives applied by most concert-goers to Arnold Schoenberg's music. The twentieth-century composer, once most highly respected by generations of academics, whose music and theoretical writings reveal a daunting intellect and capacity for analysis, and whose own legendary contempt for others became routinized posthumously among those who specialized in his defense, now appears entirely vulnerable.² With a slight edge of delight, critics are increasingly able to declare—along with Malipiero, and only superficially in imitation of Boulez, decades later—that Schoenberg is "dead."

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Although thinking and writing about Schoenberg remain valued academic pursuits, to the public beyond academic circles Schoenberg, except for a few early works, commands little spontaneous affection, and at best a grudging respect.³ If his music is as great as he and his disciples claimed, why does it remain so difficult, so merely intellectual for so many; why after three quarters of a century are essays in the genre of Alban Berg's 1924 classic "Why is Schoenberg's Music so Difficult to Understand?" still appropriate?

Five basic factors currently stand in way of a sympathetic reconsideration of Schoenberg. First and foremost is the success of the so-called "post-modern." With the collapse of the perceived tyranny of those who viewed Schoenberg as the true prophet of new music, voices have emerged (some of them repentant former adherents to the cause) who actually relish the slaughter of the main sacred cow.⁴ From 1945 until the early 1980s, the accepted wisdom among composers and scholars echoed Ernst Křenek's closing comments at the Second International Schoenberg Conference in Vienna in 1984: Schoenberg and the Second Viennese School had altered musical thinking forever. No composer in the future would be able to circumvent Schoenberg and his influence, even if he was to write minimalist and tonal music. Just fifteen years later most successful younger contemporary composers appear to have paid little or no attention to Schoenberg.⁵ This has altered the paradigm of the history of twentieth century music that held sway into the mid-1970s, in which Schoenberg played the central role.

Second is the accumulated weight of sustained historical reevaluation. Those who question how modern Schoenberg really was challenge a facile equivalence between the terms "modernist" or "avant-garde" and the twentieth century. Perhaps, they seem to say, modernism in the sense of Schoenberg and his school refers merely to one limited historical period and group within the twentieth century. Or there is the line of argument first put forth decades ago independently by Pierre Boulez and Elliott Carter questioning how far Schoenberg had really traveled from a dependency on late nineteenth-century musical models. Were not Webern, Varèse, Ives, Messiaen, and even Stravinsky equally innovative and significant?⁶ This differentiation within modernism sought to help emancipate post-World War II composition from too exclusive a bias in favor of Schoenberg. A divergent view of the century and modernity emerges from these types of revisionism, one in which Schoenberg holds merely one place of prominence among many. Schoenberg may have been less a radical conservative and more a radical reactionary, one who carried Wagner's

belief in a progressive imperative for music to an absurd extreme into an age in which history would no longer matter.⁷

By refusing to see Schoenberg as the pivotal figure in the history of twentieth-century music, these revisionists create a third factor: they detach Schoenberg's music and its aesthetic and historical valuation from the social and political projects to which it was once inextricably linked. During the 1920s, Hanns Eisler, who retained an unqualified admiration for Schoenberg, his teacher, was among the first in Schoenberg's circle to speculate independently about the function of new music in modernity.⁸ Schoenberg's modernism consistently offended its audience. If that audience had been merely made up of smug owners of capital and their bourgeois apologists, there might have seemed something redeemingly "progressive" about Schoenberg's brand of modernism. But the failure of Schoenberg's modernism to gain any audience beyond its own elite of admirers—however constituted—revealed just how hollow were his supporters' appeals to historical necessity or a Platonic belief system that legislated a normative ideal of musical thought and form and therefore a typology of proper listening.⁹

Since Schoenberg's brand of innovation as well as his Jewish identity became the focus of anti-Semitic right-wing politics early in the 1920s and later the object of Nazi persecution in the 1930s, the dissonances between the progressive in politics and the modernist in music were left unresolved. The alliance between the two went largely unquestioned for decades, even well after 1945. In the context of Cold War politics, Eisler's challenge to Schoenberg and his school from the left could be discredited as "Stalinist" and reactionary, while Schoenberg's brand of modernism continued, until the late 1960s, to appear as a non-subversive but forward-looking contemporary line of defense of individuality and freedom against uniformity and tyranny within the "free world."

Adorno's analysis of Schoenberg and his influence created a powerful critical and philosophical framework that buttressed Schoenberg's post-war influence, particularly in academic circles.¹⁰ According to this line of interpretation, modernism in music of the sort audible in Webern and in the work of the younger composers supported at Darmstadt and Donaueschingen in the 1950s and 1960s eloquently confronted the corrupting influences represented in the West by commercialism and mass society, the very ills that had helped fascism succeed.

With the receding prestige of socialist and progressive politics in the early 1980s, the growing critique of the liberal welfare state in

England and America and ultimately the collapse of Communism and fall of the Berlin Wall, the critique of capitalist culture and society put forward by Adorno and other Frankfurt School contemporaries, particularly Herbert Marcuse, became less attractive in the West to new generations of young people. Schoenberg and his notions of musical modernism were gradually detached from a plausible justifying political and historical logic locating them on the side of freedom and anti-fascism, and therefore of the angels.

While the later twentieth century heirs of the left have largely rejected modernism in favor of popular musical culture as an important dimension of political resistance, neo-conservatives have taken their own peculiar revenge on Schoenberg. Some have risen to Schoenberg's defense, citing his work and legacy as a bulwark against the collapse of cultural standards after the mid-1960s. Other neo-conservatives, however, have delighted in the idea that the largely liberal and left-wing post-war academic community's "emperor had no clothes" after all.¹¹

The fourth factor working against Schoenberg is the reemergence of an empirical and principled set of arguments prevalent at the turn of the century that defend tonality (or something very much like it) as natural and objective.¹² According to this argument, which makes an appeal to normative philosophy, psychology, and physics, certain ways of organizing sound and time in music correspond to facts and laws of nature. In the early twentieth century, Schoenberg found himself on the side of those who argued against the idea that the Western system of harmony was privileged and rooted in nature, rendering tonality normative and objective. The sophisticated revival of the idea of a "natural" music has been fueled partly by linguistic theory (e.g. Chomsky and generative grammar), language philosophy (from the late Wittgenstein on) and the analysis of syntax.

Theorists as disparate in their approaches as Boretz and Epstein have suggested that when we look carefully at music as a reflexive system of communication we need to explain rather than dismiss the failure of any music to gain response, engage listeners or be easily preserved in memory. Perhaps it is not tonality that is natural. But the need for particularly evident patterns in music: repetition, focal points, continuities, tensions, resolutions and regularity—the accumulation of classes of events that can be processed and associated readily by the brain—may be universal. Schoenberg's modernism may lack these requirements because of an inherent conflict between the way we are as humans and the way twelve-tone music is organized. The wide dissemination (or to put it more plainly, the popularity) of

a form of music need not be considered a sign of vulgarity, ignorance or concession to corrupt fashion or style. Populist politics and high theory have now merged: Schoenberg's brand of modernism, particularly in its twelve-tone phase, becomes a failed experiment that cannot intersect effectively with wider human experience cognitively and therefore either aesthetically or politically.

The fifth and final barrier to a sympathetic rehearing of Schoenberg today is ironically the difficulty we have in transcending the accumulated traditional rhetoric of criticism and defense surrounding the question of Schoenberg. Schoenberg and his disciples in the 1920s can be compared properly to the circle around the poet Stefan George, to whose work Schoenberg turned at a pivotal moment when the composer took a decisive step away from tonality.¹³ But the most apt comparison is with Richard Wagner. Not only did they both have disciples and demand uncommon degrees of loyalty from their followers, but Wagner and Schoenberg invented and institutionalized a rhetoric of self-defense and description. They both brilliantly placed themselves within music history and connected their work to past and future. Institutions designed to preserve and defend the Schoenberg legacy were created, first in Los Angeles, then in Vienna.¹⁴ Schools of composition and criticism that developed after 1945 relied heavily on Schoenberg's analysis of compositional methods, his views on form and structure, and his readings of Mozart and Brahms. To generations of Schoenberg admirers, followers and scholars, any departure from this self-constituted (or auto-poetic) code of discourse of defense and description was tantamount to ignorance or betrayal.

Schoenberg's philosophy of music and his logic of self-estimation have cast a decisive shadow over music theory and musicology in this century. Whether it is the concept of "idea" (as opposed to "style"), the "Grundgestalt," "developing variation," the "emancipation of the dissonance" or the relation of music and text, the way Schoenberg thought and wrote about music and its meaning has had perhaps more influence in the arenas of performance practice and critical approaches to music in this century than his own music has had on the writing of new music. At the end of this century, almost fifty years after Schoenberg's death, it is in part the institutionalized charisma of Schoenberg the teacher and theorist that retards a new appreciation of his music. Perhaps if we successfully challenge the rhetoric of Schoenberg and his most ardent posthumous defenders, we will be able to open up new avenues of access to his music.

II. Music and Psychology

TO MUSIC

Music: breath of statues. Perhaps:
stillness of paintings. You language where languages
end. You time,
placed vertically on the course of hearts that expire.

Feelings . . . for whom? O you the transformation
of feelings . . . into what?—: into audible landscape.
You stranger: music. You heartspace
grown out of us. Innermost thing of ours,
which, exceeding us, forces us out, —
sacred farewell:
when the inner surrounds us
as the most practiced distance, as the other side
of the air:
pure,
like a giant,
no longer livable.

—R. M. Rilke, Munich, January 11–12, 1918¹⁵

In 1926 the Polish composer Karol Szymanowski completed a draft of an essay on contemporary music. It was not published in his lifetime and appeared first in 1958 (see Appendix, p. 47).¹⁶ In it, Szymanowski argues that Schoenberg alone represents a true break with the past; Schoenberg was the only one to “cross the Rubicon” into modernity. Szymanowski understands Debussy, Stravinsky and Strauss as tied to pre-war traditions. At the same time Szymanowski remains entirely aware of the extent to which Schoenberg is not just a European but distinctly a German. He clearly identifies Schoenberg with a tradition of German composition and sees him as the heir to Wagner: the composer who represents the future of German music. Szymanowski echoes Berg’s 1924 conclusion that Schoenberg would “predominate in German music for the next fifty years.”¹⁷ Yet Szymanowski accepts the universal consequences of Schoenberg’s achievement. He is unstinting in his praise and admiration for Schoenberg’s philosophical vocabulary and rhetoric of self-assessment. The essay is curious in part because Szymanowski—unlike Stravinsky and Copland later on in the 1960s—

never sought to emulate Schoenberg in his own approach to composition by experimenting with twelve-tone composition.¹⁸

What struck Szymanowski was Schoenberg’s remarkable sojourn from Wagnerism to a new modernism. No other composer had worked so well in the pre-World War I expressionist idiom and yet had shown the courage to break away. The decisive step was the explicit severing of a long tradition of parallelism between musical form and structure and “direct psychological truth.” Schoenberg put forward a notion of absolute music that cut against the traditions of emotional response and attachment to music so eloquently witnessed by Rilke’s 1918 poem. Yet Szymanowski remained ambivalent about this. On the one hand, the “natural” development of music required that music somehow become finally independent, in the twentieth century, of reality and life, and reverse the exaggerated emotionalism of romanticism. Szymanowski shared a Hanslick-like prejudice about the inherently “absolute” non-representational character of music. On the other hand, he realized the power of an historical achievement, beginning in the nineteenth century and culminating with expressionism, in which the “horizontal” dimension of music became gradually influenced by the vertical, creating an “enriched” sound world which, metaphorically speaking, ran parallel with the “lyrics of direct life reality.” Music became “rooted in life’s psychological rhythm,” just as Rilke suggests in his response to hearing music. Extended tonality and extreme chromaticism, strengthened by the expanded palette of orchestral sound, made the Rilke-like parallelism between feeling and sound irresistible.

Schoenberg brought this historical process to completion and ultimately abandoned the residual framework of the “horizontal”; the “vertical” dimension of music was placed in the foreground. He rendered the “vertical” in music absolute. Gone were issues of “mood” and “color” or even the contrast between the static and the dynamic highlighted by modulation. The “absolute vertical” found a value in itself, not as a function of musical “expression.” This led to “the essential atomism” of Schoenberg’s modernism, by which Szymanowski means the twelve-tone compositional breakthrough of the 1920s. Szymanowski’s essay ends abruptly, incomplete, with praise for Schoenberg’s ethical authenticity and seriousness as well as a reference to the consequences of the opening up of a “limitless domain” in which truth became subjective and relative. Schoenberg had created a space in which everything seemed now permissible.

Crucial to the contemporary and posthumous defense of Schoenberg and the modernist tradition linked to his innovations

from the 1920s has been an explicit and implicit assent to his critique of the traditions and character of how audiences listened, followed and understood music. An audience that was truly musically literate, which thought purely musically i.e. could grasp music without any refuge in psychological allegory, either of narrative or mood—such an audience could truly appreciate the music of Schoenberg and his followers. As Schoenberg himself pointed out, his greatest success as a composer derived from his capacity, in his pre-twelve-tone music, to facilitate with great originality and inventiveness the listener's capacity to listen allegorically and through the use of allusion, without refuge in illustration or representation. Furthermore, as Szymanowski observed, the extension of tonality and the virtuosity in the use of modulation displayed by Schoenberg in *Gurrelieder*, for example, expanded the utility of music as a framework—independent of the text—for internal psychological reflection on the part of the listener. But then Schoenberg stopped himself and history short, interrupting the continuity of these traditions. (A typical pictorial representation of the sort of listening common at the end of the nineteenth century is the 1895 painting by the English painter Francis Dicksee [1853–1928], entitled *A Reverie*, reproduced in figure 1.)




Figure 1: Francis Dicksee, *A Reverie*

One can locate the cause for the widespread contemporary and posthumous perception that Schoenberg was the creator of a unique radical modernism in precisely this interruption, the self-conscious break with the parallelism between music and life (and therefore language) as expressed in the expectations of generations of European composers and audiences. By creating a new mode of pitch relationship and therefore a new basis for constructing the basic cells or thematic elements for works of music, Schoenberg in the 1920s explicitly attacked the dominant habit of listening within nineteenth-century musical culture, rendering it irrelevant and useless. With the fundamental abandonment of tonality, music lost its connection to the Rilke-like internal psychological dialogue conducted by the individual and therefore, as Szymanowski suggests, its evident connection to life. The aesthetic dimension had been emancipated from the psychologically instrumental. But the question remained: into what and for what?¹⁹

It is well to remember that many of Schoenberg's earliest and most ardent defenders and advocates were young listeners who sought a new and different inspiration from music; they were not professional musicians or critics. Consider for example the fascinating fragment by Arnold Zweig from 1913 entitled "A Quartet Movement by Schoenberg."²⁰ In this short prose work Schoenberg emerges as the prophetic and triumphant outsider who has arrived to rescue Europe through art exactly one hundred years after Napoleon's defeat at the battle of Leipzig in 1813. The story takes place in 1913. An Eastern European Jew is on his way to Palestine. After travelling through Berlin he visits his brother in Leipzig. The young man, the protagonist, is both impressed and revolted by the middle-class opulence and self-satisfaction evident in the architecture and the people he encounters in Leipzig. In Leipzig the sound of the Saxon dialect reminds him of the French and of Napoleon. The reunion with his brother is unsatisfactory. He becomes bored.

He wanders into a concert without seeing what is on the program. It is a quartet concert. The first work is by Haydn and the young man is lost in a quite typical reverie. He dreams of nature and the simple pleasures of life. A pre-modern idyllic world appears before his eyes. After enthusiastic applause the quartet plays the next work. The audience is stunned; it does not know how to react. But the young man is transported. He is inspired: he senses through the music the power of modernity, the city, and of science and progress. He also senses the alienation of the modern individual. He perceives the extent to which an excessive optimism about modernity prevalent within the audience has gone awry. A nameless artist, the composer of this new music,

reveals through sounds the contradictions of modernity and truthfully celebrates the possibilities of cultural renewal.²¹ Aesthetic innovation and ethical truth merge in the music.

Although the audience is at a loss, the young man leaves the concert hall suddenly seized by doubt about his own plans to leave Europe for the more primitive and yet-to-be-realized new social order of Palestine. As he wanders about on his way to the train station to resume his journey, he sees a poster and notices the name of the composer whose music he has just heard: Arnold Schoenberg, a fellow Jew. Although he proceeds with his plans, he senses that he must ultimately return to Europe to take on the cause of the rebirth of European culture along the path set forth by Schoenberg. Schoenberg's music has awakened the young man to the idea that he has not exhausted his identity as a European. A sense of homelessness, triggered by the pogroms in the East he is fleeing, has been assuaged by the music. The possibilities for a cultural and political future, for internal personal are rekindled, forcing him to reconsider his Zionism, his life's plan and his sense of self. The story ends with the hero repeating the words "O return, o return."

It is more than likely that the music Zweig had in mind was either Schoenberg's Op. 7 or Op. 10, both of which were performed in Berlin in 1912 and 1913, the year the fragment was written.²² Zweig therefore implicitly refers to at least two works which created a great uproar in Schoenberg's career and helped established his reputation as a radical. (At issue, therefore, is not *Verklärte Nacht* or *Gurrelieder*.) Although the music Zweig alludes to is not the same repertoire Szymanowski discusses, Schoenberg's break with the past was well underway in Opp. 9 and 10. Op. 7, however, possessed a "very definite but private program."²³ Nevertheless, Szymanowski's 1926 construct of Schoenberg's project can be applied to Op. 7, Op. 9, and Op. 10. Despite the presence of poetic texts, Schoenberg's first decisive breaks with habits of listening based on psychological parallelism between musical space and time and real life sensibilities, particularly the internal clock of reflection, took place before the invention of twelve-tone composition, particularly in Op. 9.

Zweig's account is all the more remarkable for its political overtones. Indeed, as the story develops Schoenberg functions for the young man as modernity's Napoleon: the new-world historical hero from humble origins. Napoleon was a hero to most Jews because of his role in their emancipation. The image of the Jewish composer as a new Napoleon redeeming the possibilities of European culture in the name of freedom, ethical progress, and enlightened modernity, fits

quite closely to Schoenberg's own self-assessment before his stunning and disillusioning encounter with anti-Semitism in the 1920s.²⁴ Zweig and Schoenberg also implicitly agree in their critique of the pre-World War I audience. Zweig gives us a picture of an uncomprehending group of affluent middle-class Europeans, suffused with culture, who delighted only in the familiar. There is however no description of booing or hissing, as took place in Vienna. Zweig's account of his fellow audience members is critical but not entirely dismissive (the experience after all raises his hopes about the use of art as an instrument of cultural and social renewal). One comes away from the fragment with a sense that confronting the public with a radical new art may in fact set in motion a social and political transformation.

Leaving aside the many implications imbedded in Zweig's strange story, it is curious that Zweig's protagonist's habit of listening did not change with the music. He listened to Schoenberg the way he listened to Haydn. Indeed, one way to understand what was going on in concert halls between the years 1909 and 1913 at performances of Schoenberg's music—events that attracted furious response and intensive critical attention—is to concentrate on one consistent thread within the notion of psychological listening shared by Zweig's protagonist, his audience, and one which is implicit in Szymanowski's analysis: the act of listening with the visual imagination. Rilke confirms the pervasive attachment to music as inspiring of a species of sight; music is the breathing statue, the stillness of paintings, the audible landscape.

The visual imagery inspired by the idea of music at the turn of the century, particularly in light of Schoenberg's own brief career as a painter and his life-long engagement with the connection between the musical and the visual, merits close historical scrutiny. What changes in Zweig's story is the substance and character of that which is visualized or imagined through music. It is in turn the perceived failure of this mode of listening to music that drove Schoenberg, after World War I, to the complete break with expressionism, a break whose courage so impressed Szymanowski.

The predominance of visualization by the listener in the presence of music led to the popularization of idealized iconographies during the second half of the nineteenth century—visual representations of the essence and nature of music. These were regularly displayed in the context of public music-making, particularly through architecture and design. One such example, with which Schoenberg and all his immediate Viennese contemporaries would have been familiar—was the curtain displayed at the performances of tragic opera at the Imperial Opera House in Vienna. A constant reminder was placed

before the audience of the parallels between the visual and the musical. Architecture and iconography were used to embody musical expectations and habits of listening. Even in Zweig's fragment, the narrative moves effortlessly from the description of architecture to the account of how music was heard. The painterly and architectural realizations of the character and nature of music prevalent in the late nineteenth century, and with which Schoenberg grew up, tell us much about the values and expectations of the audience.

Carl Rahl (1812–1865) designed the Vienna Opera curtain (commissioned by the opera house's architects) for tragic opera.²⁵ Rahl was highly respected as the leading forerunner of Hans Makart within the Viennese school of historical painting. The centerpiece of the curtain was an allegorical composition entitled *The Triumph of Harmony* (figure 2). First and foremost in it is the striking, albeit clichéd, link between the idea of harmony and classical architecture and mythology.²⁶ Rahl's composition is exactly symmetrical. At the center is a tempietto. In it is a throne on which king and queen are seated. The king's right foot marks the exact midpoint; below it is an



Figure 2: Carl Rahl, *The Triumph of Harmony*

altar with fire. All human emotions, from sorrow to contemplation and from fear to hope are embodied by figures arrayed around the altar and the throne. Truth and power are firmly rooted, stabilizing the widest range of human experience. The governing control of harmony is rendered concrete. Beneath and above this massive representation of the triumph of harmony over the wide-ranging intensities of human expression are somewhat smaller rectangular panels (figures 3 and 4) depicting the effect of song on human beings. Music, cast once more in the iconography of classical antiquity, is present in the singer, who, in turn, inspired by the unseen heavens, guides human emotion and reflection on the ship of time and through the stages of life. But it is harmony, not melody, which dominates the sense of truth in music. Melody (the horizontal) is subordinated in the curtain design, as is the idea of music with words.



Figure 3: Panel from Rahl, *The Triumph of Harmony*



Figure 4: Panel from Rahl, *The Triumph of Harmony*

Although truth in the triumph of harmony is elevated to normative status by the prestigious garb of antiquity in Rahl's tapestry, the connection between music and emotion is left ambiguous. Music (i.e. harmony and melody) does not function as an instrument of illustration or representation. The nature of music's special power to inspire the individual's emotion is left unseen. Only its effect is depicted. Music per se, divorced from its programmatic function (i.e. even in opera in its pre-Wagnerian construct, since Rahl's composition predates Wagner's influence in Vienna) provides the opportunity and

perhaps the illusion of individuality of response. In a cultural context in which uniformity, fueled in part by the scale and mechanization explicit in modernity, is understood as a threat, music becomes a resistant vehicle of personal emotion and self-realization. Music's popularity and the allegiance to what Szymanowski characterized as the psychological parallels were rooted in a Rahl-like conception of its essence: the capacity of the act of listening to music to reaffirm the authenticity of individuality in a manner that implied a fundamental reconciliation of the idea of an objective order with subjective differentiation. It is this prevalent illusion of the facile reconciliation of the contradictions spun by musical conventions that Schoenberg explicitly sought to challenge. Music appeared autonomous in that it was not descriptive of emotion, but yet it was a pure unseen instrument of human experience, adaptable by each person, founded on eternally valid rules.

At every performance of serious opera throughout Schoenberg's years in Vienna and therefore throughout Mahler's reign, audiences were reminded of this idealization: not of any particular style of music but of the essential character of all music. The prestige accorded to a system of music-making that ensured comprehensibility through the use of a stable harmonic system in which all human emotions could be channeled and expressed, cannot be underestimated. Represented in this manner, music reinforced an internalized belief system that went far beyond the realm of the aesthetic. When the audiences heard for example Op. 9 and Op. 10 in Vienna, the violent reaction that what they were hearing was not music, and that whatever it was was somehow socially and morally destructive, cannot be written off as a case of superficial philistinism. The audience had lost a fundamental reaffirmation of its own worth and individuality, cast within a cherished shared ritual of culture.

Viennese audiences were not inherently reactionary, ignorant or hostile to the new, as has often been argued. As Karl Kraus understood, the Viennese were all too eager for the new and the modern.²⁷ *Jugendstil* and the Secession (as well as their literary counterparts) enjoyed quick and easy acclaim in Vienna. Even Mahler's new productions designed by Alfred Roller were eagerly embraced, despite the reservations of some critics.²⁸ In the years 1907 to 1913, the old and the new in art and architecture lived comfortably side-by-side in the lives of the affluent middle class audience for the arts. The most successful operetta composer of the age and an admirer of Schoenberg (of whom Schoenberg in turn thought well) was Franz Lehár.²⁹ If one looks at the way Lehár furnished his 1909 Viennese

apartment one notices a seamless integration of Secession design, *Jugendstil*, and late nineteenth-century furniture and painting (figure 5).³⁰ Historicism and certain dimensions of modernism in design merge very comfortably. Functional, streamlined chairs and a more Spartan approach to ornament and space stand side-by-side with the elaborate gilded furniture and old-fashioned realist paintings and sculpture.




Figure 5: Apartment of Franz Lehár in Vienna

Josef Frank, the distinguished Viennese architect, would complain in the 1920s that radical modernism in the design of spaces for living frequently defied the psychological needs of human beings.³¹ Architects and designers, including Josef Hoffmann and later Le Corbusier (and sometimes Adolf Loos, despite himself) would insist that everything in a space had to be new, coherent and of a piece, down to the tableware. Modern architecture required the discarding of eclectic artifacts and items accumulated naturally over generations. When Frank participated in the design of workers' housing in Vienna in the late 1920s and early 1930s, he argued for simple white-walled functional interiors which permitted individuals to decorate their

homes with all the aesthetically inconsistent and seemingly contradictory clutter that mirrored their own life and family experience. To be psychologically at home meant rendering modernist domestic architecture in its interior spaces neutral, so that the occupant could individualize the space and not be ruled by the tyranny of a purist modernist ideology of aesthetic design and consistency.

Why then did a musical audience otherwise receptive to new directions in art, architecture and literature react particularly violently to Schoenberg as early as 1908? It would be simplistic to describe even the Viennese critics as incompetent and excessively conservative. Consider for example the repeated appeals by J. P. Gotthard, the Viennese composer and conductor (1839–1919). He wrote the summaries of the Viennese musical season for the *Wiener Almanach*, an annual journal on the Viennese scene in literature, art and public life. In 1911, commenting on the year gone by, he wrote:

Apart from a few exceptions, the programs of most performances in the 1911 season brought us things long known to us. This fact, when we consider the rigid conservatism of our performers, will not surprise anybody. The refusal to bring anything new on the part of performing artists is in step with music publishers who cannot be moved to publish works which do not already, in advance, promise successful sales. On the one hand we have the worship of Secessionist outbursts, and on the other hand we have the evaluation of the new from a purely commercial standpoint. Nowhere is there the prospect for a truly artistic-idealistic approach! In view of such a situation, what shall the young among the real composers do in order to realize their ideas so that they gain the chance to be taken seriously artistically? Neither in Vienna nor in the German empire does the Viennese composer find recognition and support. Indolence and cowardice hide behind the common excuse of having a surplus of manuscripts for many years to come! Dance music elevated to operetta dominates the day, and the rest is satisfied by the cabaret arts of the couplet poets and composers of the twentieth century.³²

It is not clear what Gotthard understood as a "real" (i.e. legitimately artistic) composer within the realm of the new; the phrase "Secessionist outbursts" may refer to Schoenberg. But it is not too speculative to assume that Gotthard's audience expected in music the moral equivalent of the Secession—a kind of new music whose style and character

could live side-by-side comfortably with the old, just as in the furnishings in Lehar's apartment. To some extent the music of Mahler played this role. Richard Strauss's music always did. Artistic music was considered "ideal" proportionately to its capacity to generate not so much moods, as images and a personalized inner narrative of some sort. Opponents of Strauss well into the Nazi era thought of his music as too "nervous" and "neurotic"; it was too effective as narrative and all too stimulating. It was decried as decadent (as opposed to degenerate).³³ The radical condensation of form in Schoenberg's Op. 9 and the strangeness of the instrumentation (in contrast to, for example, the 1916 *Kammersymphonie* of Franz Schreker) totally frustrated an audience accustomed to using musical time psychologically.³⁴

For Schoenberg the essence of the classical tradition had nothing to do with Rahl's imagery regarding the triumph of harmony. Music was not only autonomous in a cognitive sense but unstable (except perhaps in memory) and dynamic in its essence; it was not really susceptible to an architectural allegory. To Schoenberg the late nineteenth-century critics and audiences in fact never really understood classical compositional traditions and the classical heritage in music. Their allegiance to the transposition of music into classical architecture was emblematic of this fact. This explains why Schoenberg allied himself less with the artists associated with Mahler (e.g. Klimt, Moser, and Roller) and more with the radical expressionist group (Kokoschka and Schiele). They were the first to challenge the technical illusions of realism and representation in painting. But the difference between modernism in painting (with the exception of Kandinsky and his followers in non-objectivism), and music, was Schoenberg's search for an autonomous temporal structure clearly emancipated from the psychological-linguistic-visual nexus between sound and listener.³⁵ By abandoning repetition and the security of tonality as a memory-signpost and frame-of-reference for the listener, by pursuing instead immediate and radical thematic transformation, Schoenberg created a musical space which seemed unlivable and unusable.

From his beginnings in Op. 7 and particularly Op. 9, Schoenberg ultimately arrived at more than a revival of Hanslick's notion of absolute music. Hanslick's formalism merely argued that music should not be subordinated to or organized on the basis of the emotional, the visual, and the literary. He never believed that the hearing of music would be stripped of all possibilities for supplemental psychologizing within the framework of musical time constructed musically—that is to say, without personalized references to verbal narration, pictures, or the expression of emotion. Hanslick's point was not that great music could

not mean something to the listener in a form other than the purely musical. He admired Schumann, whose connection to the literary within the musical was overtly central to his music. Rather Hanslick felt that the inevitable extra-musical meanings were at best coincidental and supplemental, and should not serve as the basis upon which one writes music, defines its content, or judges the nature of its unique beauty. Implicit in this argument was that if music was well-composed without reference to the logic of the extra-musical, it probably worked better and in a more lasting manner over time in its subordinate and perhaps vulgar role as psychological backdrop.³⁶

In the rejection of the established psychological connections between listener and music, Schoenberg nonetheless sought to create music that itself might generate a different but equally powerful form of attachment. In this sense Adorno properly understood the radical implications of the twelve-tone strategy; it forced a critical and searching encounter with the present, through music. It did not provide an affirmative aesthetic, shielding the listener from a serious internal dialogue concerning the tensions between ordinary life in the modern world and the individual imagination.

In order to contextualize this conflict with inherited patterns of listening, one can consider comparisons to reading habits and literature. *Der Steppen* (1897), the last novel of Theodor Fontane (1819–98), the greatest German exponent of the novel prior to Thomas Mann, is an experiment in slowing down and distorting time, particularly for the reader. Following in the path of Adalbert Stifter's 1857 *Der Nachsommer*, Fontane adds the extensive use of dialogue in concert with description to create a novel without much action or plot, whose pace, through the use of language, undercuts the illusions of realism. Fontane makes easy reading difficult in order to generate critical distance. The clock of reading does not seem to run magically parallel to that of life experience (as, for example, in Balzac); rather the act of reading subverts and interrupts expectations, creating a new sense of time and space. The reader can then penetrate conventions and opinions as they appear imbedded not only in daily experience and the time of daily life, but in ordinary language. The next step beyond Fontane can be found in Joyce and Musil.

The intervention by Schoenberg represented the conscious desire to write music that presents intentional difficulties for the listener. The obstacles to staying with the music parallel contemporaneous experiments in prose writing and poetry. In prose fiction the radical instruments against the fiction of realism were repetition and the static. In Schoenberg, the means he employed prior to 1909 were

compression and constant alteration; the ultimate rejection of parallelisms then took place in the 1920s.³⁷

If, in fact, it was Schoenberg's ambition to shatter the foundations of musical expectation on the part of the listener by breaking the capacity to listen psychologically—to abandon, as Szymanowski suggests, an explicit psychologism in music—then it is clear from contemporary critical reaction that he succeeded well before the 1920s. Zweig's protagonist, after all, responded at best to general impressions and only to the contrasts with Haydn that the new music created. But he got a good deal of the message. Turning a negative contrast into a positive attribute in some general way was not Schoenberg's project. By 1907 he had embarked, albeit haltingly, on an effort to create a new kind of modernism that implied a new kind of cultural order. Part of the ambition was to suggest a world in which the alienated and homeless individual—in both the psychological and political meanings of these modifiers—could find a place. Art became part of a project of cultural and ethical restoration, not an act of aestheticist withdrawal, which explains Schoenberg's affinity to Karl Kraus.

This project gained particular urgency after World War I. Schoenberg's desire to break with the past and invent a new system was fueled by the post-war sense of chaos which in turn inspired both a kind of optimism and confidence as well as the panic, anger and reaction against the new articulated by Hans Pfitzner. Owing to the catastrophe brought on by the past, it appeared to many artists that something wholly new and free of the tragic and comic pretensions of late nineteenth-century culture had to be put into place. However, before ascribing too much to the social or political impetus behind Schoenberg's radicalism, it is well to reflect on more local reasons for Schoenberg's evolution after 1907 away from expressionism, and particularly from alliances between musical continuities and the workings of the psyche and the visual imagination.

The effort to free music from its ties to the inherited psychological and visual patterns of listening that culminated in the 1920s germinated in Schoenberg's mind for at least fifteen years. He always identified Op. 9 as pivotal in his development. One context for the composition of Op. 9 was, as Gotthard suggested in 1911, the oppressively overwhelming success enjoyed by operetta.³⁸ One thinks particularly of Leo Fall's *Die Dollarprinzessin*, which opened in 1907. Schoenberg was fond of operetta and Webern, his student, earned money conducting this particular hit among others. 1907 also saw the premiere of *Ein Walzertraum* by Schoenberg's friend Oscar Straus. Schoenberg, as we know, earned money helping to orchestrate

operettas. His affection for this art form coexisted with ambivalence, since the operetta was the most powerful demonstration of the consequences of the old models of musical continuity. An audience that revelled in operetta probably liked to hear good light music for the wrong reasons. The operetta's reductive psychology of pessimistic escapism and superficial lightheartedness itself became a source of resistance against seriousness in art, particularly as operetta grew to dominate an entire musical culture.³⁹ While Schoenberg struggled in a musical culture awash with operetta, a decisive trauma shook his personal life: his wife's affair with Gerstl, her flight from home, Webern's intervention, his wife's return, her subsequent unhappiness and ultimately Gerstl's suicide in 1908.⁴⁰

These events forced a fundamental internal reevaluation in Schoenberg's mind about music and its function. Unease and ambivalence remained. Schoenberg completed and wrote works in which the psychological use of music became more exaggerated, as the second part of *Gurrelieder* and *Erwartung* indicate. He painted in a manner and with images that placed the subjective experience and the internal state of mind entirely in the foreground. In a reverse of Rilke's observation, one can hear the sound and breathing of Schoenberg's paintings from these years. But the making of art in the old way gradually appeared dishonest, since it was insufficient to allay Schoenberg's internal sense of homelessness. Subjective expression through the use of an old, late-romantic aesthetic framework tied to conventional psychological parallels provided no relief to the sense of loneliness, a word Schoenberg would use in his rhetoric of self-description.⁴¹ This concept is distinct from solitude, implying a state of mind not dissimilar to that of Zweig's protagonist. By 1908 Schoenberg's loneliness had become both personal and political, both private and public.

The emancipation of music through a new framework of order seemed to suggest themselves not only as necessary to an adequately post-war "modern" art, but as the possible ethos of a new community based on reason and ethical truth. The ideal suggested by Carl Rahl's tapestry was not so much rejected as appropriated. Order was not replaced by disorder; neither was the classical replaced by the modern. Rather, the classical was re-invented. Harmony was supplanted. The discontinuity between past and present involved discarding all the accumulated late nineteenth-century attachments to the particular symbolisms in Rahl's tapestry, that mirrored the expectations of the audience. Schoenberg became indeed what Zweig's protagonist dreamed he would be: the creator of a new art, emblematic of a new modern European world where the sense of homelessness could be

purged. Schoenberg's post-1933 enthusiasm for an idealized Zionist state was analogous to his adherence to the twelve-tone system: they were equally disciplined expressions of an imperative to replace the continuities derived from the late nineteenth century with new ones, to jettison that which had brought him so much personal and professional unhappiness.⁴²

III. The Composer and his Public

As is well known, the Vienna premieres of Op. 7 and Op. 9 in 1907 and Op. 10 in 1908 (particularly the 1908 concert) occasioned an intense scandal and outcry among critics in Vienna.⁴³ There was a physical scuffle at Bösendorfer Hall. In the span of two years Schoenberg defined the terms of the debate about the modern in music. That controversy only intensified in 1910, when Op. 11 and Op. 15 were performed at a concert, and Op. 10 was repeated. It reached a climax with the scandal concert of 1913, in which applause and intermissions were excluded. A cursory survey of the critics' observations reveals the topography of objections that would stick to Schoenberg and his music: Schoenberg was an *enfant terrible* who intentionally outraged the public in order to draw attention to himself; his music was calculated, even mechanically devised, with neither melody nor sonority; it was essentially formless, and not so much music as the sound mirror of the "psychic illness" of the age.⁴⁴

By the mid-1920s in Berlin the essentials of the Viennese critical pre-war vocabulary had been translated into a fourth, surprisingly widespread direction. A line of reasoning left largely implicit in the leading Viennese press had become explicit: the abstract and calculating dimension in Schoenberg's music was little more than a Jewish gambit, another vindication of Wagner's assertion that Jews were incapable of genuine creativity.⁴⁵ Since most of the leading critics in pre-war Vienna were themselves Jews (e.g. Hirschfeld, Karpath, Korngold, and Kalbeck) this line of reasoning cannot be equated with the anti-Semitism that later evolved into the Nazi propaganda of the 1930s, even if it is classified under the questionable historical rubric of so-called Jewish self-hatred. The conflict between Schoenberg and his Viennese critics of Jewish origin (as well as those in Berlin later on) was rather an intra-ethnic debate regarding political security, cultural identity and assimilation. The critique of Schoenberg in a key passage from a 1907 review in the respected journal *Die Zeit*—usually a progressive organ of opinion—illustrates the argument that no real

malady rested not so much with the composer and his ambitions but rather with the audience. In former times, the critic noted, one would have shouted down the sort of music Schoenberg was writing. But now "there is an anxiety . . . an inner insecurity."⁴⁶ The contemporary audience doubted its own judgment; it was not sure that perhaps it was not missing something legitimate. Audiences listened dutifully to the new because they were not secure in their own standard of taste. Had the audience become paralyzed and therefore unable to damn openly something that was simply no good?

At stake for the Viennese Jews and the Jewish critics (most of them highly assimilated and no longer active participants in the official Jewish community) was precisely the issue that faced Zweig's protagonist and Schoenberg himself. Viennese music journalists in the years between 1907 and 1914 saw themselves as not only arbiters of taste, but as protectors of the public. Since an extraordinarily high percentage of the concert-going audience in Vienna was Jewish, Schoenberg's music could be seen as a direct challenge from one Jew to another regarding the security of Jewish assimilation acquired and maintained through an allegiance to the dominant habits of European culture. In the years between 1907 and 1913 in Vienna both anti-Semitism and Zionism—the Jewish Question—were at the center of politics and the discussion of culture as politics.⁴⁷ Many Jewish members of the audience were themselves emigrants to Vienna and at best first-generation natives. Schoenberg understood that the post-Wagnerian approach to music, including its massive sonorities and formal strategies (e.g., Bruckner) created a psychological euphoria in the audience that was not merely private and personal. Music as mere expressionism and suggestive of mood had political consequences, particularly in the context of the codification of nationalist schools of music and cultural rhetorics of identity outside of German-speaking Europe, particularly in Russia, Hungary, and the Czech provinces of the Empire. Late nineteenth-century musical composition assisted in heightening the way culture intersected with race thinking, nationalist constructs of history and ethnic mythology. This was equally true for German-speaking Europe. The operatic and orchestral music of Humperdinck, Strauss, Weingartner (*Orestes*, 1902), Schillings (*Ingwilde*, 1894, and *Orestes*, 1900), Hausegger (*Barbarossa*, 1900) and Pfitzner (*Von deutscher Seele*, 1922) was all too often celebratory of the mythic German, or the Greek as German, or the Gothic as German. Post-Romantic large-scale composition was easily appropriated by nationalist politics. Ideals of ethnic authenticity and anti-Semitism

created an uncomfortable contradiction to the Jewish audience's enthusiasm for late nineteenth century romanticism.

A new art of music that established music's autonomy was not therefore an "art for art's sake" project. The creation of a cultural system in music with alternative political consequences, perhaps more universalistic, required among other things a turn to smaller forms and smaller ensembles. Modernism needed to erect a barrier against nationalism using the very same public cultural instruments of social formation, and in the case of Jews, of assimilation. German and European music after 1918 had to promise a firmer and certainly less self-deceptive cultural antidote for a nationalism in which Jews were either marginalized or excluded.

After 1914, and particularly in the 1920s, the critics' approach to Schoenberg, including rabid anti-Semitic attacks, became more tied to generically general notions of a post-war crisis in the world concerning modern life and culture. With the appearance of the first twelve-tone works some criticism became more respectful, but rarely more sympathetic. Oscar Bie, for example, made an unfavorable but polite comparison between Bartók and Schoenberg. Bie unwittingly confirms the idea that Bartók had no need to invent artificially; he could reach back into the cultural roots of his homeland and find natural sources of originality. Bie's unfavorable comparison hides an implicit agreement with the view of the Jew as inferior, foreign, and without genuine roots in Europe. What Schoenberg lacked was sensuality, something Bartók possessed in abundance. The Jew was thrown back purely on the intellect, and therefore on supposedly abstract and artificial invention. Schoenberg's music was a "document of the intellect and of the idea with an abruptness—severing all connections with the past." The modern, assimilated Jew had no natural alternative "past" to fall back on.⁴⁸

Leopold Schmidt, the enthusiastic proponent of Strauss, wrote in a response to a post-war performance of *Gurrelieder* that with his new music Schoenberg had unfortunately left his "natural impulses" behind. Drawing a contrast between Schoenberg's present work and *Gurrelieder*, Schmidt implies that Schoenberg's work had deteriorated into sophistries, artistic abstinence and a "doctrinaire fixation on the new." In response to Op. 16 Schmidt accused Schoenberg of the attempted "dissolution of music."⁴⁹

Critics both for and against Schoenberg after 1914 frequently share a common ground. Hans Kleemann in an article on "Futuristic Music" accuses Schoenberg of "acoustic games" and an "abstract, intellectually devised way of music-making devoid of imagination."

He explicitly picks up the pre-war theme that Schoenberg is preying on the audience's gullibility.⁵⁰ Adolf Weissmann concedes that Schoenberg, following the path of late Beethoven, is searching for a complete restructuring of music. Weissmann is not sure that something "positive" can emerge, but is certain that the effort is ethically on a par with the reforms of Wagner.⁵¹ Weissmann is equally confident that Schoenberg's project is uniquely Jewish.⁵² Paul Bekker sides with Schoenberg, but with considerable emotional restraint, defending Schoenberg as operating in a historical context in transition, bereft of a useful compass for standards and values; at least Schoenberg shows courage and maturity.⁵³

Within this barrage of criticism the defense crafted by Schoenberg and his supporters—casting Schoenberg as the restorer of the purely musical and therefore pre-Romantic classical values—was ineffective. If one were only able to throw away the crutches of psychological listening, the defenders say, and respond to music on music's own unique terms, one would see that Schoenberg is not a radical after all. What makes Schoenberg's music great are exactly the attributes we locate in Bach, Mozart, and Beethoven: the inspired command of compositional procedures essential to a refined sense of form and unique to the dynamic realization of musical ideas.

The tradition of reception which has identified Schoenberg as a radical conservative or a conservative revolutionary derives from this species of the contemporaneous defense of Schoenberg. Twelve-tone composition was proclaimed to be no more abstract than the classical system—it was merely a fresh approach to an old problem. Schoenberg, accepting the Wagnerian progressive imperative that the artist must respond to the contemporary moment, saw twelve-tone composition as what the great pre-Wagnerian masters might have done in the same historical circumstances. Schoenberg became therefore a kind of updated Brahms: a conservative as progressive. The music written with twelve tones needed to be judged by the same aesthetic criteria by which one judged Brahms and Beethoven.⁵⁴

The flaw in this post-1920 appeal to a novel concept of neoclassicism lay not in its aesthetic premises. Rather, this appeal attempted to circumvent the decisive moment of history, the one discussed by Szymanowski, leaving unanswered the political challenge of late nineteenth-century, post-Wagnerian cultural nationalism in music. The era whose authority was invoked on behalf of Schoenberg was pre-nationalist, and therefore irrelevant as a cultural symbol. By preaching a more authentic and valid characterization of musical classicism, Schoenberg and his defenders also challenged the widespread late

nineteenth-century appropriation of Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven as uniquely German figures in a post-Wagnerian nationalist sense. Schoenberg's 1933 refuge in the example of Brahms constituted the most convincing and reassuring appeal to history. Brahms, as even Szymanowski realized, had been a solitary figure, unsympathetic and out of step with Wagnerian nationalist politics. He had not been an anti-Semite. A north-German Protestant, Brahms had lived in Vienna and found himself somewhat homeless in the racist and radical nationalist politics of the 1890s, as revealed by his failed and naive effort to convince Dvořák to move to Vienna.⁵⁵

The allure of late romanticism had been ultimately, as Schoenberg himself argued, a deceptively easy way to reach a wide and not necessarily well-educated mass audience.⁵⁶ Its consequences were ultimately disastrous, both aesthetically and politically. Wagner and his successors deluded the late nineteenth-century audience and its early twentieth-century successor into believing that by listening psychologically, by following and adding stories and visual impressions, one was actually thinking musically. The audience was rendered capable of understanding Mozart, Beethoven, and even Brahms the way they should be understood by applying the model of Wagner's music.

Hidden in the press reports, both those before 1914 and those before 1933, is the fact that some significant segment of the audience either liked what they heard or was not outraged. Schoenberg's own defense, and that of Berg, made the assumption that printed critical journalistic rhetoric actually reflected audience attitudes. Implied was a dissatisfaction with the musical competence of both the audience and the critics. But beyond this point of view Schoenberg and his defenders failed to question the validity of their own historical narrative. Were the classical models so energetically praised and analyzed by Schoenberg truly examples of self-consciously formalist music? Why was the imposition of a narrative or visual fantasy onto an instrumental work by Mozart, Beethoven or Brahms historically false, inappropriate, or in conflict with the intentions of the composer? Did the kind of puritan habits of listening so energetically propagated and wished for by the Society for Private Performances in the 1920s ever exist? We know from the use of specific keys by Mozart, the hidden existence of extra-musical narratives in Beethoven's instrumental music, and the biographical context and philosophical intentions of Brahms, that the kind of pure musical listening so desperately desired by the organizers of the Society and implicit in its manifesto may never have existed.⁵⁷

The call by Schoenberg and his defenders for a new musical elite that could truly appreciate the classical masters and therefore modern

music—for a public separated from its journalistic masters—was not so much a call for a cultural restoration or a return to a vanished classical era as it was a radical and novel fundamentalism about the nature of music and its public function. In this peculiar way Schoenberg followed directly in the path of Wagner's schemes for educational reform as characterized and understood by Eberhard Preussner in 1935. In Preussner's view, the intent of Wagnerian reform was to raise the level of musical culture in an urban capitalist and industrial world by restoring an active amateurism. Schoenberg and Wagner are allied in their implicit critique of what Preussner viewed as the consequences of high capitalism and commercialization. Preussner's ultimate solution was fascist politics and conservative aesthetics, whereas Schoenberg's modernism legitimately allied itself with Adorno's critique of modern culture and its doubts about the virtues of commercial music.⁵⁸

Let us return for a moment to Zweig's enthusiastic hearer in Berlin. Much of Schoenberg's audience in Berlin was made up of Jews. Music, as in Vienna, had been a primary instrument of assimilation. Like Karl Kraus, Schoenberg had come to revile the self-delusion of most urban Jews who assumed that the mere acquisition of wealth and culture was a sufficient basis for a sense of security. The unease identified by critics within the audience was not merely an insecurity of judgment. It mirrored an insecurity of belonging and identity in Weimar society. As Schoenberg's own sojourn back to self-professed Jewish identity indicates, the Jew's cultural experience of hearing music tied in directly with issues of membership in European culture and society. The radical surface of Schoenberg's music cut through the legacy of complacency, security and self-satisfaction. It challenged the premises of the audience's fragile sense of place.

It is as if Schoenberg's post-1920s modernism was a coded language alerting the Jews in the audience to the growing danger and instability inherent in their situation. Anti-Semitism, a key element to Viennese politics circa 1907, had become a major aspect of the political discourse in Germany during the 1920s. The late Romantic conventions of Wagner and post-Wagner composers needed to be attacked because, in the large-scale and grandiose orchestral music of Strauss for example, there lurked, as Szymanowski recognized, a Wagnerian ideal of the quintessentially Germanic: a blood-and-soil aesthetic of rootedness and collective spirituality that was ultimately appropriated by fascism.

Mahler's mix of success and disappointment in Vienna, and Schoenberg's lingering ambivalence toward Mahler's music were part of a prescient instinct on Schoenberg's part. Zweig's protagonist

was right: the aesthetic credo of a new Europe in which the Jew could truly belong could not be derived from Wagnerian aesthetics. A truly modern, ethically and aesthetically refined, logical system of expression was needed, one that mirrored the ideals and possibilities of the future. Aesthetics could prefigure a different political and social world. In this sense it is wrong to consider Schoenberg's gradual turn back to Judaism and form of Zionism as irrelevant to his late works for instruments.⁵⁹ The power of the work from the 1930s, beginning with *Moses und Aron* and ending with the very latest pieces, derives from the synthesis of aesthetic and political radicalism. This explains Schoenberg's remarkable and eloquent enthusiasm at the end of his life for the possibilities of musical culture in the new Jewish state.⁶⁰

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From our vantage point at the end of the century there appear to be two ways to rehear Schoenberg's work with sympathy. First, we must discard the traditional rhetoric of criticism and defense. Second, we must penetrate beyond the point at which Szymanowski stopped: at Schoenberg's commitment to sever the link between psychology and music. From 1907 on, Schoenberg's modernism contained a vision of music as a means of cultural renewal and ultimately as a dimension of political utopianism cloaked in a Stefan George-like aestheticism. In Schoenberg the spiritual and the rational merged and confronted the individual's self-conscious struggle with modernity. Schoenberg's initial focus had been Europe, especially German-speaking Europe. He shifted his gaze by the late 1920s and envisaged a new society in which political membership for the Jew could be realized, a society in which reason flourished in both culture and art. The beneficiary of this new society would be the emancipated, diaspora Jew, previously cut off from stable membership in any European nation. Schoenberg thus repeated the pattern of recognition and response experienced by Theodor Herzl in 1897.

Like Bartók, Szymanowski was not a Jew. Like Bartók, he had an unchallenged connection to a folk heritage, which he could use as a basis for innovation.⁶¹ Despite his sympathy for Schoenberg, Szymanowski never understood the extent to which Schoenberg was not German. Nor did he understand Schoenberg the Jew as intimately as the Jewish critics who hated his music. They were angry because they heard Schoenberg's challenge to their status as European cosmopolitans. With no recourse to a pre-modern, landed national folk or cultural tradition, Schoenberg, like Herzl, tried to reassert the rational in the new. Schoenberg

appealed to the spirit of Mozart and Haydn, the Enlightenment and the classicism of the eighteenth century. Schoenberg at first assumed, as did Zweig's hero, that if reason and art could be combined in a new language detached from allusions to mythology and ethnicity (as evident in Wagner's work), then a new universalistic basis for society and culture might be created in the aftermath of World War I. In such a context, the Jew would be secure. Initially Schoenberg believed that post-war Germany might hold out that promise. He never took America seriously, but turned his attention, after 1933, to the possibilities in Palestine and Israel. In this peculiar sense, Schoenberg's modernism was like Herzl's vision of the new Jewish State: a displaced European utopia for Jews, and a fantastically poignant and carefully constructed expression of a secure and rooted political future without anti-Semitism.

Schoenberg's music after 1909 and particularly after 1920 is therefore profoundly psychological and emotional in its communicative structure. It derives from pressing human necessities, without lapsing into representation or illustration.⁶² The Jewish element in Schoenberg's modernism has little to do with the allegations of dryness and artificiality put forward by anti-Semites. There was, however, something Jewish about Schoenberg's modernism, as Adolf Weissmann suspected. But it was something that neither Szymanowski nor Strauss could understand. Bartók could stick with tonality because in the politics of the 1920s his reconciliation of pre-modern rural music with modernism meant forging a connection with a rediscovered national past in which he had legitimacy, and located in a specific region. We too rarely connect Schoenberg's invention of twelve-tone composition with nationalism. His finest contemporaries, from Stravinsky to Janáček⁶³ and Bartók, had their own authentic folk roots to fall back on as a source of originality and modernist renewal. What did the assimilated German Jew have to fall back on? By inventing a system, modeled in its own way on Viennese classicism, Schoenberg sought to transmute a German national heritage—the pre-Wagnerian German tradition, seen as the universal in music—adequately into the twentieth century. In this way Schoenberg sought to dominate the musical world the way Wagner had, but in a manner in which all Jews—particularly assimilated, cultured Jews with no easy access back to traditional Judaism—could partake as equals.⁶⁴

There was nothing unnatural or artificial about twelve-tone music or Schoenberg's modernism in the 1920s—it sprung from the existential condition of European Jewry before 1933. Like the inter-war protagonists of Esperanto, Schoenberg sought to fashion a new, valid

universal modernist art in which both reason and emotion could be communicated and to which no social class, religion or ethnic group had claims of priority or higher status. In the wake of the collapse of this dream he used his modernist method with searing emotion to critique the past and support the idea of a new political utopia—in *Kol Nidre*, the *Ode to Napoleon*, as well as in the String Trio, Op. 45, and the Fantasy, Op. 47.

The angry audiences and critics of yesteryear are gone. In the contemporary world the particular issues that inspired Schoenberg have become largely moot. There is now an opportunity to embrace Schoenberg's music with the appropriate kinds of psychological listening it demands and rewards. We need to be inspired by the intense utopian emotionalism of Schoenberg's modernism and by his sentimental and subtle imagination and vision—communicated through music—of future cultural and human possibilities.

APPENDIX

Excerpt from "W sprawie 'muzyki współczesnej',"
(On the question of "contemporary music")

by Karol Szymanowski

It is understandable that after the epoch of the absolute reign of Wagner, a battle of ideas articulated in part by his prominent successors was rekindled again. (We are omitting here intentionally the solitary figure of Johannes Brahms who stood aside from the battle. His art—notwithstanding its absolute value—has played hardly any role in the evolution of recent music).

During the final pre-war years, among the factions with divergent opinions and growing protests against the might of the creator of Nibelungen, given the dread of oncoming thunderstorms, there was an inevitable crisis of ideas. The necessity for a basic internal reordering was finally felt. Characteristically, this feeling was supported by the awakening of interest in the musical modernism of other nations, mainly France and Russia.

Under such circumstances, within major conflicts and battles for even the right to express an opinion, emerged slowly the fame of the most amazing composer in contemporary Germany, Arnold Schoenberg.

Here we arrive at the nucleus of the problem. Schoenberg is indeed the only one in the group of the still-living excellent colleagues representing pre-war modernism in music who not only transformed the cataclysms of the horrible war that shook Central Europe, but survived as a banner, an emblem, a representative of ideas which were to lead German music out of its pre-war suffocating atmosphere toward new achievements and conquests. He is, according to the prevalent German opinion, the long awaited builder of the aerial bridges leading to the road toward the future.

His name, along with the name of Stravinsky, is a symbol, a symbol of revolutionary modernism in music.

It is worthwhile to reflect on the psychology of this phenomenon.

It is necessary to use maximum thoughtfulness and objectivity when voicing criticism of Schoenberg. His enormous creative energy, his fanatic belief in his own mission, his unshaken loyalty to ideas—all aspects of this extraordinary personality demand respect.

A laconic superficial dismissal of the artist whose achievements tipped the scales of contemporary music—is out of the question.

The internal reconstruction of the basic means of expression found its deepest meaning in Schoenberg. He aimed somewhat *centrifugally* away from the ideal nucleus, toward absolute re-evaluation of formal elements of music, toward entirely new basic foundations.

Most puzzling is the fact that Schoenberg used the post-Wagnerian epigonism as a point of departure, as confirmed eloquently by *Gurrelieder*, with its undeniable romantic elements.

We notice step-by-step how a musical dynamic, heading by necessity to relaxation, and the organic cohesion of form, give way characteristically to extra-musical contents. These mysterious connections—developed through Wagner, German romanticism and also the secure traditionalism of a well-founded culture, are the only points of departure for any critical appraisal of Schoenberg's work. This is all in spite of the paradox that today the traditional culture has deviated far from its natural sources.

Let's consider the separate ways in which formal musical elements gradually developed depending on ideological foundations. Musical romanticism, predominant in Germany, was the epoch of breakthrough. The "horizontal" style of the classics, which implied in principle the construction of pure musical "form," changed gradually to a "vertical" style. This happened under the influence of the "dramatization" of the content, connecting music with the direct psychological truth. For completely understandable reasons a more differentiated and enriched *harmony* became the starting point for the romantic style of music.

Increasingly music was saturated with the lyrics of direct life, a reality rooted in life's psychological rhythms which was, strictly speaking, formally framed by the rhythms of a *living word* with all its arbitrary improvisations and emotional paths. These rhythms diverted music from its natural ways of development. The strong bonds of rhythm—the external skeleton which make the proportions of separate parts of a musical work understandable—loosened gradually—whereas the vertical, harmonic sounds emerged into the foreground as cornerstones, landmarks, creating arbitrary points of support (in a formal sense) and a general background for music saturated with lyrics. Besides, in an abstract sense, harmony created a gratifying frame for the so-called "mood" (*horrible dictu*), the formal "nothing." Musical dynamics were set aside for the benefit of the dynamics of "emotions," leading to a new feeling of "color" in music and therefore in essence a *static* notion. Harmony, deriving from formal principles, followed its own motion as long as the concept of *modulation* was possible. With the increasing differentiation of the separate elements of harmony (simultaneous sound) the moment arrived when dissonant harmony created a *chord as a value in itself*, a chord coming from nowhere and going nowhere, an *unresolved dissonance*—and an absolute vertical simultane-

ous sound. In the history of this chord Tristan's chromaticism was the breaking point. It underwent further evolution in the works of prominent composers in the post-Wagnerian era (mainly Strauss, Mahler, etc.).

However, this chord was used by these composers as an expression of conflict, as a "mood"—never as a *formal absolute value*. It was a derivative, a departure, a wandering. But by its very existence the possibility of a true road leading to the goal remained. The concept of an absolute vertical sound as a *value in itself*, not as a function of musical "expression," became the transition to the essential atomism.

Arnold Schoenberg crossed the Rubicon. He separated the lines from the past forever with a complete sense of responsibility. With the realization of this idealization through his decision, he found himself in the limitless domain of all possibilities in which—to quote Nietzsche—"Nichts ist wahr, alles ist erlaubt."

It is important to realize the seriousness and the consequences of this step.

NOTES

1. Quoted in Anna Maria Morazzoni, "Der Schönberg-Kreis und Italien. Die Polemik gegen Casellas Aufsatz über 'Scarlattiana,'" in *Bericht über den 2. Kongress der Internationalen Schönberg-Gesellschaft: Die Wiener Schule in der Musikgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts*, ed. Rudolf Stephan and Sigrud Wiesmann, (Vienna, 1986), p. 80, n. 13. I would like to thank Paul De Angelis, Irene Zedlacher, and Karen Painter for their advice and assistance with the essay. Prof. Painter, Joseph Auer, and Klaus Kropfinger kindly made archival materials available to me. The translations are the author's, with the exception of those from the Polish, which are a collaboration with Dr. Anne Botstein.

2. See Norbert Linke, "Die Nachwirkungen Schönbergs in der Gegenwart—Auswertung einer Umfrage," in *Bericht über den 3. Kongress der Internationalen Schönberg-Gesellschaft: Arnold Schönberg—Neuerer der Musik*, ed. Rudolf Stephan and Sigrud Wiesmann (Vienna, 1986), pp. 40–56; Alex Ross, "Schoenberg, Anyone?" *The New Yorker* (8 March 1999): 84–86; and David Schiff, "A New Measure for Heroes in Music's Valhalla," *The New York Times*, Sunday Arts and Leisure Section (28 February 1999). See also Walter B. Bailey "Changing Views of Schoenberg" in *The Arnold Schoenberg Companion*, ed. Walter B. Bailey (Westport, Conn., 1998), pp. 3–10.

3. Much to Schoenberg's annoyance, only *Verklärte Nacht* from 1899 seemed to have entered the repertoire and become popular by the 1930s. As a result of the Mahler craze of the past several decades, *Gurrelieder* has found a new following, vindicating its enormous success at the premiere in Vienna in 1913.

4. Schoenberg has been retrospectively judged as the "false" messiah. During the past decade William Thomson, Martin Vogel, and Joseph Swain have all argued with varying degrees of resentment against Schoenberg's innovations, rejecting the idea that he defined and set the proper course for musical modernism, particularly in the 1920s, with twelve-tone composition. See William Thomson, *Schoenberg's Error* (Philadelphia, 1993); Martin Vogel, *Schoenberg und die Folgen. Die Irrwege der Neuen Musik*, vol. 1 (Bonn, 1984) and vol. 2 (Bonn 1997); Joseph P. Swain, *Musical Languages* (New York and London, 1997), esp. pp. 119–40.

5. Certainly not in the sense that that even the first generation of post-modernists did (e.g., Görecki, Penderecki, Del Tredici, Glass, and Rochberg). See Křenek, "Schlusswort," in *2. Kongress der Internationalen Schönberg-Gesellschaft*, p. 285.

6. See Pierre Boulez, "Schoenberg is Dead," in Boulez, *Notes of an Apprenticeship*, trans. Herbert Weinstock (New York, 1968), pp. 268–76; and on Carter's views see David Schiff "Redefining Boundaries. Carter as Symphonist," *Musical Times* 139 (1998): 10.
7. See Heinrich Helge Hatteson, *Enantization durch Aneignung. Untersuchungen zu den frühen Streichquartetten Arnold Schönbergs* (Kassel, 1990), pp. 1–7.
8. See Jürgen Schebera, *Eisler: Eine Biographie in Texten, Bildern und Dokumenten* (Mainz, 1998), esp. pp. 23–33.
9. Copland and Blitzstein (who studied with Schoenberg in Berlin) had similar misgivings in the 1930s about the incongruity of an assumed coherence between progressive politics and musical modernism, and not only in Schoenberg's version of it. The modern in music that challenged inherited expectations about musical beauty and comprehensibility tied to the use of tonality appeared more aristocratic than democratic. See Aaron Copland and Vivian Pevis, *Copland. 1900 through 1942* (New York, 1984), pp. 226–30 and p. 237.
- David Josef Bach, Schoenberg's old friend and a socialist, had similar doubts well before the First World War.
10. See Theodor W. Adorno, "Schönberg und der Fortschritt," in Adorno, *Philosophie der Neuen Musik* (Frankfurt/Main, 1978), pp. 36–126; It is remarkable how high the prestige of Schoenberg and his post-war following was. This can be gleaned from the library of the pianist Claudio Arrau, who did not play contemporary music but who followed carefully and admired the radical modernism of the 1950s and 1960s. See also Joseph Horowitz, *Conversations with Arrau* (New York, 1982), p. 118.
11. See for example Samuel Lipman's essay "Schoenberg's Survival" (originally published in *Commentary*) in *Music after Modernism* (New York, 1979), pp. 31–47.
12. See David Epstein, *Shaping Time. Music, the Brain, and Performance* (New York, 1995); Benjamin Boretz, "Sketch of a New Musical System (Meta-Variations, Part II), *Perspectives of New Music* 8/2 (1970): 49–111; Swain, *Musical Languages*. Also see Leonard Bernstein's Norton Lectures at Harvard published as *The Unanswered Question* (Cambridge, 1976).
13. See Albrecht Dümmling, "Public Loneliness: Atonality and the Crisis of Subjectivity in Schoenberg's Opus 15," in *Schönberg & Kandinsky. An Historic Encounter*, ed. Konrad Boehmer, (Amsterdam, 1997), pp. 101–38, esp. 124–36. The sociologist Max Weber took particular aim at George and the aestheticist isolationist position in the immediate post-war years. Weber was also suspicious of cults of personality and tightly drawn circles of disciples on the grounds of their inherent tension with intellectual freedom and the ethics of responsibility in a democracy—a criticism that might aptly be applied to Schoenberg and his defenders. See the historic speeches of 1919 entitled "Wissenschaft als Beruf" and "Politik als Beruf."
14. At the Los Angeles Schoenberg conference in 1991 honoring Leonard Stein one could detect remnants of something not unlike the attitude of Wagnerians at Bayreuth after the master's death. The *Journal of the Arnold Schoenberg Institute* had its parallel in the *Bayreuther Blätter*. The Los Angeles Institute's mission and that of the Vienna Arnold Schoenberg Center, both with their faithful recreations of the study in Brentwood and the close cooperation if not control by more than one generation of family descendants, have a familiar ring for those who know Bayreuth. There is always the inherent risk in the memorialization and institutionalization of an aesthetic legacy of a historic figure that rigidity and a tendency to monopolistic control will predominate. Posthumous enthusiasm quickly deteriorates into warring camps of claimants, almost hagiographical devotion to preserving and sorting out biographical details, and intolerance towards so-called "deviant," unsanctioned interpretations. Schoenberg's own penchant for domineering habits and fiercely held opinions and loyalties easily become routines in the institutional shrines created to preserve his music and ideas
15. Rainer Maria Rilke, *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. 2: *Gedichte 1906–26* (Leipzig, 1957), p. 111.

16. Karol Szymanowski, "W sprawie 'muzyki współczesnej,'" in Szymanowski, *Z Pism*, vol. 6 (Krakow, 1958), pp. 107–18. The text in question, from pp. 114–18, is contained in the appendix to this essay.
17. Alban Berg, "Why is Schoenberg's Music so Difficult to Understand" quoted in Willi Reich, *Alban Berg* (New York, 1974), p. 204.
18. See Tadeusz A. Zieliński, *Szymanowski. Liryka i ekstaza* (Krakow, 1997), pp. 227–43.
19. Despite Szymanowski's extensive praise and doubtless admiration, he did not follow suit in his own work precisely because he could not quite abandon this communicative nexus. He could not sacrifice "psychologism" in music on behalf of music's absolute nature. Szymanowski's argument is quite similar to what Adorno would write in 1948, particularly on Schoenberg's departure from conventions of expressivity in music. See Adorno, *Philosophy of Modern Music*, trans. Anne G. Mitchell and Wesley Blomster (New York, 1973), pp. 37–60.
20. In Arnold Zweig, *Novellen*, vol. 1 (Frankfurt/Main, 1987), pp. 301–7. See also Wilhelm von Sternburg, "Um Deutschland geht es uns," *Arnold Zweig. Die Biographie* (Berlin, 1998), p. 68.
21. See Job Ijzerman, "Schönberg's Pursuit of Musical Truth: Truth as a Central Category in Expressionism," in *Schönberg & Kandinsky*, pp. 183–98, and Leon Botstein, "Music and the Critique of Culture. Arnold Schoenberg, Heinrich Schenker and the Emergence of Modernism in Fin-de-Siècle Vienna," in *Constructive Dissonance: Arnold Schoenberg and the Transformation of Twentieth Century Culture*, ed. Juliane Brand and Christopher Hailey (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1997), p. 19.
22. Furthermore, Op. 7 and Op. 9 were both performed in Leipzig in 1912, by the Flonzaley Quartet and the Gewandhaus under Nikisch.
23. For this group of works see Walter Frisch, *The Early Works of Arnold Schoenberg* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1993), pp. 181–247, esp. pp. 186–87, and Christian Martin Schmidt, "Schönberg's 'very definite-but private' Programm zum Streichquartett op. 7," in *Bericht über den 2. Kongress*, pp. 233–34.
24. See Alexander L. Ringer, *Arnold Schoenberg. The Composer as Jew* (Oxford, 1990), and his essay, "Assimilation and the Emancipation of Historical Dissonance," in *Constructive Dissonance*, 23–24; and Leon Botstein, "Arnold Schoenberg: Language, Modernism and Jewish Identity," in *Austrians and Jews in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Robert S. Wistrich (New York, 1992), pp. 162–83.
25. See Hans-Christoph Hoffmann, Walter Krause and Werner Kitzschka, *Das Wiener Opernhaus* (Wiesbaden, 1972); also *Das K.K. Hofopernhaus in Wien* (Vienna, 1894), plates 50–52.
26. Consider for example the neoclassicism of the new Musikverein in Vienna designed by Theophil von Hansen and completed in 1870, the year of an extensive and influential Beethoven centenary festival held in the new hall.
27. The best English-language introduction to Karl Kraus remains Edward Timms, *Karl Kraus: Apocalyptic Satirist* (New Haven, 1986), see esp. pp. 30–62.
28. See Manfred Wagner, *Alfred Roller in seiner Zeit* (Salzburg, 1995), pp. 71–112 and pp. 177–85. The attitudes and function of the Viennese critics and the public at the fin de siècle cannot be inferred from the vitriolic attitudes of either Kraus or Schoenberg. It is curious, for example, that Bruno Walter praises the staunchly conservative anti-Schoenberg critic Robert Hirschfeld (who also had his reservations about Mahler) in a letter to Hans Pfitzner in 1903 as a "wonderful and smart" man. In Bruno Walter, *Briefe 1894–1962* (Frankfurt/Main, 1969), p. 64.
29. See H. H. Stuckenschmidt, *Schönberg. Leben-Umwelt-Wirkung* (Munich, 1989), p. 50.
30. In *Im Heim—Die Welt* (Vienna, 1909); on Schoenberg and Lehar see Otto Schneidereit, *Franz Lehar. Eine Biographie in Zitaten* (Innsbruck, 1984), pp. 204–6.

31. See the essays collected in *Josef Frank, Architect and Designer. An Alternative Vision of the Modern Home*, exhibition catalog, ed. Nina Sritztler-Levine (New Haven, 1996), and Haus Nr. 12 (Josef Frank) and Nos. 49–52 (Adolf Loos) in *Werkbundsedlung. Internationale Ausstellung Wien 1932*, ed. Josef Frank (Vienna, 1932). Frank's critique of architectural modernism parallels Eisler's doubts in the 1920s about Schoenberg.
32. *Wiener Almanach. Jahrbuch für Literatur, Kunst und öffentliches Leben* xxi, ed. Jacques Jaeger (Vienna and Leipzig, 1912), pp. 204ff.
33. These are the phrases used about Strauss in 1932 by Richard Eichenauer in *Musik und Rasse*; quoted in Tim Ashley, *Richard Strauss* (London, 1999), p. 164.
34. This radical break was precisely what Schoenberg sought to achieve. He made this point explicitly in his own discussion of Op. 9. See Claus-Steffen Mahnkopf, *Gestalt und Stil. Arnold Schönbergs Erste Kammersymphonie und ihr Umfeld* (Kassel, 1994), pp. 186ff.
35. Leon Botstein, "Egon Schiele and Arnold Schoenberg: The Cultural Politics of Aesthetic Innovation in Vienna 1890–1918," in *Egon Schiele. Art, Sexuality and Viennese Modernism*, ed. Patrick Werkner (Palo Alto, 1994), pp. 101–18.
36. See Eduard Hanslick, *On the Musically Beautiful*, trans. and ed. Geoffrey Payzant (Indianapolis, 1986), pp. 6–7 and 36–40; also pp. 82–83. These sections are selected to highlight the idea that although the content of music is autonomous, and the source of its beauty likewise, music remains a human and natural phenomenon in history, making its adaptation to individualized forms of appropriation, even "false" ones, understandable. See also Thrasyloulos Georgiades, *Musik und Sprache* (Berlin, 1954), pp. 138–42. I differ therefore with key points in the reading of Hanslick and the mid-nineteenth century debate articulated by Lydia Goehr in *The Quest for Voice* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1998), pp. 63–65 and 91–98.
37. See Konrad Boehmer, "Expressionism and Rationality" in *Schönberg & Kandinsky*, pp. 169–81. For Fontane and reader expectations, as well as parallels with the visual arts, see Theodor Fontane, *Der Stechlin* (Berlin, 1993) and *Fontane und die bildende Kunst*, eds. Claude Keisch, Peter-Klaus Schuster and Moritz Wullen (Berlin, 1998). On Süßner see *Der Nachsommer* (Munich, 1987) and Marina van Zuylen, *Difficultly as an Aesthetic Principle. Realism and Unreadability in Stifter, Melville and Flaubert* (Tübingen, 1994), pp. 1–46.
38. See Franz Hadamowsky and Heinz Otte, *Die Wiener Operette* (Vienna, 1947), pp. 399–402.
39. As Siegfried Krakauer's 1987 book on Offenbach and Karl Kraus's fanatical enthusiasm indicated, Schoenberg's generation of modernists understood and admired the mix of parody, social critique, dramatic rigor, and refinement that characterized the great operettas of Offenbach and Johann Strauss; what was disturbing was the routinization and trivialization of the form as well as the loss of the critical edge that marked the operetta in the twentieth century. The attraction on the part of Schoenberg and Kraus to operetta of the nineteenth century (and the comic theatre and farce of an earlier epoch, that of Nestroy) is connected to the modernist impulse to fashion, in a new, rigorous and honest language inherently as devastatingly critical of mid- and late-nineteenth century mores as operetta had been. See Georg Knepler, *Karl Kraus liest Offenbach* (Vienna, 1984), and Karl Kraus, "Offenbach-Renaissance" in *Die Fackel* (April 1927), pp. 757–58; Siegfried Krakauer, *Jacques Offenbach und das Paris seiner Zeit* (Frankfurt, 1980).
40. See Otto Breicha, *Gesult und Schönberg. Eine Beziehung* (Salzburg, 1993), p. 7.
41. Arnold Schoenberg, "How One Becomes Lonely" (1937), in *Style and Idea*, ed. Leonard Stein (New York, 1975), pp. 30–52.
42. In the comparison between twelve-tone composition and Zionism it must be pointed out that Herzl's debt to nineteenth-century concepts of nationalism and statehood was powerful. What was radical was the notion of a modern Jewish political entity.
43. See Leon Botstein, "Music and Its Public," (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1985), vol. 4, pp. 1202ff.

44. "Die Moderne in der Tonkunst," *Die Zeit* (8 February 1907).
45. The notion of a specifically Jewish and sophisticatedly complex music written by Jews seeking to partake in European culture—gratuitously ugly, but justifiable on technical grounds—was rendered concrete in a parody of "Ostjuden" in Strauss's 1905 *Salome* in the music for the five Jews (Rehearsal Nos. 188–207). This example was used by anti-Semitic critics from the 1920s and 1930s. See Sander L. Gilman, "Salome, Syphilis, Sarah Bernhardt, and the Modern Jewess," in *The Jew in the Text. Modernity and the Construction of Identity*, ed. Linda Nochlin and Tamar Garb (London, 1995), pp. 101–2. Examples of this criticism in its Nazi form can be found in Ernst Bücken, *Die Musik der Nationen* (Leipzig, 1937), p. 451; and his *Wörterbuch der Musik* (Leipzig, 1940), pp. 389–90.
46. *Die Zeit* (8 February 1907).
47. Consider, for example Arthur Schnitzler's exemplary novel from 1908 *Der Weg ins Freie*.
48. See Oscar Bie, "Die Neue Musik," *Berliner Börsen-Courier* (22 March 1920). Steiner Sammlung; Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin.
49. See Leopold Schmidt, "Die österreichische Musikwoche in Berlin," *Neue Freie Presse*, and "Aus den Konzerten," *Berliner Tagblatt* (1 April 1925). Steiner Sammlung, Berlin.
50. See Hans Kleemann, "Futuristische Musik" (3 October 1919), Steiner Sammlung, Berlin.
51. See Adolf Weissmann, "Von Wagner bis Schönberg," from Arnold Schönberg Center, Vienna.
52. See Adolf Weissmann, "Die Ausdruckskunst Arnold Schönbergs," in Weissmann, *Die Musik in der Wältkrise* (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1922), p. 183.
53. See Paul Bekker, "An Arnold Schönberg," in Bekker, *Briefe an zeitgenössische Musiker* (Berlin, 1932), pp. 57–67, and Bekker, "Zwischen Vergangenheit und Zukunft." Steiner Sammlung, Eugen Püschel, writing about the twelve-tone system, concurred with Szymanowski's assessment. Music was no longer "psychologically grounded," and century old habits were set aside. The intellectual is construed as the absence of emotional connection with the audience, which in turn becomes a metaphor for the nation. See Eugen Püschel, "Vom Impressionismus zur abstrakten Musik," in Steiner Nachlass, Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin.
54. As Felix Galimir recounted, when Schoenberg received back from Rudolf Kolisch the manuscript of Op. 37, the Fourth Quartet, Kolisch had written out the tone rows; Schoenberg was outraged. That was not the sort of response he wanted. After all, what did such analysis have to do with music! Video interview with Felix Galimir, Fall 1998, courtesy of Robert Martin.
55. See Leon Botstein, "Brahms and his Audience. The Later Viennese Years 1875–1897," in *The Cambridge Companion to Brahms*, ed. Michael Musgrave (forthcoming, Cambridge, 1999).
56. Josef Rufer, *Das Werk Arnold Schönbergs* (Kassel, 1959), p. 139.
57. See Alban Berg, "Prospekt des Vereins für musikalische Privataufführungen," in *Schönbergs Verein für Musikalische Privataufführungen*, ed. Heinz-Klaus Metzger and Rainer Riehn, Musik-Konzepte 36 (Munich, 1984): 4–7.
58. Eberhard Preussner, *Die bürgerliche Musikkultur* (Hamburg, 1935), pp. 200–10.
59. See Jost Hermand, "Der Biblische Weg: Zur Radikalität von Schönbergs zionistischer Wende," in *3. Kongress der Internationalen Schönberg-Gesellschaft*, pp. 195–206, and particularly p. 206, in which Hermand speaks of the "unpolitical dodecaphonic music" Schoenberg wrote in the 1930s, of which there is, in my view, none. See also a later extension of this argument in Hermand's "Ein Überlebender aus Deutschland. Zur Radikalität von Arnold Schönbergs zionistischer Wende," *Judentum und deutsche Kultur* (Köln, 1996), pp. 160–85,

which contains comparable characterizations of Schoenberg's chamber and orchestral work from the 1930s (p. 179).

60. See Schoenberg's 1951 letter to the director of the Israel Academy of Music in *Arnold Schönberg, Ausgewählte Briefe*, ed. Erwin Stein (Mainz, n.d.), pp. 297f.

61. See Karol Szymanowski, "Zagadnienie 'ludowości' w stosunku do muzyki współczesnej (Na marginesie artykułu Béli Bartóka 'U źródeł muzyki ludowej')" from 1925 (On the Question of Folk Music in Relation to Contemporary Music [Marginalia on Bela Bartók's article on the sources of folk music]), in Szymanowski, *Z Pism*, pp. 77–85.

62. Consider Schoenberg student Erich Itor Kahn's post-war "Thoughts about the Twelve Tone Technique" which makes the same point and links Schoenberg's mode of composition with the historical moment and the intense search for an "adequate" expressive and "spiritual" vision, in Juan Allende-Blin, *Erich Itor Kahn, Musik-Konzepte* 85 (Munich, 1994): 105.

63. Janáček was able to utilize the Czech language, his own idiosyncratic harmonic theories (put forward in 1913, two years after Schoenberg's *Harmonielehre*) and fashion a modernism that openly embraced the psychological, once again relying on pre-modern elements but ultimately contemporary notions of national identity. Compare for example *Kalá Kalanová* from 1921 with Schoenberg's music from the same period. Both may be divergent resolutions of the same historical process.

64. See Bela Bartók, "Harvard Lectures" (1943), in *Essays*, ed. Benjamin Suchoff (Lincoln, Nebraska, 1992), pp. 354–92.